Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. El-ShallAttorney Grievance Comm'n v. El-Shall
Watts
Booth
Biran
Gould
Eaves
Killough,
JJ.
Opinion by Biran, J.
Filed: July 27, 2026
I
Procedural History
On August 4, 2025, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Petitioner”), acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (the “PDRA”) alleging that Respondent Sara Mohamed Samy El-Shall violated the following Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”)3: 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a) and (b) (Communication), 1.16(c) and (d) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a) and (d) (Misconduct).
On October 16, 2025, the hearing judge signed an Order of Default. The court emailed that order to Bar Counsel and Ms. El-Shall, along with a request that they indicate their availability to attend a virtual meeting with the hearing judge on one of three proposed dates. See
On October 20, 2025, before the Order of Default was docketed, Ms. El-Shall filed an Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for an Order of Default. In her filing, Ms. El-Shall asserted that she “did not intentionally disregard the proceedings” but rather had failed to respond in a timely manner “due to acute mental health challenges.” Ms. El-Shall stated that her “forthcoming pleadings will set forth a meritorious defense.” On October 22, the
Ms. El-Shall did not attend the October 22 virtual scheduling meeting. Following the meeting, the hearing judge issued a Scheduling Order requiring all discovery to be completed by December 31, 2025, and scheduled an evidentiary hearing for January 14-16, 2026.
On October 23, 2025, the hearing judge filed a letter on the docket that stated, among other things:
Although the Court may not have granted the Default Motion had it had the benefit of the Opposition when ruling on the Default Motion, the fact remains that the Court granted the Default Motion and the Respondent finds herself in default status. Under
Maryland Rule 2-613(d) , the Respondent must move to vacate the Order of Default. If she does so, the Court will rule on it in the ordinary course. See Holly Hall Pubs., Inc. v. County Banking & Tr. Co., 147 Md. App. 251, 262-63 (2002) (recognizing that defaults are generally disfavored).If this case were a train, it would be leaving the station shortly. See
Rule 2-613(d) (providing thirty days to move to vacate an order of default);Rule 19-727(d) (providing that a merits hearing in an attorney grievance matter “shall be completed within 120 days after service on the attorney”). The Respondent would be wise to hop on before it’s too late.
Ms. El-Shall did not file a motion to vacate the Order of Default. On November 24, 2025, Petitioner filed a Motion for Judgment of Default under
The evidentiary hearing went forward on January 14, 2026. Ms. El-Shall did not appear for the hearing. Petitioner called no witnesses but introduced five exhibits. The hearing judge issued findings of fact and conclusions of law on January 22, 2026.
II
The Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact
The hearing judge found that Petitioner established the following facts by clear and convincing evidence based on the PDRA’s factual averments and on information contained in the exhibits that Petitioner introduced at the evidentiary hearing.
Ms. El-Shall’s Practice
Ms. El-Shall was admitted to the Maryland Bar on June 19, 2013. At all times relevant to this case, Ms. El-Shall maintained an office for the practice of law in Baltimore City. Ms. El-Shall’s area of practice was workers’ compensation.
Representation of Stacey Wisniewski
In November 2022, Stacey Wisniewski retained Ms. El-Shall to represent her in a workers’ compensation matter after terminating her prior attorney due to communication
However, communication issues soon arose. On January 2, 2023, Ms. Wisniewski emailed Ms. El-Shall with questions about her case; Ms. El-Shall never responded. On January 6, 2023, Ms. Wisniewski followed up by email, and on January 9 and 11, Ms. Wisniewski followed up by phone. Ms. El-Shall did not respond to these communications. Ms. Wisniewski followed up again on January 16, leading Ms. El-Shall’s assistant to schedule a telephone meeting between Ms. El-Shall and Ms. Wisniewski for January 20. Without notice, Ms. El-Shall failed to attend that meeting and did not follow up.
On January 23 and 31, 2023, Ms. Wisniewski sent Ms. El-Shall additional emails. On January 31, Ms. El-Shall’s assistant emailed Ms. Wisniewski, apologizing for the lack of communication and asking to schedule a call for later that day. Due to an apparent issue with Ms. Wisniewski’s email, Ms. Wisniewski’s response to this email was not sent, and no meeting occurred.
On February 15, 2023, Ms. Wisniewski received a letter from Ms. El-Shall, to which Ms. Wisniewski responded with several questions. Ms. El-Shall did not respond to that email. Ms. Wisniewski attempted to follow up by email again on February 27 and March 6; Ms. El-Shall did not reply until March 16.
Between March 16 and May 3, 2023, Ms. El-Shall and Ms. Wisniewski exchanged several emails about scheduling Ms. Wisniewski’s independent medical examination. Ms. El-Shall also informed Ms. Wisniewski that her hearing before the Maryland Workers’
Between May 27 and July 14, 2023, Ms. Wisniewski sent Ms. El-Shall several emails without receiving a response. On July 17, the day before her WCC hearing, Ms. Wisniewski contacted Ms. El-Shall about preparation needed for the hearing. Ms. El-Shall’s assistant scheduled a preparation call for that evening at 5:45 p.m. Ms. El-Shall did not call Ms. Wisniewski at the appointed time. Ms. Wisniewski emailed Ms. El-Shall about the meeting at 6:12 p.m., and Ms. El-Shall rescheduled the call for 7:00 p.m. However, Ms. El-Shall did not call at 7:00 p.m., instead texting Ms. Wisniewski to ask about having a call the following morning. Ms. El-Shall failed to call Ms. Wisniewski in the morning.
