*1 adequacy of cross-examination it be true that the may While the undisclosed evidence as to whether may speculation invite case, speculation such the outcome of affected have would materiality of that of the question, not affect ultimate does duty evidence, does not affect certainly and it such it upon obligation imposed discharge has to the State Brady. APPEALS THE COURT OF SPECIAL OF
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, COSTS. WITH MARYLAND OF COMMISSION
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE N. Frank LANOCHA. Term, AG, Sept. Docket No. Misc. Maryland. Appeals of
Court of 14, 2006. April *2 Broderick, (Melvin John C. Hirshman, Asst. Bar Counsel Bar Counsel of the Attorney Grievance Com’n of Maryland), fore Petitioner.
Benjamin Baltimore, Lipsitz, Respondent. CATHELL, WILNER, BELL, C.J.,
Argued before BATTAGLIA, HARRELL, C. and JOHN GREENE (Retired, JJ. Specially Assigned), ELDRIDGE Judge. BELL. Chief Transactions, (c) Interest: Prohibited
Rule 1.8 1 Conflict of Conduct, adopted by as Rules of Professional Maryland 16-812, the situation addresses Maryland drafts, client, grants a will that non-related lawyer relative and the lawyer or a covered gift to the It thereby. provides: caused conflict “(c) giving an instrument lawyer prepare A shall lawyer related lawyer person or a related person child, sibling, spouse any sub- parent, revised, February By dated Rules Order July 2005. It now reads: effective including *3 any from a lawyer "A shall not solicit substantial gift, testamentary prepare on behalf of a client instrument a or lawyer any lawyer person or to the substantial giving the a related lawyer gift gift recipient of the is related the unless the or other persons paragraph, related include a purposes For of this client. child, grandchild, parent, grandparent or relative or spouse, other close, lawyer a the client maintains individual with whom the or relationship.” familial promul- respondent's occurred misconduct Because 1.8(c), 1.8(c) applies to case. former this gation the current Rule, respect present Comment confirms that inde- With contemplated: pendent counsel still Lawyers “Gifts to client, accept gift a lawyer may a from if the transaction A “[6] gift example, simple a general fairness. For meets standards of appreciation is present given holiday or as a token of such as a gift, lawyer permitted. If a client offers a more substantial it, (c) lawyer accepting prohibit from paragraph does not under the although gift may be the client such voidable influence, gifts presump- client which treats doctrine undue event, over- tively any due to concerns about fraudulent. clients, lawyer may suggest that a reaching imposition benefit, lawyer's lawyer or gift be made to the substantial lawyer forth in except to the client as set where the is related (c). paragraph legal gift requires preparing a If effectuation of “[7] conveyance, the client should have the a will or instrument such as excep- provide. can The sole advice that another detached relative of the donee.” where the client is a tion to this Rule is stantial gift from a including a testamentary gift, except where:
“(1) donee; the client is related to the “(2) the client represented by independent counsel in connection with the gift.”
This Rule
Court,
was before this
involved
disciplinary
two
proceedings, during the 2003 Term: Attorney Griev. Comm’n
Stein,
531,
(2003)
373 Md.
“The Rule is mandatory and contains no provision for
waiver
the provision to consult
independent
with
coun-
sel....
(1)
The Rule is qualified in only three
if
ways:
‘substantial,’ (2)
is not
if the client is related to the
attorney,
if the client has consulted
independent
counsel. Unlike the provision under the Ethical Consider-
rule,
ations of our prior
provision
and prohibition is
express and mandatory.”
