ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. Darlene M. COCCO.
Misc. Docket AG No. 1, Sept. Term, 2014.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Feb. 23, 2015.
109 A.3d 1176
No argument on behalf of Respondent.
Argued before: BARBERA, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, MCDONALD, WATTS, JJ.
ADKINS, J.
Petitioner, Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“AGC“), acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Respondent, Darlene M. Cocco.1 Bar Counsel charged that Cocco, in connection with her representation of Robin L. Jones, engaged in professional misconduct by issuing an invalid subpoena and threatening third parties with suit if they did not comply. Bar Counsel alleged that in the course of her representation of Jones, Respondent violated a number of Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC“).2
As permitted by
THE HEARING JUDGE‘S FINDINGS OF FACT
Cocco was admitted to practice law in Maryland on June 15, 2004. Robin L. Jones retained Cocco to pursue claims against a Walmart located in California, Maryland, sometime after sustaining injuries in an accident at the store on May 4, 2009. Although she and Jones agreed to file suit in St. Mary‘s County, Cocco never filed a lawsuit on behalf of Jones in any court.
In July 2009, Cocco attempted to obtain a copy of surveillance video of the May 4
Bar Counsel began its investigation in response to a complaint filed by Christopher R. Dunn, an attorney for Walmart. Cocco responded to Bar Counsel‘s initial inquiry, arguing both that the complaint should be dismissed due to the statute of limitations or estoppel and that the subpoena was used to obtain pre-trial evidence to which Jones was entitled. Bar Counsel replied to Cocco, indicating that she had failed to respond to Dunn‘s core allegation: that she had presented a knowingly invalid subpoena and threatened the store‘s employees with suit if they did not immediately comply with her demands for the surveillance video. Cocco again responded, writing: “Give[n] that the alleged behavior happened on 9/17/09 it is well past the 3 year Statute of Limitations[;] accordingly I have nothing else to say on this matter.” Bar Counsel notified Cocco that the complaint had been docketed, informed her that attorney disciplinary matters are not subject to statutes of limitations, and requested a response to its most recent letter. Cocco responded that she “was unable to recall any additional information about the September 17, 2009 incident.”
THE HEARING JUDGE‘S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Judge Chandlee found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Cocco violated MLRPC 3.4(c); 4.1(a)(1); 4.4(a); 8.1(a) and (b); and 8.4(a), (c), and (d).
MLRPC 3.4(c) provides that a lawyer shall not “knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists.” The court concluded that Cocco violated Rule 3.4(c) when she “knowingly issued and served an invalid subpoena in violation of
MLRPC 4.1(a)(1) provides that “[i]n the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person.” The court concluded that Cocco violated Rule 4.1(a)(1) when she “misrepresented to Wal-Mart employees that they were required to comply with the invalid subpoena.”
MLRPC 4.4(a) provides that “[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden
MLRPC 8.1 provides: An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or (b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority[.]
The court concluded that Cocco violated Rule 8.1(a) when she “misrepresented to Bar Counsel that the subpoena was a valid means of obtaining pretrial discovery” and 8.1(b) when she “failed and refused to respond to Bar Counsel‘s requests for information regarding the issuance of the subpoena and the communications between [Cocco] and Wal-Mart employees.”
MLRPC 8.4 provides in part: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; . . . (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]
The court concluded that Cocco‘s violation of several MLRPC provisions constituted a violation of Rule 8.4(a). It also found a violation of Rule 8.4(c) from Cocco‘s presentation of the invalid subpoena and misrepresentation to the employees that they were obligated to comply. In explaining that Cocco also violated Rule 8.4(d), the court summarized: “[Cocco‘s] conduct, taken as a whole including issuing and serving an invalid subpoena, threatening Wal-Mart employees, . . . and refusing to respond to Bar Counsel‘s requests for information, brings the profession into disrepute and violat[es] Rule 8.4(d).”
DISCUSSION
Standard Of Review
“In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court has original and complete jurisdiction and conducts an independent review of the record.” Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 147, 167, 994 A.2d 928, 940 (2010) (citations omitted). “We accept a hearing judge‘s findings of fact unless we determine that they are clearly erroneous.” Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50, 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006).
Pursuant to
Neither Cocco nor Bar Counsel notes any exceptions to the hearing judge‘s findings of fact or conclusions of law.4 And, because Cocco filed no response to Bar Counsel‘s requests for admissions, they are deemed admitted.
As to any findings not deemed admitted due to Cocco‘s failure to respond to the request for admissions, both parties were permitted to file “(1) exceptions to the findings and conclusions of the hearing judge and (2) recommendations concerning the appropriate disposition[.]”