Ms. El-Shall and Ms. Wisniewski met in person for the first and only time on the morning of the WCC hearing (July 18, 2023). Ms. El-Shall prepared Ms. Wisniewski for the hearing in the building lobby. At the hearing, Ms. Wisniewski received a settlement and was ordered to obtain a functional capacity evaluation. Ms. El-Shall received 20 percent of Ms. Wisniewski’s $40,000 settlement.
Between September 23 and December 20, 2023, Ms. Wisniewski sought updates on her case three times without response. On December 20, Ms. Wisniewski received an out-of-office email stating that Ms. El-Shall was on medical leave. On December 25, Ms. El-Shall’s assistant informed Ms. Wisniewski that another attorney, Aaron Schwartz, would handle her case. On March 1, 2024, Ms. Wisniewski emailed Mr. Schwartz and Ms. El-Shall. Ms. El-Shall replied that she would call Ms. Wisniewski, but never did. Ms. Wisniewski emailed Ms. El-Shall with questions on March 6 and 8. Ms. El-Shall answered
On June 28, 2024, Ms. Wisniewski filed a complaint with Petitioner. Bar Counsel sent letters to Ms. El-Shall on July 2 and August 13, requesting a response to the complaint by July 24 and August 27, respectively. Bar Counsel’s investigator, Jason Bogue, emailed Ms. El-Shall on September 13 and 18 at four email addresses, requesting that Ms. El-Shall contact him. On September 19, Ms. El-Shall replied to Mr. Bogue by email:
Dear Mr. Bogue,
My apologies for the delay in responding. This is my first day back in the office this week. I have received the letter from [Assistant Bar Counsel] dated August 13, 2024, enclosing the complaint and attachments and am in the process of responding and compiling any relevant documentation to attach in my response. I recognize that I am well beyond the August 27, 2024, deadline and sincerely apologize for the delay. Initially, I overlooked the extensive attachments, and it is taking me longer to go through everything than I anticipated. Again, I know that I should have contacted Bar Counsel to request additional time/provide an explanation. I believe I would be in a better position to discuss this matter after thoroughly going through the file and responding and believe I will be able to do so by Monday, September 23, 2024 (I will try to have it completed by tomorrow) and will give you a call after sending if that is acceptable.
Thank you for your time and attention to this matter.
Best regards,
Sara El-Shall
On September 25 and 27, 2024, having not received the promised response, Mr. Bogue emailed Ms. El-Shall. On September 30, Mr. Bogue left Ms. El-Shall a voicemail on two phone numbers listed for her in the Attorney Information System (“AIS”). Ms. El-
On October 7, Ms. El-Shall again emailed Mr. Bogue:
Dear Mr. Bogue,
Hope all is well. I have been struggling with depression and anxiety especially with this investigation and under the care of a therapist and physician I again apologize for the delay, but will have my response to you by Tuesday, October 8th.
Ms. El-Shall did not send the promised response.
On October 16, 2024, Bar Counsel docketed the matter for further investigation and emailed Ms. El-Shall notice that she had until October 30, 2024 to respond. In the email, Bar Counsel stated: “That is the final deadline. Should you not respond, Bar Counsel will consider that you knowingly fail[ed] to cooperate with the investigation and take the appropriate action.”
On November 4, 2024, Mr. Bogue again emailed Ms. El-Shall, requesting a Zoom interview regarding Ms. Wisniewski’s complaint and an additional complaint.6 Ms. El-Shall did not respond. On November 8, Mr. Bogue attempted to call Ms. El-Shall at both phone numbers listed in AIS, leaving voicemails requesting that Ms. El-Shall contact him, but received no response. On November 18, Mr. Bogue emailed Ms. El-Shall again requesting to schedule an interview. Mr. Bogue received an out-of-office email stating that Ms. El-Shall would return on November 20. Ms. El-Shall did not respond to this email.
Once at this location, the Respondent answered the front door. I inquired with the Respondent if she was Ms. El-Shall. The Respondent stated that she was not. I then informed the Respondent that I knew she was Ms. El-Shall. The Respondent then shut the front door. I then stated through the closed door that I was an Investigator with the Attorney Grievance Commission, and I knew it was her because I have a copy of her MVA record with a photograph.
The Respondent then opened the front door. I advised the Respondent I was the Investigator she had previously emailed with about the listed complaint, and she had never provided a response. The Respondent stated, “I’m Sorry”.
During this interaction, Ms. El-Shall acknowledged that she had a copy of Ms. Wisniewski’s complaint. Mr. Bogue provided Ms. El-Shall with the additional complaint and a copy of the letter accompanying that complaint. Mr. Bogue informed Ms. El-Shall that if she did not respond to Bar Counsel within seven days with respect to both complaints, Bar Counsel would subpoena her to provide a statement under oath. Ms. El-Shall did not respond further to Bar Counsel.
On December 12, 2024, Bar Counsel issued a subpoena for Ms. El-Shall to appear for a statement under oath on January 22, 2025, and sent it to Ms. El-Shall by email and certified mail. On January 13, 2025, Mr. Bogue emailed Ms. El-Shall and left voicemail messages to confirm her appearance. Ms. El-Shall neither responded to the communications nor appeared for the statement under oath. Bar Counsel attempted to call and email Ms. El-Shall regarding her failure to appear, but Ms. El-Shall did not respond.