violation of the Rule one,” as “a most serious 'id. at A.2d at we commented on the reasons for the Rule and the concerns at which it was directed:
“There are many potential dangers inherent an attorney drafting a will in which he or she is the beneficiary. Con- interest, flict of the attorney’s incompetency to testify be- cause of a transaction deceased, with the the attorney’s ability to testator, influence the the possible jeopardy to probate of the entire ifwill its contested, admission is *4 possible harm to other beneficiaries and the undermining of the public trust and confidence in the legal profession are some of the dangers.” 538,
Id. at 376, 819 A.2d at citing In re Polevoy, 985, 980 P.2d (Colo.1999); 987 White, Jr., Philip Annotation, At Attorneys Law: Disciplinary Proceedings Drafting Instrument Such as Will or Trust Under Which Attorney-Drafter or Member Attorney’s Family or Law Grantee, Firm is Beneficiary, of
238 (2000). Brooke, Devisee, Md. 597 374 or 80 A.L.R.5th Legatee, Moreover, the Rule is ignorance 821 at of at A.2d 379; at 378 Md. at A.2d defense. 179-80, A.2d Md. at at 428. Lanocha, Last Will the drafted the respondent, N. Frank By Ann for his Sarah Ester Straw. and Testament will, received a of respondent’s bequest the wife $10002 Inc., Chimes, the and, bequest but for a second for $2000 respon- the bequeathed rest and of estate was residue death of adult After Ms. Straw daughter. dent’s Testament admission of the Last Will and following the Baltimore the Chief Orphans’ County, Court for probate Counsel, him of a informing of wrote to Bar Judge that Court 1.8(c). of Rule possible violation Counsel, Thereafter, acting approval Bar Mary- of Attorney Commission the direction of Grievance 16-751,3 land, Petition For petitioner, see Rule filed a wife; bequest respondent's issue been made as to the 2. No has not, is, bequest $ of or thus do not address whether "substantial.” 16-751(a) provides; 3. Md. Rule “(a) Disciplinary Remedial Action. Commencement of "(1) Upon approval approval or direction of Upon of Commission. Commission, Disciplinary file a Bar Counsel shall Petition Appeals. Action in the Court of or Remedial Crime; "(2)Conviction by Rule Reciprocal Action. If authorized 16-773(b), 16-771(b) may file for Disci- Bar Counsel a Petition plinary Appeals Court of without or Remedial Action in the notify approval promptly Bar Counsel shall of the Commission. may filing. The review Commission on Commission pursuant to petition of a that was filed direct the withdrawal subsection. Charges” against previously had filed a "Statement of Bar Counsel 30, 2000, July respondent. Adopted November effective filing charges.” governs It Maryland “statements Rule 16-741
provides: "(a) Charges. Filing Statement of “(1) Upon investigation, Bar shall file with completion of an Counsel Charges if Bar Counsel determines the Commission a Statement that: "(A) constituting profes- engaged either in conduct incapacitated; or is sional misconduct *5 Disciplinary against Remedial Action the In respondent. 1.8(c), to a of expected, addition violation Rule charging the 8.4(d)4 also petitioner alleged a violation of Rule of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.
Following hearing, a the Hon. Susan Souder of the Circuit whom, Court for to County, pursuant Baltimore to Rules 16- 752,5 case, fact, we forwarded made of findings see Rule 16-757(c),6 by evidence, convincing clear and Rule see 16- 757(b),7as follows: “(B) professional incapacity misconduct or the does not war- Action; Disciplinary rant immediate Petition for or Remedial “(C) Agreement a Conditional Diversion appropriate is either not parties
under the agree circumstances or the were unable to one; and “(D) reprimand a appropriate is either not under the circum- (i) rejected by (ii) stances or attorney, one was offered and a proposed reprimand disapproved by was the Commission and Bar Counsel Charges.” was directed to file of Statement filing of charges” triggered peer The the “statement of review 16-742, 16-741(b), 16-743, process, see Rules complet- and was filing ed of Disciplinary the Petition or Remedial Action. for 8.4(d) "|i]t provides professional 4. for a misconduct (d) engage prejudicial to: in conduct to the administration of justice.” provides, 5. Rule 16-752 as relevant: "(a) Upon filing Order. aof Petition Disciplinary for or Remedial Action, the Appeals may of designating Court enter judge an order any circuit responsible court hear the action and clerk for maintaining designation the record. order require The shall judge, after attorney, consultation with Bar Counsel and the to enter scheduling defining order discovery setting the extent of dates motions, completion discovery, filing hearing.” 16-757(c) provides: 6. Rule "(c) Findings judge prepare and conclusions. shall and file or fact, judge’s dictate into the record findings a statement of the including action, findings any regarding as to evidence remedial record, conclusions of If law. dictated into the the statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless time is extended Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed statement shall filed be with the responsible days clerk for the record no than later after the hearing. conclusion of the The clerk copy shall mail a party.” statement to each 16—757(b)provides: 7. N. Frank Lanocha by respondent prepared
“A will was he Ann Ester whom his Sarah Straw $1,000 from Ms. Straw bequest provided related. The will addition, Lanocha, wife. Respondent’s Teresa W. *6 residue” of Ms. that the “rest and Straw’s provided also will (also Lanocha-Sisson bequeathed Teresa éstate was Sisson). In the event Ms. Lanocha- as Teresa M. known Straw, the rest of Ms. predecease Ms. were Sisson to Ms. bequeathed Lanocha-Sisson’s estate was Straw’s sons, dispute that the There no Respondent’s grandsons. substantial. latter or influence improper indication that duress
“There or Respondent by to bear on Ms. Straw brought were by indepen- represented Ms. Straw was not anyone else. Mr. Lanocha although in connection with will dent counsel Ms. Straw did that she consult other counsel. suggested nor attorney she did not know involve not wish to consult an her affairs. stranger personal a in [1.8(c)] of Rule knowledge ‘had no whatsoever “Respondent ...” or content.’ its existence concluded, facts, these “that there was court on hearing The 1.8(c) Rules of Professional Maryland of Rule of violation Conduct.” the respondent exception took petitioner
Both
of
and conclusions of law.
