99 Mass. 148 | Mass. | 1868
The defence in this suit seems to rest upon the supposition that the existence and organization of the corporation, the functions and capacities with which it is endowed by the law creating it, are alone what constitute the franchise, or “ commodity,” which is the subject of the tax or excise imposed by" the St. of 1865, c. 283. If it were so, there would be much force in the argument that, when these are derived exclusively from the authority of another state, they are not proper subjects of state taxation here.
But we think this is a too limited view of the matter. It is not merely the creation of corporate functions and privileges, or the conferring of rights and franchises by the legislature, which entitles the state to tax the possessor of such privileges and rights. The exercise of powers or privileges, and even of occupations without especial powers or privileges, may be equally subjected to such taxation, under the constitutional authority to “impose and levy reasonable duties and excises.” It was so considered in the case of Portland Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass. 252; and the tax of one per cent., laid upon the capital stock of the bank, was justified upon principles equally applicable to individuals transacting similar business, and to brokers, factors, auctioneers, &c. The tax was not sustained on the ground that the corporation derived its existence from the state which imposed the tax ; on the contrary, one principal question in that case was, whether, by the charter, the state had not conferred upon the bank the privilege of doing the business, for which it was created, without restriction, so as to exempt the corporation from the requisition of any tax or duty afterwards levied upon the exercise of that privilege.
That decision is sufficient for the present case. The tax is, indeed, in form., levied upon the capital stock of the corporation,
When the exercise of corporate functions, authorized by the state, is extended beyond the limits of the state, as in railroads and telegraph lines, the tax is apportioned accordingly. In the case of mining companies whose mines are without the state, the tax is limited by the “ par” of the stock ; and the tax upon foreign companies is founded upon the express consideration of “ having an office or place of business within the Commonwealth for the direction of its affairs or ‘transfer of shares.” A mining corporation which comes within the terms of this provision has its domicil of business within the Commonwealth, as completely as one that is organized under our General Statutes for the prosecution of a like enterprise. A corporation which seeks, by its agents, to establish a domicil of business in a state other than that of its creation, must take that domicil, as individuals are always understood to do, subject to the responsibilities and burdens imposed by the laws which it finds in force there. The state may deny to foreign corporations the right to transact their business, hold property, or exercise any corporate function whatever within its limits. Or it may permit them to exercise such privileges upon terms prescribed by law, as has long been done in relation to insurance companies. Erie Railway Co. v. New Jersey, 2 Vroom, 531. The provisions of the statute in question are founded upon this right of exclusion or of conditional admission. Exclusion is the remedy provided to enforce compliance. The very defence to the suit implies the enjoyment of valuable rights and privileges within the Commonwealth, which a foreign corporation can only exercise by comity and the permission of the state.
The Commonwealth is therefore entitled to an injunction restraining the further prosecution of the business of the defendant corporation within the Commonwealth, excepting the payment of debts already contracted, until all taxes due under said act shall be paid with interest and costs.