Representation of De’Errick’A Hawks
On March 21, 2024, De’Errick’A Hawks retained Ms. El-Shall to represent her with respect to a workers’ compensation claim. After Ms. Hawks signed a retainer agreement, Ms. El-Shall had no further communication with Ms. Hawks; however, Ms. El-Shall did file a claim with the WCC on behalf of Ms. Hawks.
In May 2024, Ms. Hawks learned that her employer’s attorney required her to be seen by the employer’s doctor. Ms. Hawks attempted to call, email, and text Ms. El-Shall, but received no response. Ms. Hawks then called the doctor’s office to schedule the appointment but was told that only her attorney could do so. Because she could not reach Ms. El-Shall, Ms. Hawks was unable to schedule the appointment. As a result, the WCC rescheduled Ms. Hawks’s original July 2024 hearing to October 2024. Ms. Hawks learned that the WCC had postponed her hearing after the WCC contacted her; Ms. El-Shall never contacted her about the postponement.
Ms. Hawks continued to try to contact Ms. El-Shall through the summer of 2024, but received no response. Eventually, Ms. Hawks was referred to another attorney, Robert Gordon, whom she retained in October 2024 to take over her case. Mr. Gordon contacted Ms. El-Shall, who immediately sent him Ms. Hawks’s case file. With Mr. Gordon’s assistance, Ms. Hawks settled her claim in December 2024. Mr. Gordon attempted to contact Ms. El-Shall to determine the division of fees, but Ms. El-Shall never responded.
On December 12, 2024, Bar Counsel docketed Ms. Hawks’s complaint for further investigation and sent Ms. El-Shall a Docket Notice by email and certified mail to her home address. Bar Counsel received an out-of-office reply, stating, “Greetings, I am currently out of the office and will return Friday, December 13, 2024. I will respond to your message upon my return. Thanks! Sara El-Shall.” Ms. El-Shall did not respond to Bar Counsel.
On December 12, 2024, Bar Counsel issued a subpoena for Ms. El-Shall to appear for a statement under oath on January 22, 2025, and sent it to Ms. El-Shall by email and certified mail. On January 13, 2025, Bar Counsel staff emailed Ms. El-Shall and left voicemail messages to confirm her appearance. Ms. El-Shall did not respond to the communications and did not appear for the statement under oath. Bar Counsel staff attempted to contact Ms. El-Shall by phone and email regarding her failure to appear, but Ms. El-Shall did not respond.
The hearing judge found that Ms. El-Shall “has never engaged with or provided documentation to Bar Counsel regarding [Ms. Hawks’s] complaint.”
Representation of Marquisha Lajuan Jackson
On May 15, 2023, Marquisha Jackson retained Ms. El-Shall to represent her in a workers’ compensation matter. Ms. El-Shall held an initial phone consultation with Ms. Jackson. Afterwards, they communicated by email, phone, and text.
On November 20, 2024, Ms. Jackson emailed and texted Ms. El-Shall a notarized letter terminating her services. Ms. El-Shall did not respond to Ms. Jackson. On December 3 and 5, 2024,7 Ms. Jackson emailed Ms. El-Shall, asking her to withdraw from the case, but Ms. El-Shall did not respond. The hearing judge found that Ms. El-Shall did not withdraw from the case and that “Ms. Jackson was unable to hire a new lawyer, apparently because [Ms. El-Shall] had not withdrawn.”
In early December 2024, Ms. Jackson filed a complaint with Bar Counsel. On December 4, Bar Counsel emailed the complaint to Ms. El-Shall and the following day sent it by certified mail to her home address. The letter requested that Ms. El-Shall provide a response and any relevant documents by December 10. After receiving no response, on December 12, Bar Counsel docketed the complaint and sent it to Ms. El-Shall by email and certified mail to her home. Bar Counsel received an out-of-office reply from Ms. El-Shall’s
On January 13, 2025, Bar Counsel staff emailed Ms. El-Shall and left voicemails to confirm her appearance for the statement under oath. Ms. El-Shall did not respond and did not appear for the statement under oath.
On January 22, 2025, Bar Counsel staff called and emailed Ms. El-Shall regarding her failure to appear, but Ms. El-Shall did not respond.
The hearing judge found that Ms. El-Shall “has never engaged with or provided documentation to Bar Counsel regarding [Ms. Jackson’s] complaint.”
III
The Hearing Judge’s Conclusions of Law
We now summarize the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.
Rule 1.3 - Diligence
The hearing judge concluded that Ms. El-Shall displayed a lack of diligence, in violation of Rule 1.3, in the Wisniewski, Hawks, and Jackson matters by “repeatedly failing to respond to client communications” and by “failing to advance each of the … matters[.]” In the Wisniewski matter, Ms. El-Shall would “fall off the radar for months on end,” only responding to Ms. Wisniewski after she attempted to contact Ms. El-Shall several times. Additionally, Ms. El-Shall failed to attend multiple scheduled preparation meetings the day
The hearing judge found that, in the Hawks matter, Ms. El-Shall failed to communicate with Ms. Hawks – despite Ms. Hawks’s repeated attempts to contact her by email, text, and phone – after Ms. Hawks signed the retainer agreement. While Ms. Hawks ultimately settled her case, she did so only after engaging a different attorney.
The hearing judge found that, in the Jackson matter, Ms. El-Shall ignored several communications from Ms. Jackson regarding settlement paperwork. Additionally, the hearing judge found that Ms. El-Shall failed to respond to Ms. Jackson’s notarized letter and subsequent emails terminating her representation and requesting that Ms. El-Shall withdraw from the case.