hearing
findings
fact
court’s
the hearing
is to
single exception
The petitioner’s
8.4(d).
Rule
It relies on
to find
of
failure
a violation
court’s
Brooke,
excep
the respondent’s
in
this
overruled
Court
of
in that case of a violation
hearing
finding
court’s
tion to
of
Rule
8.4,8
finding
in addition to the uncontested
Rule
proving
averments of
petitioner has the burden of
"The
convincing
A respondent who asserts
by
evidence.
petition
clear
mitigation
has
a matter of
or extenuation
affirmative defense or
preponderance of
proving
matter
the defense or
the burden of
the evidence.”
(d).
8.4(a)
Attorney
charged
with a violation of
8. Brooke was
414,
417 n. 3
Md.
161 n.
Griev. Comm’n
1.8(c)
in
petitioner
violation. The
reminds us that we held
that,
Brooke
because
violation
the Rules
“[a]
Professional
may
finding
8.4,”
Conduct
be a basis for
violation of
Md. at
821 A.2d at
hearing
court
found
properly
that violation
the basis of the Rule
violation.
respondent
the Brooke
acknowledges
holding and that
it supports
petitioner’s
He
position.
asks
“the Court
re-examine
need
a violation
purpose
finding
1.8(c),
rule in
specific
this instance MRPC
which itself affords
for imposing
a basis
whatever sanction the Court deems
sanctionable,
appropriate,
premised upon
also is
the same
conduct,
allegedly
rule,
sanctionable
under
another
8.4(d).”
instance
The respondent offers as reasons for the
reconsideration, reminiscent
arguments
Brooke made
case,
and the concerns
any
we addressed
the lack of
”
necessity to do
so and avoidance
the “aura of ‘piling on.’
Responding
arguments made by
respondent
*7
case,
Court, Brooke,
that
in
out
the
of
pointed
finding
that
a
of
violation
one Rule of Professional Conduct based on the
violation of another
punishment,
was not double
did not run
afoul
of
purpose
that,
of
attorney discipline
any
and
in
event,
a
finding
of
rule violation differs from the sanction.
177,
374 Md.
821 A.2d at
the latter regard, made clear that the number of violations does not determine
sanction,
the appropriate
the facts and circumstances of the
Id.,
particular case do.
citing Attorney Grievance
Comm’n
Briscoe,
554, 568,
Md.
745 A.2d
(quoting
Attorney
Milliken,
486, 519,
Grievance Comm’n v.
348 Md.
(1998)).
We shall sustain the petitioner’s
exception, for the reasons
stated Brooke.
(2003). Although
hearing
court determined that Brooke violated
1.8(c) violation,
merged
Rule 8.4 and
it with the Rule
id. at 162 n.
