175 Mich. 438 | Mich. | 1913
A resolution of the board of education of the city of Detroit instructed the secretary of the board—
“To purchase a supply of such high school textbooks, as are not furnished free on the usual terms on which the board purchases text-books, sufficient to*439 supply the needs of high school pupils during the first semester, and to arrange for the sale of the books at cost to high school pupils; the secretary to act in conjunction with the superintendent and the committee on text-books and course of study and finance.”
Bids for books to be furnished under this resolution were solicited. Asserting that the board of education has no power to engage in the purchase and sale of text-books, the attorney general, upon the relation of two taxpayers of the city, who are also dealers in books, filed in the circuit court, in chancery, a bill to restrain contemplated further proceedings in accordance with the resolution. An issue was made by answer and replication; there was a hearing at which testimony was taken in open court; the court granted the permanent injunction prayed for in the bill; and the defendants have appealed from the decree. The question presented is whether the board of education has power to do what the resolution contemplates shall be done.
It is conceded that the defendant board has no express power to carry out its resolution unless it is conferred in the following language of the act creating the school district:
“The board of education shall have full power and authority * * * to make by-laws and ordinances * * * relative to regulation of schools, and the books to be used therein; * * * relative to anything whatever that may advance the interests of education, the good government and prosperity of the free schools in said city, and the welfare of the public concerning the same.” Act No. 233, Laws 1869, § 8.
Relying upon this, defendants also point out that section 5 of the act gives to the board of education power to sell and convey real and personal property as the interest of said free schools may require. It is said, too, that, in the absence of express power in this behalf, power to do what the board desires to do may fairly be implied, and that the exercise of the
Broad as the terms employed in the act are, we cannot admit that what is proposed to be done is “anything whatever that may advance the interests of education, the good government and prosperity of the free schools in said city, and the welfare of the public concerning the same,” within the meaning and purpose of the statute. It is familiar doctrine that school districts are State agencies with limited powers, confined, generally, to those expressly enumerated and those necessarily implied. And, although in general terms powers may be broadly given, the character of the corporation itself and the purposes for which it was created supply limitations in view of which the language employed must be read. Powers could not
The decree of the court below is affirmed. No costs of this appeal are awarded to either party.