Rule 1.4 - Communication
The hearing judge concluded that Ms. El-Shall violated Rules 1.4(a) and (b) in the Wisniewski, Hawks, and Jackson matters for the same reasons that he concluded she violated Rule 1.3.
Rule 1.16 - Declining or Terminating Representation
The hearing judge concluded that Ms. El-Shall violated Rule 1.16(d) in the Wisniewski, Hawks, and Jackson matters.8 Regarding the Wisniewski matter, the hearing judge found that Ms. El-Shall “effectively abandoned Ms. Wisniewski after her July 2023
Rule 8.1 - Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters
The hearing judge concluded that Ms. El-Shall violated Rule 8.1(b) in the Wisniewski, Hawks, and Jackson matters, due to her failure to engage with Bar Counsel in the investigations in each case. With respect to each matter, the hearing judge found that Ms. El-Shall failed to: (1) respond to her clients’ complaints as Bar Counsel requested; (2) respond to emails and voicemails seeking to schedule an interview with Bar Counsel; and (3) appear for the January 22, 2025 statement under oath despite a subpoena. In addition, the hearing judge concluded that, “[p]erhaps most troubling, in the Wisniewski matter, after [Mr. Bogue] went to [Ms. El-Shall’s] home address, [Ms. El-Shall] denied her identity.” Finally, the hearing judge found that Ms. El-Shall failed to “engage[] meaningfully in this litigation, again ignoring the process after representing that a response and defense would be forthcoming.” The hearing judge observed that Ms. El-Shall’s “pattern of communication with Bar Counsel and the Court matches [her] pattern of communication with her clients – failing to respond for long stretches, apologizing, promising a further response or cooperation, and then nothing.”
The hearing judge concluded that Ms. El-Shall violated Rule 8.4(a) because she violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.16, and 8.1. Additionally, the hearing judge concluded that Ms. El-Shall violated Rule 8.4(d) in the Wisniewski, Hawks, and Johnson matters by: (1) failing to respond to Bar Counsel in each investigation; and (2) “failing to respond to client outreach and otherwise keep clients apprised of the status of their matters.”
Remedial Action Taken by the Attorney
The hearing judge determined that, given Ms. El-Shall’s lack of participation in the disciplinary process, including the proceedings in court after the filing of the PDRA, there was no evidence that Ms. El-Shall took any steps “to remedy her action and inaction.”
Aggravating Factors
The hearing judge concluded that five aggravating factors are present in this case: (1) a pattern of misconduct; (2) multiple violations of the Rules; (3) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding; (4) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct; and (5) indifference to making restitution or rectifying the misconduct’s consequences.
In finding a pattern of misconduct, the hearing judge observed that Ms. El-Shall committed “similar flavors of misconduct” in the three matters over several years. Based on his determination that Ms. El-Shall violated Rules 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.16(d), 8.1(b), and 8.4(a) and (d), the hearing judge concluded that the aggravating factor of multiple violations of the MARPC was present. The hearing judge found that Ms. El-Shall obstructed the disciplinary proceeding in bad faith by “essentially stonewall[ing] Bar
On the other hand, the hearing judge concluded that Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the aggravating factors of: (1) a dishonest or selfish motive; and (2) likelihood of repetition of the misconduct. On the record before the court, the hearing judge was unable to make any findings as to why Ms. El-Shall abandoned her clients, failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel during the investigation of the clients’ complaints, and failed to participate in the proceedings before the court. As a result, the hearing judge could not conclude, by clear and convincing evidence, that Ms. El-Shall had a dishonest or selfish motive.
The hearing judge stated that he was “confounded” concerning the aggravating factor of likelihood of repetition of the misconduct. Although Ms. El-Shall’s “failure to participate meaningfully in these proceedings” did not give him a “great measure of confidence that she appreciates the seriousness of her conduct or these proceedings,” the hearing judge noted this was the first time Ms. El-Shall had faced disciplinary charges. Observing that “the bulk of the caselaw applying this factor has involved attorneys with serial attorney grievance matters,” the hearing judge found that “this factor is in equipoise,” and determined that Petitioner did not meet its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. El-Shall is likely to repeat the misconduct.
The hearing judge observed that Ms. El-Shall bore the burden to establish any mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence. Because Petitioner did not allege any prior professional discipline, the hearing judge concluded that the mitigating factor of absence of prior attorney discipline was present. However, because Ms. El-Shall failed to participate in the proceedings, the hearing judge concluded that she could not “benefit from any other mitigating factors.”
IV
Standard of Review
“This Court has original and complete jurisdiction in attorney discipline proceedings and conducts an independent review of the record.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Bonner, 477 Md. 576, 584 (2022). Where neither party files any exceptions to the hearing judge’s factual findings, this Court “may treat the findings of fact as established.”
If a party files exceptions to factual findings, this Court “shall determine whether the findings of fact have been proved by the requisite standard of proof …. The Court may confine its review to the findings of fact challenged by the exceptions.”
“The hearing judge’s findings of fact are left undisturbed unless those findings are clearly erroneous[.]” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Hoerauf, 469 Md. 179, 207-08 (2020) (citation modified). A factual finding is not clearly erroneous “where there is any competent evidence to support” it. See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. O’Neill, 477 Md. 632
V
Discussion
A. Ms. El-Shall‘s Clarifications to the Hearing Judge‘s Findings of Fact
Although Ms. El-Shall did not participate meaningfully when this case was before the hearing judge, she has since obtained counsel and engaged in the proceedings before this Court. In a written submission filed by counsel, Ms. El-Shall states that she does not except to the hearing judge‘s findings of fact. However, Ms. El-Shall offers two clarifications to the hearing judge‘s factual findings. First, Ms. El-Shall points out the typographical error concerning the year of Ms. Jackson‘s emails to Ms. El-Shall asking Ms. El-Shall to withdraw from Ms. Jackson‘s case. See note 7 above.