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
We also agree with the hearing judge‘s conclusions that Cocco violated MLRPC 3.4(c); 4.1(a)(1); 4.4(a); 8.1(b); and 8.4(a), (c), and (d). In knowingly presenting an invalid subpoena in contravention of
During the course of Bar Counsel‘s investigation, Cocco failed repeatedly to respond to the allegations that she had threatened third parties with an invalid subpoena. This was a violation of MLRPC 8.1(b). See Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n v. Weiers, 440 Md. 292, 306-09, 102 A.3d 332, 341-42 (2014) (concluding attorney had violated MLRPC 8.1(b) when although he had responded to the AGC, he “fail[ed] to cooperate readily and fully with Bar Counsel“).6 We also agree with the hearing judge‘s conclusion that, overall, Cocco‘s conduct was “prejudicial to the administration of justice” and, consequently, an 8.4(d) violation. See Mixter, at 524-27, 109 A.3d 1 (discussing MLRPC 8.4(d) and concluding that attorney had violated the Rule). Taken together, these violations also constitute a violation of MLRPC 8.4(a). Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n v. Van Nelson, 425 Md. 344, 363, 40 A.3d 1039, 1050 (2012) (“Rule 8.4(a) is violated when other Rules of Professional Conduct are breached.“).
Sanction
Bar Counsel recommends that Cocco be disbarred or, alternatively, placed on inactive status. In its Recommendation for Sanction, Bar Counsel highlights Cocco‘s use of an invalid subpoena and her threats of suit to the Walmart employees if they did not comply. Bar Counsel also draws the Court‘s attention to Cocco‘s prior unrelated reprimand from the AGC in November 2010. This reprimand arose from a violation of MLRPC 8.4(d) for presenting “inappropriately provocative and inaccurate accusations of misconduct by an opposing counsel and [not following] appropriate procedures in pursuing her client‘s interests.”
As we recently discussed: In selecting a sanction, we are cognizant of the principle that attorney discipline proceedings are not instituted to punish an offending lawyer, but rather to protect the public and the public‘s confidence in the legal profession. Imposition of a sanction protects the public in two ways: through deterrence of the type of conduct which will not be tolerated, and by removing those unfit to continue in the practice of law from the rolls of those authorized to practice in this State. Our selection of an appropriate sanction is guided by the nature and gravity of the violation, the intent with which the violation was committed, and the particular circumstances surrounding each case.... Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n v. Park, 427 Md. 180, 195, 46 A.3d 1153, 1161 (2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
When determining the appropriate sanction, we must also consider any mitigating factors. Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n v. Roberts, 394 Md. 137, 165, 904 A.2d 557, 574 (2006) (“The appropriate sanction depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, including any mitigating factors.” (citation omitted)). Here, the hearing judge found no mitigating factors, and there is no reason to upset that finding. See Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n v. West, 378 Md. 395, 411, 836 A.2d 588, 597 (2003) (“On review, we keep in mind that the
Cocco committed an egregious misrepresentation when she used an invalid subpoena to threaten individual third parties into complying with her demand for information. “A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”
So, too, was Cocco‘s conduct harmful to the public perception of lawyers in general. By her actions, Cocco posed a risk to the public perception of the integrity of attorneys in general, and specifically of those serving a subpoena. Such misconduct is particularly significant because lawyers, unlike other persons, may obtain signed blank subpoenas to be completed as they see fit prior to service. See
An intentional misrepresentation--particularly one of this magnitude and with the broader implications discussed supra--ordinarily will warrant disbarment:
Unlike matters related to competency, diligence and the like, intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the most important matters of basic character to such a degree as to make intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost beyond excuse. Honesty and dishonesty are, or are not, present in an attorney‘s character. Disbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for intentional dishonest conduct.
Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 418, 773 A.2d 463, 488 (2001) (emphasis added).
Here, Cocco committed a misrepresentation in the name of the court in an attempt to threaten and bully third parties who were unaware of the fallacious nature of the subpoena. In so doing, she seriously abused her trusted position as an officer of the court. Absent any mitigating factors, and with due consideration paid to the potential harm visited upon the public perception of lawyers in general, Cocco‘s transgressions warrant the strictest sanction. Time and again, we have reached the conclusion that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for intentional misrepresentations, particularly when they cast disrepute upon the public perception of lawyers. See Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n v. Goodman, 381 Md. 480, 499, 850 A.2d 1157, 1168 (2004) (disbarring an attorney for intentional misrepresentation after reasoning that “[o]nly in the case of compelling extenuating circumstances will we even consider imposing less than the most severe sanction of disbarment in cases involving dishonesty and fraudulent conduct” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 596, 876 A.2d 642, 660 (2005) (disbarring attorney for, among other misrepresentations, “falsifying a supposed settlement of claims with [an] insurer[and] intentionally misrepresenting matters in negotiations with third-party health care providers“).
Accordingly, we conclude that disbarment is the appropriate sanction.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761. JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST DARLENE M. COCCO IN THE SUM OF THESE COSTS.