Attorney General v. BrownAttorney General v. Brown
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Lynch
The defendant, Harold Brown, appeals from a decision of a judge in the Housing- Court granting summary judgment in favor of the Attorney General. In October, 1983, the Attorney General filed suit against Harold Brown, alleging violations of
1.
Federal preemption.
Brown claims that
There are several theories under which a State statute may be preempted, by Federal law. Congress may expressly state that State law is preempted, see
Jones
v.
Rath Packing Co.,
430 U.S. 519 (1977), or an intent to preempt the field may be inferred where the scheme of the Federal legislation is so comprehensive that it creates the inference that Congress “left no room” for State regulation in that area, see
Rice
v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
See also California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n
v.
Guerra,
479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987). Neither theory applies here. There is nothing in the Federal statute that explicitly preempts State regulation. In fact, the Federal statute envisions participation by States in the implementation of the program, thus, reducing the persuasiveness of the argument in favor of preemption. See
Kargman
v.
Sullivan,
552 F.2d 2, 11 (1st Cir. 1977). Furthermore, although the Federal scheme is comprehensive, there is no
Federal law may also preempt State law to the extent that it actually conflicts with the Federal law . California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, supra at 281. A conflict may be found where compliance with both State and Federal regulations is physically impossible, see Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or where the State statute “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., supra at 525-526; Grocery Mfrs. of America, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Health, 379 Mass. 70, 81 (1979). Since compliance with both statutes is not impossible, we shall focus our inquiry on whether the State statute is an obstacle to the accomplishment of the Federal purpose.
“[P]re-emption is not to be lightly presumed.” Guerra, supra at 281. There must be “actual, impermissible conflict,” not merely “unsupported pronouncements as to [Federal] policy.” Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc., supra at 82, quoting Kargman v. Sullivan, supra at 6. In addition, exclusive Federal power is less likely to be intended in areas of local, rather than national, importance. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 493 (1987) (control of interstate pollution primarily matter of Federal law); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 553-554 (1973) (power to grant copyrights national in scope); Kargman v. Sullivan, supra at 11.
Brown claims that the State statute, as interpreted by the Housing Court judge, mandates a landlord’s participation in a voluntary Federal program and, therefore, violates the supremacy clause. The Attorney General claims that there is nothing in the Federal statute that would prohibit States from requiring landlords to participate in the Section 8 program where they offer apartments that fall within the Section 8 fair market rents.
The State statute does not conflict with the Federal statute and is not preempted thereby. Both
It does not follow that, merely because Congress provided for voluntary participation, the States are precluded from mandating participation absent some valid nondiscriminatory reason for not participating. The Federal statute merely creates the scheme and sets out the guidelines for the funding and implementation of the program by the United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) through local housing authorities. It does not preclude State regulation.
In Massachusetts Medical Soc’y v. Dukakis, 637 F. Supp. 684, 699 (D.Mass. 1986), aff’d, 815 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1987), the court found nothing in the Federal Medicare Act precluding States from prohibiting balance billing even though the Federal act does not. The court reasoned that the mere fact that the Federal act contained no prohibition of balance billing did not mean that the States could not prohibit such a practice. Id. 5 Similarly, in Kargman v. Sullivan, supra, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld a Boston rent control ordinance against a challenge that it was preempted by Federal housing legislation which set the maximum rents for federally subsidized apartment complexes. Id. at 4, 13. The court ruled that the HUD rents were not minimum rents and that Boston was not necessarily foreclosed from creating a rent control system mandating lower rents, id. at 7, and that no actual conflict was demonstrated even though “some adverse financial consequences” to the landlords did exist, id. at 13.
In the present case, the defendant has failed to demonstrate an actual impermissible conflict. In fact, the Federal scheme envisions State and Federal coordination. In
Kargman
v.