generally and the respondent that per- asserts the Rule 8.4 violation (c). to tained section The basis of those assertions is unclear. First, he exceptions.9 excepts
The filed several respondent 1.8(c). that conclusion he violated hearing to the court’s address the he court’s failure to excepts hearing Next to client and his to duty duty a his lawyer’s tension between regulatory Spe- other rules. disciplinary with the comply have that the court should cifically, respondent believes with, it, regarding potential “the actual or put as he issue dealt to carry and lawyer’s duty responsibility a tensions between client, in disposition, this instance out the instructions of demise, worldly possessions her of all of Mrs. Straw’s upon to to respondent that and looked the manner she chose rules comply to obligation implement respondent’s conduct, demand- difficult and lawyers’ patently regulating wisdom, only judicious requires task often not but ing which that Finally, judgment positing exercise of sound as well.” in a genesis had their caveat proceedings the disciplinary County Orphans’ in the Baltimore Court action filed dismissed, and have been noting proceedings caveat Court, the Circuit hearing had been to his hearing the fact that the court exception takes to respondent any of fact or conclusions of law “with findings made drew disciplinary proceeding to the effect on instant respect from which it arose.” underlying caveat case dismissal of first one mentioned-to exception is the dispositive than those conclusion, elaboration of facts without further court, drafting respondent’s hearing found his will, bequest a substantial the terms made Straw, he whom was daughter, long-time for Mrs. his so, not related, who, being do did despite advised coun seek, by independent not represented and therefore was *8 1.8(c). will, If violated we sel connection with Stein, hold, held in 373 Md. at to as both continue hearing challenges respondent's exceptions court’s 9. One that, specific bequest acknowledge in addition to the failure to $2,000 Chimes, to Inc. The respondent's bequest was a for wife there course, is, simply We an respondent view the matter correct. oversight significance to the resolution of the note it has no and before this Court. issue Brooke, at A.2d and 374 Md. at 428 A.2d 1.8(c) (“Rule attorney is absolute—an an may prepare designating legatee instrument himself as under circum- herein”), presented stances that the prohibition Rule’s is both absolute, mandatory exceptions and the other two are moot. The respondent recognizes that and Brooke make Stein compliance the requirements of Rule mandatory that, therefore, and a violation inexorably they follows when Indeed, are not. he characterizes the approach Stein/Brooke 1.8(c).” approach as a se “per Accordingly, the respondent proffers differences between his case and Stein Brooke, which, maintains, and he either require additional fact or findings demonstrate that the conclusion of hearing court does not rest the requisite evidentiary foundation. us, In he reminds the idea of the gift to the attorney went came from himself. See 373 atMd. 819 A.2d at respondent 379. The characterizes this difference as “striking perhaps and decisive.” both Stein unlike in the judice, case sub the respon- points dent out that the testamentary provision benefitted the Here, who drafted the will. the beneficiary was the respondent’s daughter, both, asserts, who is the respondent juris adult and “sui beyond respondent’s control with respect to the late Mrs. testamentary Straw’s her.” he Finally, says, the concern expressed by Court with respect to the evidence,” “inevitable lack primary after the death, testator’s as to the circumstances of the gift or the making of the are will “alleviated or mollified” this case witnesses, availability sure, two one to be being the respondent’s daughter and beneficiary, the other a seemingly witness, independent Mrs. handyman Straw’s and friend. not,
These “differences” are singly cumulatively, a suffi- cient basis for changing approach that we took in Stein and continued in viewing Brooke respondent’s case from a different perspective. concerns we identified Stein, some of on, which the respondent relies simply drive need the Rule and make its violation “very serious” not, matter. That list be, was not intended *9 A.2d at 376. Nor did list. 373 Md. exhaustive See that importance we in the order it the concerns list listed the “dangers.” We perceived the various ascribed to and, later reiterated yet, in last confidence the courts public’s one, concern, announcing the sanction that when only one: the appropriate we determined be this case. suspension warranted find an indefinite “We is a ethical violations lack respondent’s While factor, As stated justify reprimand. it does not mitigating 1.8(c) to be most above, of Rule consider violation confi- public conduct undermines Respondent’s serious. particularly egregious professional in the legal dence manner.” Brooke, 374 Md. at at 379. See
Id. at (“Deterrence public and the of such conduct at 428 A.2d can only preserved be legal profession confidence in the behavior”). protecting against are overruled. exceptions The respondent’s recom- submitted respondent petitioner Both the imposi- sanction. Aware the Court’s regarding mendations in both Stein and suspension an indefinite tion of history, petitioner disciplinary had a neither whom indefinitely be ordered sus- respondent that the recommends law, right reapply with the pended practice from the justified, the days. recommendation ninety after states, respondent the facts that given petitioner 1.15(b)10 and violations of Rules reprimanded 2001 for 8.1(b)11 because, that he be suggested unlike who 1.15(b) provides: 10. "(b) deposit lawyer's in a client trust lawyer may A own funds charges purpose paying bank service for the sole
account account, necessary purpose.” for the only in an amount but 8.1(b) provides: 11. Rule bar, or a applicant admission reinstatement “An application or in connection with a bar admission in connection with matter, disciplinary shall not: made the beneficiary, respondent did not suggest bequest to his daughter.
