Chapter 29, Laws 1893, abolished the existing subdivision of towns into highway districts and made the town the unit for the performance of the highway constructing and maintaining duty imposed upon the town. In place of highway surveyors, highway agents elected by the town were provided. In case of a failure to elect by the town or of a vacancy in the office, the selectmen were authorized to appoint, but no person could at the same time hold the offices of highway agent and selectman. Ib., ss. 4, 5. Section 3 of the act which provided for the election of such officers and defined their powers and duties was amended and re-enacted in 1897, 1913, 1915, and 1917. The amendment of 1917 is not material, but in 1915 (Laws 1915, c. 171) the whole section was revised, rearranged, and errors in former amendments corrected. The section was then reenacted, all former legislation relating thereto being repealed. The material part of this act, the existing law on the subject, is: "At the annual election, each town shall elect by ballot one or more, not exceeding three, highway agents, who, under the direction of the selectmen, shall have charge of the construction and repair of all highways and bridges within the town, and shall have authority to employ the necessary men and teams, and purchase timber, planks, and other material for construction and repair of highways and bridges. . . . Or the town may vote at the annual election to instruct its selectmen to appoint an expert highway agent, who, under the direction of the selectmen, shall have the same power and perform the same duties as a highway agent if elected by said town." If the defendant Brooks can qualify as an "expert highway agent," the town has not instructed the selectmen to appoint one. The relators were duly elected by ballot by the town and there is no vacancy. If the selectmen can remove certain highways from the jurisdiction of the agents in the absence of special authority as to such highways, they could in the same way treat all the highways in the town. They could arbitrarily deprive the duly elected officers of the town of the entire authority vested in them by the town.
Occasion has not arisen to define the division of power between selectmen and highway agents in the performance of the official duty of highway construction and repair. O'Brien v. Derry,
It is said that two highway systems have existed in New Hampshire since 1905, one the so called state highway system which includes state highways and state aided highways, and the other such highways as are not state highways or state aided highways. This claim is well supported. Laws 1915, c. 48, s. 2; Kelsea v. Stratford,
But it is argued that the governor and council now represented by the highway commissioner, being judge of the manner in which the duty of maintenance was performed and authorized to prescribe the terms upon which the town should be permitted to perform improvement work, could prescribe in advance that a particular person should have charge of and do the work. Whether this would be a reasonable exercise of the state's power of control or of the "general supervision, control, and direction . . . over all matters pertaining to the . . . construction, maintenance, and abandonment of highways, now or hereafter built or maintained either in whole or in part with money appropriated from the state treasury" which the highway commissioner is required to exercise (Laws 1915, c. 103, s. 4), or not, need not be considered. The petitioners do not complain because the highway commissioner has required them to put Brooks in charge or to employ him. Their complaint is that the selectmen have supplanted them in the performance of the duties confided to them by law by the appointment of another to perform duties which the town elected them to perform. If the selectmen had no power to make the appointment complained of, the consent or approval of the highway commissioner did not confer it upon them. The power of the commissioner of highways is not involved. It does not appear that he required the employment of Brooks, if it could be shown that under the circumstances such a requirement was a reasonable exercise of his control over road improvement or maintenance in part at the expense of the state.
Nothing has been found in the road improvement law extending the directing power of the selectmen. As has already been suggested, if the selectmen under their power of direction have authority to remove one road from the relators' charge they could have taken all and absolutely deprived the relators of all official power and duty. As the statute expressly declares the offices of highway agent and selectman to be incompatible, it is not probable that the legislature *Page 75 by giving directing power to the selectmen intended to authorize them to absorb the office as they could if they possessed the arbitrary power of removal which alone would sustain the action complained of.
The defendant's appointment is void and the order dismissing the petition erroneous. The plaintiff's exception is sustained. It is uncertain whether the order was made upon a trial of the facts or upon the allegations of the petition merely. For this reason instead of ordering the granting of the prayer of the petition the order is
Order of dismissal set aside.
All concurred.