Sullivan, supra
at 11, the court saw the “federal housing legislation [which] creat[ed] the network of subsidized housing law [as] superimposed upon and consciously interdependent with the substructure of local law relating to housing.” Thus, we conclude that
2. Summary judgment. In his order of April 1, 1986, the Housing Court judge found that the Boston Housing Authority (BHA) and the Executive Office of Communities and Development (EOCD), which issue Section 8 certificates in the Boston area, currently provide Section 8 assistance payments on behalf of 3,670 and 2,826 eligible families, respectively. Approximately 50% of the families who received Section 8 certificates through BHA and EOCD are unable to secure housing for which they can use their certificates, “principally because of discrimination against Section 8 certificate holders.” He also found that Section 8 certificate holders are “overwhelmingly blacks and other minorities.” 6
The judge further found that Harold Brown, who owns or has a general partnership interest in 8,000 residential units of which 3,000 are in the Allston-Brighton area of Boston, refused
The judge granted summary judgment for the Attorney General and held that Brown’s practice of refusing to process rental applications from Section 8 certificate holders was a violation of
In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Attorney Gen.
v.
Bailey,
386 Mass. 367, 370, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 970 (1982). See
In
Wheelock College
v.
Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination,
371 Mass. 130 (1976), this court set out the standard of proof necessary to establish unlawful discriminaton under G. L. c. 151B. Although the case dealt with sex discrimination in employment, the general rule regarding burden of proof under G. L. c. 151B was not so limited.
Wheelock College, supra
at 131, 136-139. Once the complainant proves a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination, the burden shifts to the respondent to produce evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the action.
Id.
at 136-138. The burden of proof, however, rests at all times with the complainant.
Id.
at 139. Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that under
In his opposition to the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, Brown claimed that he had legitimate business reasons for refusing to accept Section 8 tenants. He stated in his affidavit that he wished to use his own lease form because the Section 8 lease was less advantageous to him and that, in some instances, housing authorities have allowed variations. He further claimed that it was important for him to be able to collect the last month’s rent and, in some cases, one month’s rent as a security deposit, because he could earn more money in interest than the amount which he must return to the tenant. 8
In his appeal Brown claims that he did not violate
A local housing authority could not approve Brown’s standard lease since it contains provisions which are clearly contrary to the provisions of the Section 8 program. Under the regulations, the lease must comply with requirements of the program and cannot contain certain prohibited lease provisions.
Thus, whether local housing authorities waived any of the requirements of the Section 8 program is immaterial. There are, however, issues which we believe to be material to the central issue whether Brown discriminated against recipients of Section 8 subsidies “solely” because of their status as such. Brown claims that legitimate business reasons kept him from renting to Section 8 certificate holders, primarily his loss of the cash flow engendered from his collecting, in advance, the last month’s rent and a security deposit equal to one month’s rent. That these reasons are related to the requirements of the Section 8 program does not necessarily equate with discrimination “solely” on the basis of the individual’s status as a Section 8 certificate holder. Brown should have an opportunity to litigate the issue whether his reasons are legitimate business reasons which are not satisfied by the protections afforded by the regulations of the Section 8 program.
The Attorney General claims that the protections gained from the collection of the last month’s rent in advance are provided by
The Attorney General claims that any loss due to the inability of Brown to collect the last month’s rent is “de minimis” since under
Judgment reversed.
Notes
Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 established a program “for the purpose of aiding lower-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically mixed housing.”
Brown asserted before the Housing Court that he now accepts Section 8 tenants and that the issue was whether
in the past,
Brown’s policies violated
Similarly, even where a case may be not properly before the court, we may address the issue where it is one of significant public importance. Selectmen of Braintree v. County Commissioners of Norfolk, 399 Mass. 507, 508 (1987). Wellesley College v. Attorney Gen., 313 Mass. 722, 731 (1943).
The court acknowledged that participation in the Medicare program itself was voluntary; therefore, the State prohibitions against balance billing did not mandate something that Congress had made voluntary. Massachusetts Medical Soc’y v. Dukakis, supra at 702. We do not believe, however, that this compels a different result in the present case.
The judge found that between July, 1982, and January, 1985, 79% of the Section 8 certificates issued by the BHA went to members of minorities.
The Attorney General’s claim is that Brown discriminated in relation to those apartments which fall within the fair market rentals allowed by Section 8. There is no contention that Brown should be forced to lower his rents in order to make his properties accessible to Section 8 certificate holders.
Under
The statute also provides for adjustments in the monthly rents to reflect changes in the fair market rentals, and additional adjustments “to the extent [the Secretary] determines such adjustments are necessary to reflect increases in the actual and necessary expenses of owning and maintaining the units,” including increases in taxes, utility rates, and other costs.