Although conceding that he meets all of the prerequi sites for violating will, rule—he drafted the for a person *10 unrelated, whom he was will bequeathed gift daughter to his and the testator not represented by independent counsel and did not seek such counsel—and that Stein Brooke reflect adoption this Court’s of a line bright rule as to the sanction to be administered for violation of Rule 1.8(c), the respondent urges nevertheless that the proceedings be dismissed and that no sanction be issued. He bases that recommendation on his view merits of his various exceptions. Those exceptions overruled, been have however. Anticipating that eventuality, the respondent’s posi fail-back tion is that the appropriate reprimand sanction is a or a period (30) suspension not to exceed thirty days.
In both Stein and the beneficiaries of the client’s substantial testamentary gift attorney was the prepared who case, In will. one it was the attorney himself suggest- who ed that he be given case, bequest. although the beneficiary is the attorney’s and, daughter, she is an adult respondent out, points juris “mi and beyond respondent’s compulsion and control respect with to the late Mrs. Straw’s testamentary her.” There is no evidence respondent orchestrated the bequest to his daughter or will share in it in Indeed, any way. the opposite case, is the hearing court was clear:
“There is no indication that duress or improper influence were brought to bear on Ms. by Respondent Straw or anyone else. Ms. Straw was not represented by indepen- dent counsel in connection with the will Mr. although Lano- cha suggested that she consult counsel. Ms. did Straw "(b) fail to necessary disclose a fact misapprehension to correct a person matter,
known knowingly have arisen in the fail respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions disciplinary authority, except that require this Rule does not disclosure protected by of information otherwise Rule 1.6.” did nor attorney to consult she not know involve an
wish personal in her affairs.” stranger circumstances, appropriate believe that Under 29 Wis.2d reprimand. Eisenberg, is a See State v. sanction (1965) attorney for (reprimanding N.W.2d 235 will, daughter, his uncle’s drafting disinheriting wife inherit); mother, he might his from whom In re favor of (N.D. Boulger, Action 637 N.W.2d Disciplinary Against 2001) for codicil that drafting will (reprimanding contingent him substantial testa- provisions giving included arise12). did not even mentary gift, though contingencies (La.2003) Blair, (imposing In re 840 So.2d See also disci- attorney, month suspension three record, relatively ex- inexperienced who was plinary remorse, client that gave preparing sincere will pressed testamentary gift). attorney’s wife ORDERED; PAY ALL IT SO RESPONDENT SHALL IS *11 COURT, TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS AS COSTS TRANSCRIPTS, ALL PUR- THE OF INCLUDING COSTS 16-761, RULE FOR WHICH TO MARYLAND SUANT ENTERED IN OF THE IS FAVOR SUM JUDGMENT OF MARY- GRIEVANCE COMMISSION ATTORNEY AGAINST N. FRANK LANOCHA. LAND WILNER, dissenting opinion. J. files a BATTAGLIA, J., dissenting joined by opinion files a CATHELL, J. Against Boulger, N.W.2d 714- Disciplinary re Action 637 In In (N.D.2001), the court elaborated: Boulger's mitigating favor. "There aré considerable circumstances years practiced many and Boulger has law in this state for has history disciplinary prior of misconduct. While record or Boulger acknowledges having drafted with contin- the instruments himself, disclosure of the gent to he has made full and free devises Disciplinary and has of Board been circumstances this case circumstances, throughout proceedings. these cooperative Under appropriate perhaps been the most sanc- an admonition would have tion.” WILNER,
Dissenting Opinion by Judge. 1 concur in the sustaining Court’s of Bar excep- Counsel’s tion and its of overruling Subject Lanocha’s to exception. one caveat, that, critical agree here, well under facts reprimand would be the appropriate imposed. sanction to be The caveat is the one that I in my noted dissent in Attorney 531, 545-49, Grievance v. Md. 380-82 (2003). view, my the only effective and practical way to enforce MRPC is to require errant to disgorge the fruits of his violation of the Rule renouncing, or causing any member is family who selected as the beneficia- renounce, to ry legacy obtained violation of the Rule. be, may It well and for of I purposes this case am willing accept, Mr. Lanocha’s version what occurred entirely is accurate—that he nothing did to induce Ms. to leave a Straw part her Estate to daughter Lanocha’s and that she making gift—but insisted we will really never know, because Ms. Straw is and dead cannot That testify. problem every one get these cases: only one side of the story. agrees
The Court that compliance with the Rule is mandato- ry that a violation “follows when inexorably” require- ments the Rule are not satisfied. But notwithstanding rhetoric, it making insists on the Rule a toothless clawless tiger by providing no effective sanction for its violation. I believe, continue to each new case continue to believe more firmly, even way that the violations of avoid the Rule “the simple expedient requiring lawyer, as a minimal Rule, sanction for violating the what disgorge the lawyer wrongfully lawyers created. If know that a violation of the bring Rule will them no gain, they financial will have no *12 Rule, that, incentive to violate the else, all above is what protect the public.” will Id. at A.2d 382.