Second, Ms. El-Shall asks this Court to take judicial notice that, on February 3, 2025, following Ms. Jackson‘s request, Ms. El-Shall filed a motion to withdraw her appearance in Ms. Jackson‘s case, as evidenced by the WCC docket. Based on this information, Ms. El-Shall asserts that “Ms. Jackson was not prevented from retaining another attorney.” Ms. El-Shall also points us to WCC docket entries reflecting that, on February 20, 2025, a settlement agreement was filed with the WCC regarding Ms. Jackson‘s claim,9 and that the WCC approved the settlement agreement on April 3, 2025.
Although we generally confine our review to matters in the record before the hearing judge, we may take judicial notice of facts outside the record before a hearing judge in an attorney grievance case, where appropriate under
B. Ms. El-Shall‘s Violations of the MARPC
Neither party excepts to the hearing judge‘s conclusions of law concerning Ms. El-Shall‘s violations of the MARPC. Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. El-Shall violated Rules 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a) and (b) (Communication), 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a) and (d) (Misconduct).
Rule 1.3 (Diligence)
Rule 1.3 compels an attorney to “act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” An attorney can violate this rule “by failing to advance the client‘s cause or endeavor; failing to investigate a client‘s matter; and repeatedly failing to return phone calls, respond to letters, or provide an accounting for earned fees[.]” Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n v. Dailey, 474 Md. 679, 703 (2021) (alteration by the Court) (citations omitted).
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge‘s conclusion that Ms. El-Shall violated Rule 1.3 in the Wisniewski, Hawks, and Jackson matters. Ms. El-Shall repeatedly failed to respond to client communications in all three matters. In the Hawks matter, Ms. El-Shall failed to schedule Ms. Hawks‘s appointment with her employer‘s doctor, causing the hearing before the WCC to be delayed. In Ms. Jackson‘s case, Ms. El-Shall‘s failure to provide settlement paperwork to her client demonstrates a failure to advance her client‘s cause. In addition, although Ms. El-Shall eventually filed a motion to withdraw as Ms. Jackson‘s counsel, her failure to do so promptly further delayed the resolution of Ms. Jackson‘s claim.
Rule 1.4(a) and (b) (Communication)
Rule 1.4 states as follows:
(a) An attorney shall:
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client‘s informed consent, as defined in Rule [1.0], is required by these Rules;
(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; [and]
(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information[.] ...
(b) An attorney shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
This Rule requires attorneys to “communicate with their clients and keep their clients reasonably informed of the status of their case.” Edwards, 462 Md. at 699. This Court has noted that “[f]ailing to do so ‘prevents the client from making informed decisions.‘” Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n v. Rossbach, 485 Md. 563, 595 (2023) (quoting Edwards, 462 Md. at 699).
We agree with the hearing judge that, for the same reasons Ms. El-Shall violated Rule 1.3, she also violated Rule 1.4(a) and (b). See Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n v. Planta, 467 Md. 319, 349 (2020) (“We have sustained Rule 1.4 violations when a client tries repeatedly to contact the attorney, but the attorney fails to provide a response.“); see also Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n v. Karambelas, 473 Md. 134, 162 (2021) (“Rule 1.4 is violated when an attorney communicates nothing or fails to communicate crucial information to the client regarding the status of a case.“).
Rule 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation)
Rule 1.16(d) provides:
Upon termination of representation, an attorney shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client‘s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of another attorney, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned
or incurred. The attorney may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.
We agree with the hearing judge‘s conclusion that Ms. El-Shall violated Rule 1.16(d) by effectively abandoning the three clients. See Dailey, 474 Md. at 707-08 (upholding hearing judge‘s conclusion that, when the attorney abandoned her client‘s case, she “effectively terminat[ed] the representation without giving her client notice“). In the Jackson matter, although Ms. El-Shall filed a motion to withdraw as counsel in February 2025, that does not excuse her significant delay in fulfilling Ms. Jackson‘s request that she do so.
Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters)
Rule 8.1(b) prohibits an attorney, in connection with an attorney disciplinary proceeding, from “fail[ing] to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail[ing] to respond to a lawful demand for information from [a] ... disciplinary authority,” unless the information is protected by the attorney‘s obligation to confidentiality under Rule 1.6. “We have consistently held that repeated failures to respond to Bar Counsel‘s investigative requests can be a violation of [Rule 8.1(b)].” Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n v. Kotlarsky, 453 Md. 469, 480 (2017). Petitioner established through clear and convincing evidence that Ms. El-Shall violated Rule 8.1(b). In all three matters, Ms. El-Shall repeatedly failed to meaningfully respond to Bar Counsel‘s requests for information.
To the extent the hearing judge also based his conclusion that Ms. El-Shall violated Rule 8.1(b) on Ms. El-Shall‘s denial of her identity when Mr. Bogue appeared at her home, we disagree with that determination. Ms. El-Shall does not dispute the hearing judge‘s
Rule 8.4(a) and (d) (Misconduct)
Rule 8.4 states:
It is professional misconduct for an attorney to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the [MARPC], knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; [or]
...
