Attorney-General v. GoetchiusAttorney-General v. Goetchius
The bill of complaint was filed by the Attorney-General under the provisions of
The only answering defendant is the Borough of Edgewater which claims the lands by virtue of a final decree of this court adjudging that the other defendants named in this suit stand foreclosed of all right of redemption in and to certain lands including the lands under water which are the subject-matter of this suit. The State of New Jersey was not a party to the foreclosure under which the Borough of Edgewater claims its title.
The grantee, John M. Goetchius, died in August, 1904. His heirs were joined in this bill as parties defendant. They did not answer and a decree pro confesso was entered against them.
This cause was submitted to me upon a stipulation of facts and briefs. The stipulation is practically a restatement of the allegations in the pleadings. The stipulation, among other things, contains the following:
“It is further stipulated and agreed that the question before the court is as follows:
“Does the Borough of Edgewater have title by its bill to foreclose in the Court of Chancery to foreclose the right of redemption of the defendants or does title reside in the State of New Jersey by reason of the allegations that the original title was obtained by John M. Goetchius by fraud in this bill?”
In 1869, the legislature passed an act, chapter 383, P.L. 1869 (
“That in case any person or corporation who by any legislative act, is a grantee or licensee, or has such power or authority, or any of his, her or their representatives or assigns shall desire a paper capable of being acknowledged and recorded, made by and in the name
The bill alleges that in pursuance of the provisions of the foregoing act, John M. Goetchius, being the owner of lands fronting on the Hudson River which lie above high water mark and in front of which are the lands in question, being lands under water, applied for and obtained a grant on September 25th, 1901, from the Riparian Commission and Foster M. Voorhees, Governor, for the sum of $50, whereas under the terms of the above act, Goetchius should have paid $130,000 for the grant since he was the owner of 2,600 feet frontage of upland. The defendant denies that Goetchius was obliged to pay $50 per lineal foot and contends that by subsequent statutes the Riparian Commissioners, together with the Governor, were empowered to convey such riparian lands upon such terms as they fixed and determined.
The grant in question recited that it was made “Pursuant to an act of the Legislature of said State, approved March 21st, 1871, entitled, c.” The pleadings admitted, except as to the amount of the consideration, that the grant was made pursuant to the provisions of the act of 1869. The act of 1871 did not apply to lands under the waters of the Hudson River where the lands in question are located. The act of 1869 applied to the lands under the tidewaters of the Hudson River, New York Bay and the Kill von Kull, lying between Enyard‘s dock, on the Kill von Kull, and the New York State line. The act of 1871 applied to grants of the State‘s lands under tidewaters elsewhere than within the territory named in the act of 1869. Fitzgerald v. Faunce, 46 N.J. Law 536, 592, 594.
The question as to the right of Goetchius to obtain the grant, which is now sought to be set aside, is not raised in this suit. It appears that he had the right by virtue of his being the successor in title to one, Robert Annett, who, in 1844, was authorized by the legislature “to keep up and maintain wharves, * * *, upon and in front of his said lands, in the same manner as fully to all intents and purposes, as if an act of the legislature had been first passed, authorizing and making it lawful for him or them to build and erect the same.” See P.L. 1844 p. 210. In McCarter, Attorney-General v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 78 N.J. Eq. 346, 351; affirmed, 86 N.J. Eq. 168, Vice-Chancellor Stevens, in considering the said act of 1869, said:
“Sections 4 and 8 provide for grants to two different classes of persons — section 4 for the class mentioned in section 3, viz., those who already have a grant of lands under water or a license to reclaim or build docks, c., given by prior legislative act, and section 8 for the class of persons who have no such grant or license.”
Goetchius was within the class of persons entitled to the grant under section 4 of the act of 1869. Therefore, the only question remaining for consideration is whether or not he was obliged to pay $50 per lineal foot for his grant of 2,600 feet frontage. There is nothing in the pleadings or in the stipulation concerning the value of the lands in question at the time the grant was made. I am, therefore, unable to determine whether the lands conveyed were worth even the $50 which the grantee paid.
After a thorough study of the pertinent statutes and the cases construing them, which I might state required several months of research, I am of the opinion that the grant should not be set aside. It appears that the provisions of section 4 of the act of 1869 remained in effect until 1891. In that year the legislature passed an act (P.L. 1891 p. 213) entitled “A Further Supplement to an act entitled `An Act to ascertain the rights of the state and of the riparian owners in the lands lying under the waters of the bay of New York and elsewhere in the state,\’ approved April eleventh, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-four.” Said act was approved March 20th, 1891, and took effect immediately. Section 4 of said act (
“That the riparian commissioners, or a majority of them, together with the governor, shall not hereafter be required to give leases for lands of the state under water, convertible into grants upon payment of the principal sum mentioned therein, but may sell or let any of the lands of the state below mean high-water mark, upon such terms as to purchase money or rental, and under such conditions and restrictions as to time and manner of payment and duration and removal of any lease, the occupation and use of the land sold or leased, and such other conditions and restrictions as the interest of the state may require, as may be fixed and determined by said riparian commissioners, or a majority of them, together with the governor.”
Section 5 of said act provides:
“That all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with this act be and the same are hereby repealed, and that this act shall take effect immediately.”
I have concluded that the legislature, by means of the act of 1891, repealed the provisions of section 4 of the act of 1869 which act made it mandatory upon the riparian commissioners and the Governor to obtain $50 per lineal foot of land conveyed. From and after the passage of the act of 1891 the riparian commissioners and the Governor were given discretion “as the interest of the State may require” to fix and determine the price to be paid for a grant within the purview of the fourth section of the act of 1869. Up to the time of the enactment of the act of 1891, the only statute which fixed the price to be obtained for riparian grants was section 4 of the act of 1869 and, as above stated, the act of 1869 applied only to lands under the tidewaters of the Hudson River, New York Bay and the Kill von Kull, lying between Enyard‘s dock, on the Kill von Kull, and the New York State line which territory included the lands in question. The Riparian Act of 1871 (P.L. 1871 p. 44),
In view of the foregoing, I am convinced that the riparian commissioners and the Governor were empowered by the provisions of sections 4 and 5 of the act of 1891 (P.L. 1891 p. 213) to obtain for the grant in question a price to be fixed and determined by them. Since it appears by the terms of the grant itself that $50 was the price so fixed and determined and there being no proof as to the value of the lands conveyed, I am of the opinion that there should be a decree in favor of the defendant Borough of Edgewater. In the case of Attorney-General v. Sooy Oyster Co., 78 N.J. Law 394, 410, the court said:
“Courts do not, in these cases where the administrative
The elements for judicial interference are not present in this case.