The legacy here was not to Lanocha but to his adult daughter, and Lanocha has argued that he had control over daughter’s his acceptance legacy, it that was not within power his to have her I renounce it. am unwilling to accept that as a given. For one thing, nothing there is in the record it. A to renounce caveat indicate that he ever asked her Will, by at that time and Lanocha was advised
was filed in that what he had done was violation lawyer his own that, had his skeptical if Lanocha informed deeply Rule. I am might well accepting legacy that the result of her daughter of a practice from the law violation suspension be his Conduct, have she would nonetheless Rule of Professional legacy. accepting insisted on Mr. suspend indefinitely. I Lanocha would BATTAGLIA, CATHELL, J., which Dissenting Opinion by J., joins. a reprimand I do that
I
not believe
dissent.
respectfully
in
imposed
we have
with the sanctions
commensurate
1.8(c).
on the lan
of Rule
Based
involving
cases
violations
1.8(c),
reasoning
as the
of this Court’s
Rule
as well
guage of
v.
873 Md.
Attorney
in
Grievance Comm’n
opinions
(2003),
Attorney
Grievance Comm’n
(2003),
in
Maryland Rules of As we noted Stein: 8, 2005, notes, February majority dated As Rules Order
1.
revised,
July
The revision does not alter
effective
*13
(1)
is qualified
only
The Rule
in
three
if the
is not
ways:
(2)
‘substantial,’
if the client is related to the
attorney,
if
has
the client
consulted with independent counsel.
Md. at
no distinction testamentary gifts between made to the directly those attorney and made to of the attorney. relatives majority’s The that reliance the fact Mr. Lanocha’s is an daughter misplaced. adult is Rule contains no exception for to gifts adult children of the attorney. Moreover, the that in assumption order Mr. Lanocha to benefit from the to bequest his he daughter, would have in it, either share it or maintain some control over is flawed. Certainly, anticipated that “parents” “adults,” would be such that adult status should not presump- tively mitigate attorney’s violation of the Rule. majority
The also upon hearing relies court’s determina- tion that
[tjhere is no indication duress or improper influence brought were to bear on by Ms. Straw Respondent else. anyone Ms. Straw was not represented indepen- by dent counsel connection with the although will Mr. Lano- cha suggested that she consult counsel. Ms. did not Straw wish to consult an attorney she did not nor know involve a stranger personal her affairs. finding 1.8(c), however, violation of Rule does not
turn on affirmative evidence of duress or improper influence by attorney. Rather, such improper influence presumed merely from the fact that the attorney drafted the testamenta- ry instrument which either the attorney or the attorney’s relative benefitted. If the attorney his advised or her client the client counsel, should independent seek refused, client and the attorney reticent from withdraw the undertaking because relationship with the independent 1.8(c), requirement counsel it nor does distinguish gifts between made to the and those made to the attorney’s relatives. prohibition present. are
very
gave
concerns that
rise
mandates the
relationship
client
The closeness
that the client is
counsel
insure
independent
intervention
attorney.
influenced
being
Furthermore,
previously
has
observed:
this Court
*14
for attor
imposed reprimand
some courts have
[although
instruments,
typical
such
are
neys
draft such
decisions
who
Ethics as
ly
opposed
of Professional
under
Canons
1.8(c).
Miller,
Bar v.
stringent
the more
See Florida
(FIa.1990); Iowa
Bd.
Supreme
555
854
Court
So.2d
of Prof'l
(Iowa
Winkel,
1995);
862
and Conduct v.
541 N.W.2d
Ethics
Horan,
Prueter,
(Minn.1984);
613
State v.
In
359 N.W.2d
re
(1963).
488
But see In re Man
21
123 N.W.2d
Wis.2d
attor
(reprimanding
148
For the dissent foregoing sanction reprimand appropriate determination that impose suspension. an indefinite would joins dissenting opinion. in this CATHELL Judge