249 Mass. 473 | Mass. | 1924
This is an information brought by the attorney general at the relation of the insurance commissioner under St. 1922, c. 417, § 1, to restrain the defendant from
The question to be decided is whether this so called lease constitutes a contract of insurance. A contract of insurance is defined by G. L. c. 175, § 2, to be “ an agreement by which one party for a consideration promises to pay money or its equivalent, or to do an act valuable to the insured, upon the destruction, loss or injury of something in which the other party has an interest.” This definition is intended to be comprehensive of all kinds of insurance, including life, fire, accident, fidelity, health, title, and liability, because it is the definition of the chapter in which all these varieties of insurance are regulated. This statutory definition does not differ in any essential from the common law definition. Commonwealth v. Wetherbee, 105 Mass. 149. Claflin v. United States Credit System Co. 165 Mass. 501.
It is manifest that the defendant does not receive so far as the face of its lease is concerned any particular sum of money for the part of the agreement which relates to the cancellation of the debt in case of the death of its customer. The consideration for the lease or contract appears to be single both for the personal property and the agreement as to cancellation of the debt in case of the customer’s death. It is equally plain that the defendant is bound by the terms of its contract to cancel the balance of debt due it in case of the death of its customer, and to cause the title to personal property to vest in his estate. Its contract is not like an unsealed agreement to discharge an overdue debt 'on payment in cash of less than its full amount. The quoted clause of the lease is part of the defendant’s initial contract with its customer, is supported by the consideration of that contract and is binding upon the defendant. The clause respecting cancellation of the balance of the debt necessarily implies transfer of title to the property by the defendant to the estate of its customer on the death of the latter.
. Whether this clause in the contracts of the defendant is ancillary to its chief business or is mainly for advertising ends is not relevant in view of the absolute prohibition in G. L. c. 175, § 3, against the making of contracts for insurance except by companies and in the manner authorized by law. This prohibition is sweeping. It is not subject to exceptions. It is conceded that the defendant is not authorized to make contracts of insurance. Therefore it has violated the statute.
Injunction to issue as prayed for, with costs.