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]
An attorney‘s conduct is “prejudicial to the administration of justice” under Rule 8.4(d) where the attorney fails to respond to client communications or keep their client appraised of their case, and where the attorney repeatedly fails to respond in a timely manner to Bar Counsel‘s inquiries. See Edwards, 462 Md. at 707-08. We agree with the hearing judge that Ms. El-Shall violated Rule 8.4(d) in all three matters.
“An attorney violates Rule 8.4(a) if they violate any other rule of professional conduct.” Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n v. Yeatman, 489 Md. 211, 235 (2024). Because we conclude that Ms. El-Shall violated Rules 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.16(d), 8.1(b), and 8.4(d), she violated Rule 8.4(a) as well.
C. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
Next, we determine which aggravating and mitigating factors apply in our determination of the appropriate sanction for Ms. El-Shall‘s violations of the MARPC. For an aggravating factor to apply, Bar Counsel must establish its existence by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n v. King, 491 Md. 485, 515 (2025).
Aggravating Factors
This Court has explained that pertinent aggravating factors in an attorney grievance proceeding include:
(1) prior attorney discipline; (2) a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple violations of the MARPC; (5) bad faith obstruction of the attorney discipline proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the Maryland Rules or orders of this Court or the hearing judge; (6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the attorney discipline proceeding; (7) a refusal to acknowledge the misconduct‘s wrongful nature; (8) the victim‘s vulnerability; (9) substantial experience in the practice of law; (10) indifference to making restitution or rectifying the misconduct‘s consequences; (11) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled substances; and (12) likelihood of repetition of the misconduct.
Rossbach, 485 Md. at 600-01 (citation modified). The hearing judge determined that five aggravating factors are present here: (1) a pattern of misconduct; (2) multiple violations of the MARPC; (3) bad faith obstruction of the attorney disciplinary proceeding; (4) refusal to acknowledge the misconduct‘s wrongful nature; and (5) indifference to making restitution or rectifying the misconduct‘s consequences. The hearing judge declined to find the existence of two additional aggravating factors: (1) a dishonest or selfish motive,13 and (2) likelihood of repetition of the misconduct.
We agree with the hearing judge that Ms. El-Shall displayed a pattern of misconduct. In all three matters, Ms. El-Shall failed to communicate regularly with her clients, effectively abandoning them. Furthermore, she failed to meaningfully respond to Bar Counsel‘s inquiries in all three matters. When she occasionally would respond, promising a forthcoming reply, she repeatedly failed to follow up. These circumstances establish a pattern of misconduct. See, e.g., Yeatman, 489 Md. at 236-37 (finding a pattern of misconduct where, in two matters, the attorney failed to communicate with his clients, failed to take basic steps to competently handle both matters, and failed to timely respond to Bar Counsel‘s letters and requests for documents in connection with the investigations of both matters).
As discussed above, Ms. El-Shall violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.16, 8.1, and 8.4. Thus, she has committed multiple violations of the MARPC.
Ms. El-Shall engaged in bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by failing to respond to Bar Counsel‘s reasonable requests for information. “[T]his Court has regularly treated repeated failures to respond timely and sufficiently to Bar Counsel‘s lawful requests as sufficient to satisfy the aggravating factor of bad faith obstruction.” King, 491 Md. at 516.
We conclude that Ms. El-Shall displayed indifference to rectifying the misconduct‘s consequences by her delay in withdrawing from Ms. Jackson‘s case before the WCC. Although Ms. El-Shall eventually moved to withdraw as Ms. Jackson‘s counsel, that does not undo the indifference she displayed prior to that point toward rectifying the consequences of her failure to act with diligence and to appropriately terminate the attorney-client relationship with Ms. Jackson. See Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n v. Hecht, 493 Md. 211, 264-65 (2026) (finding aggravating factor of indifference to making restitution where attorney delayed refunding clients).
Regarding the aggravating factor of likelihood of repetition of the misconduct, Petitioner contends that “[t]he facts found by the trial court display [Ms. El-Shall‘s] complete disregard for her duties as an advocate on behalf of her clients and no indication that [she] has altered her behavior in the years since.” Petitioner also relies on this Court‘s application of this aggravating factor in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Hamilton, 493 Md. 42, 59 (2026) (attorney‘s “continued absence for the duration of this grievance process indicates a likelihood of repetition of such misconduct“).
Dr. Tellefsen was not subject to cross-examination by Petitioner at the evidentiary hearing. Nor did the hearing judge have the opportunity to consider Dr. Tellefsen‘s reports in reaching his conclusion concerning the likelihood of repetition of misconduct. For these reasons, we do not consider Dr. Tellefsen‘s reports here.
This Court considers the following mitigating factors in determining the appropriate sanction:
(1) the absence of prior attorney discipline; (2) the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) personal or emotional problems; (4) timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify the misconduct‘s consequences; (5) full and free disclosure to Bar Counsel or a cooperative attitude toward the attorney discipline proceeding; (6) inexperience in the practice of law; (7) character or reputation; (8) a physical disability; (9) a mental disability or chemical dependency, including alcoholism or drug abuse, where: (a) there is medical evidence that the lawyer is affected by a chemical dependency or mental disability; (b) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct; (c) the lawyer‘s recovery from the chemical dependency or mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and (d) the recovery arrested the misconduct, and the misconduct‘s recurrence is unlikely; (10) delay in the attorney discipline proceeding; (11) the imposition of other penalties or sanctions; (12) remorse; (13) remoteness of prior violations of the MARPC; and (14) unlikelihood of repetition of the misconduct.
Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n v. Taniform, 482 Md. 272, 298 (2022) (citation modified).
The hearing judge found only one mitigating factor to apply, given Ms. El-Shall‘s default below: the absence of prior attorney discipline. Petitioner does not except to this finding. We agree that this mitigating factor is present.
Ms. El-Shall contends that we should consider Dr. Tellefsen‘s opinions and thereby conclude that Ms. El-Shall has met her burden to demonstrate the existence of two other mitigating factors: (1) personal or emotional problems; and (2) a mental disability or
“When, subsequent to the evidentiary hearing ... a respondent attorney produces proffered new evidence that may be material to the matter ... , [this Court] possesses the discretion to remand the proceedings so that the new evidence may be offered and, if admitted, considered by the hearing judge.” Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n v. Lee, 387 Md. 89, 116 (2005). However, this Court typically will not remand to the hearing judge for introduction of evidence that was available to the respondent at the time of the evidentiary hearing. See Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n v. James, 385 Md. 637, 657-59 (2005) (declining to remand case to hearing judge to allow respondent to introduce documents that respondent failed timely to produce in discovery to Bar Counsel).
In arguing for a remand, Ms. El-Shall relies on Attorney Grievance Commission v. King. There, the hearing judge found that the attorney had been the victim of domestic violence and therefore found the mitigating factor of personal or emotional problems. King, 491 Md. at 513-14. However, the hearing judge in that case did not make any findings concerning the degree to which domestic violence contributed to the attorney‘s misconduct or whether it was likely to contribute to future misconduct. Id. at 514. We stated that, “[i]n a different case, we might be inclined to return this to the hearing judge to make such findings.” Id. However, because the attorney herself “did not tie the domestic violence she
Ms. El-Shall asserts that her case is the “different case” we envisioned in King because, on remand, Dr. Tellefsen‘s opinions would provide mitigation evidence “that goes to the very heart of this matter.” She contends that a remand is particularly appropriate because the mental disability that (in Dr. Tellefsen‘s opinion) caused the misconduct also prevented Ms. El-Shall from participating in the proceedings before the hearing judge.
Petitioner argues that we should neither remand the case for the hearing judge to consider Ms. El-Shall‘s belated mitigation evidence, nor find the presence of additional mitigating factors in the first instance ourselves.
As discussed above, Dr. Tellefsen‘s opinions were not subject to cross-examination by Petitioner during the evidentiary hearing. We refer attorney grievance cases to circuit court judges for evidentiary hearings so that the claims of both Bar Counsel and attorney respondents may be tested through our adversarial system of justice. It would be improper for us to credit Dr. Tellefsen‘s untested opinions in the first instance.
We also agree with Petitioner that it would be inappropriate on this record to remand the case to the hearing judge. We are not persuaded that Ms. El-Shall was unable to participate in the proceedings before the hearing judge. On October 20, 2025, before the Order of Default was docketed, Ms. El-Shall filed on her own behalf an Opposition to Petitioner‘s Motion for an Order of Default. In her filing, Ms. El-Shall stated that she “did not intentionally disregard the proceedings. The failure to respond timely was due to acute
What Ms. El-Shall did not know when she filed this Opposition was that the hearing judge had already signed an Order of Default. That Order had not yet been docketed. On October 22, 2025, the court issued a Notice of Default Order. As required under
Depression, anxiety, substance abuse, and other mental health-related conditions correlate with increased levels of shame. See Brian Lawlor et al., The Harming Power of Shame, BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY, NOV. 5, 2025, at 3, available at https://perma.cc/DBE8-Z9GP. When a person experiences shame, social withdrawal and absenteeism commonly result. Id.; see also Jeff Elison et al., Investigating the Compass of Shame: The Development of the Compass of Shame Scale, 34 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY: INT‘L J. 221, 222-23 (2006) (describing withdrawal and avoidance as two common reactions to shame). Thus, it would not be surprising that an attorney who experiences shame incident to depression and substance abuse would find it difficult to participate in disciplinary proceedings, despite the prospect of facing sanctions.
We can imagine a case where an attorney is so incapacitated by mental health or substance abuse problems that they are completely unable to participate in an evidentiary hearing on disciplinary charges. The record does not reflect that this is such a case. We have no reason to disbelieve Ms. El-Shall‘s statement in her October 2025 filing that she had been experiencing acute mental health challenges. Yet, Ms. El-Shall demonstrated with the one filing she submitted that she had the wherewithal to participate to some degree in the disciplinary proceedings as early as October 2025. The evidentiary hearing went forward on January 14, 2026, without Ms. El-Shall in attendance. On February 24, 2026, counsel for Ms. El-Shall entered his appearance in this case. Ms. El-Shall has not
In addition, as discussed below, even if we assume that the hearing judge would find that the mitigating factors of personal or emotional problems and mental disability or chemical dependency are present, it would have no effect on our determination of the appropriate sanction. For all these reasons, we decline to direct a remand to allow Ms. El-Shall to introduce mitigation evidence.
In sum, we conclude that the mitigating factor of absence of prior attorney discipline applies in this case. We determine that the following aggravating factors are present: (1) a pattern of misconduct; (2) multiple violations of the MARPC; (3) bad faith obstruction of the attorney disciplinary proceeding; (4) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct; and (5) indifference to rectifying the misconduct‘s consequences.
