97 Mich. 589 | Mich. | 1893
The Attorney General petitions for leave to file an information in the nature of a quo warranto for the purpose of ascertaining by what authority respondent claims the right to maintain its road and collect tolls thereon. The petition is based upon-the act of the Legislature of 1893 known as “Local Act No. 421,” entitled “An act to repeal an act entitled ‘An act to incorporate the Detroit & Saline Plank-Koad Company/ approved March 23, 1848, and to provide for winding up the affairs of said company.” The first section of said Act No. 421 is the repealing section, and the second section provides that proceedings may be had for winding up the affairs of said corporation in the circuit court, as in cases of forfeiture.
It appears by the House Journal that on February 9, 1893, within the first 50 days of the session, a bill was introduced in the House, entitled “A bill to authorize the cities and townships of the State to acquire by purchase
The last of the 50 days was February 22. The bill substituted on May 24 was clearly a new bill, and the case is ruled by Saclcrider v. Board of Supervisors, 79 Mich. 59. The bill introduced provided for the purchase and sale or condemnation of the rights of toll or plank road companies in the streets or highways of cities or townships. It contemplated a taking of property rights, and compensation therefor, and not a forfeiture. It recognized the act under which respondent was incorporated, and property rights acquired and held thereunder. The bill passed repeals the act of incorporation, and recognizes no right to property. In Attorney General v. Rice, 64 Mich. 385, and Hart v. McElroy, 72 Id. 446, the bills related to the organization of territory into municipalities. The body of the bills did not appear in the journals, and it was held that the presumption must be that the body of the bills related to the same territory. In the present ease, however, we have the bill as passed, and the title to the bill introduced, which title sets forth clearly and explicitly the object of the bill presented. While we cannot resort to testimony outside of the journal, we are justified in giving to the journal entries their apparent meaning. The presumption is that the bill introduced had a body, and that the object, the attainment of which was therein provided for, bore some resemblance to the purpose expressed in the title. This presumption must be indulged; otherwise, by the use of scissors and mucilage and an amendment (?) of the title, the constitutional provision may be easily evaded.
In Attorney General v. Rice, supra, it is said that—
“The object of the Constitution in providing that no new bill shall be introduced after the first 50 days of the session (article 4, §_ 28) is to prevent hasty and improvident legislation, and to compel, so far as any previous law can accomplish that result, the careful examination of pro*593 posed laws, or, at least, the affording of opportunity for that purpose (Cooley, Const. Lim. 139); and .also to give the people of the State, or of any locality in the State, an opportunity to be heard upon proposed legislation affecting their interests. The legislative journals, referring as they do to the titles of all bills introduced, give some warning to the people of the measures introduced.”
The legislative journal, up to the date of the passage of this bill, — but a few days before adjournment, — gave no hint that such a bill was under consideration. Certainly no one was bound to presume that provisions repealing a special act of incorporation, taking away its power to hold property, and compelling a surrender of its property rights, were germane to a title providing for the purchase and sale, within prescribed limits, of rights of property of all corporations. If such an act was contemplated, the notice was delusive and deceptive.
It is clear that the constitutional provision respecting the introduction of bills has been disregarded, and the petition is therefore dismissed.