D. Sanction
In attorney grievance cases, “we select a sanction with the purpose of protecting the public and deterring future misconduct, not punishing the attorney.” King, 491 Md. at 509. In doing so, “[w]e consider a variety of factors, including the rules that were violated, the mental state of the attorney, the injuries, if any, caused by the attorney‘s misconduct, and the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors.” Taniform, 482 Md. at 316.
In Hamilton, as in this case, the attorney violated Rules 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.16(d), 8.1(b), and 8.4(d) by effectively abandoning her client and by failing to meaningfully participate in Bar Counsel‘s investigation. See Hamilton, 493 Md. at 53-57. However, unlike Ms. El-Shall, the attorney in Hamilton violated Rules 1.5(a) and 1.15(c) by failing to deposit the client‘s retainer into an attorney trust account, charging an unreasonable fee, and failing to refund any portion of the retainer. See id. at 55-56. Unlike the present case, in Hamilton, we found the aggravating factors of substantial experience in the practice of law, dishonest or selfish motive, and likelihood of repetition of the misconduct. Id. at 58-59. In addition, as noted above, the attorney in Hamilton failed to participate for the duration of the proceedings. See id. at 48-49, 59. Based on all these circumstances, we disbarred the attorney. See id. at 60. Ms. El-Shall‘s misconduct is not as egregious as that of the attorney in Hamilton.
The other disbarment cases upon which Bar Counsel relies are also distinguishable. In Fox, in addition to abandoning his client and failing to cooperate with attorney grievance proceedings, the attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) by making an intentional misrepresentation to his client. See Fox, 417 Md. at 533-34. In Yeatman, after defaulting in the proceedings before the circuit court, the attorney made things worse by blaming his clients for the
Ms. El-Shall presents differently than Mr. Yeatman did. It is telling that the hearing judge in this case was “confounded” when considering the aggravating factor of likelihood of repetition of the misconduct. The record before the hearing judge suggested the presence of mental health issues. Ms. El-Shall stated that her failure to respond timely to the motion for default judgment was “due to acute mental health challenges.” She also told Bar Counsel‘s investigator that she was suffering “with depression and anxiety especially with this investigation and [was] under the care of a therapist and physician[.]” There was no suggestion that Mr. Yeatman‘s misconduct may have been related to mental health challenges.
In addition, after the hearing judge issued his findings of fact and conclusions of law, Ms. El-Shall retained counsel and began to participate meaningfully in the proceedings. In doing so, she showed a seriousness of purpose and respect for the process – albeit belated – that distinguishes her from attorneys (like the respondent in Hamilton) who take no part in the proceedings at all.
In our view, Attorney Grievance Commission v. Lee and Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kovacic are more analogous to this case. In Lee, we indefinitely suspended an attorney who violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.16, 3.2, 8.1(b), and 8.4(d) in connection with one client matter. 393 Md. 546, 563 (2006). We opined that “[i]ndefinite suspension from the practice of law is the proper sanction where the attorney violates [Rules] 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(b), and 8.4(d) by failing to communicate with the client and failing to cooperate with Bar
In Kovacic, the attorney violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 8.1(b) by failing to communicate with her client in a divorce proceeding and failing to timely respond to Bar Counsel‘s inquiries. 389 Md. 233, 239 (2005). There was “neither a finding, nor any basis for mitigating the respondent‘s misconduct[,]” because the respondent defaulted at the evidentiary hearing stage and did not appear when the case ultimately returned to this Court. See id. at 235, 236-37, 239-40. We imposed the sanction of indefinite suspension even though the attorney had no prior disciplinary history. Id. at 240.
In this case, as in Lee and Kovacic, we conclude that an indefinite suspension is the appropriate sanction. Ms. El-Shall effectively abandoned three clients and repeatedly failed to respond to Bar Counsel‘s inquiries. At the hearing in this Court, when asked for Petitioner‘s position concerning an appropriate sanction if the Court opted not to disbar Ms. El-Shall, Petitioner recommended an indefinite suspension with the right to apply for reinstatement after two years. As stated above, Ms. El-Shall recommends an indefinite suspension with the right to seek reinstatement after six months.
Dr. Tellefsen‘s reports suggest that Ms. El-Shall might have established the existence of the mitigating factors of personal or emotional problems and a mental disability or chemical dependency if Ms. El-Shall had participated in the evidentiary hearing. However, even if we were to credit everything in Dr. Tellefsen reports, we would conclude that Ms. El-Shall is not ready to resume the practice of law and that an indefinite suspension is necessary to protect the public. We decline to provide a specific time after
Given that Ms. El-Shall has alleged “acute mental health challenges[,]” we shall include as a condition to reinstatement that Ms. El-Shall demonstrate, by a report of a health care professional pre-approved by Bar Counsel, that she is mentally and physically competent to resume the practice of law. Any disagreement between Ms. El-Shall and Bar Counsel over the approval of such mental health care professional shall be decided by this Court. See Taniform, 482 Md. at 326. In addition, Ms. El-Shall shall engage an attorney monitor for a one-year period upon reinstatement to the practice of law in Maryland.16
VI
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Ms. El-Shall violated Rules 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.16(d), 8.1(b), and 8.4(a) and (d). We suspend Ms. El-Shall indefinitely from the practice of law in Maryland, effective as of the date of issuance of this opinion. Any petition for reinstatement that Ms. El-Shall files must include a report of a health care professional pre-approved by Bar Counsel demonstrating that Ms. El-Shall is mentally and physically competent to resume the practice of law. In addition, if Ms. El-Shall intends to resume a solo practice, her petition for reinstatement will need to include an agreement
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO