The arguments at the bar took a wide range, embracing a discussion of almost the whole .jurisdiction of this court, under the head of nuisance. It is nоt intended to notice all the points of controversy; because the court is under no necessity of laying down, any general principles for the decision of this case. It stands on very special circumstances, found upon issues requested by the parties.
It is admitted, that for the ordinary damage to the plaintiff ’s land by flooding it, there is a remedy by action; and that it is an adequate remedy. On that score then, the interposition of this court is not asked.
But it is said, that the injury to the plaintiff's health and that of Ms family is one, which cannot he ascertainеd at law; much less, adequately compensated ; and that a jiist apprehension of it forms a proper case for the prevеntive justice of equity, by injunction.
It may he so, where the nuisance, thus operating upon an individual, arises from an" establishment made fdr personаl gratification, or mere private profit It is certain, that equity does, in some instances, restrain mere private nuisances. But it is equally сertain that it is not forward to do so, unless they interfere with a clear right long previously enjoyed ; or will be followed by irreparable mischiеf, which makes immediate action a duty founded on imperious necessity. These are general doctrines. And the destruction of health might well be considered a case of irreparable mischief, in a case where private emolument alone is looked to on the other side. But our views'cannot be thus limited in the case before us. Mills arc necessary public conveniences; and water spills thе ordinary and almost the universal kind in this state. It is á maxim, that private right must yield to public convenience, upon adequate compensatiоn,' Without adverting to the variety of subjects to which courts have applied it, itis sufficient for the occasion to remark, that the legislature hath by divers statutes extended it to mills. In a modern act, it lias been carried to the unusual extent of taking away the common law action, until the quantum, of dam age has been ascertained, by a peculiar method, to be more than •£ 10 annually. If less, it amounts to a compulsory leаse, for five years. It may be, that the damages of the plaintiff will be less than the sum specified in the act. It would be strange, if this court were to. prohibit the erection of a mill, for which, if erected, the party, by positive enactment of the legislature, can have no action at common law. If the plaintiff rely on the magnitude of the injury, he ought to have put it to the jury to assess the probable amount, or at least to have made proof, to rebut an inference fairly deducible from the verdict. The jury have found, that the mill will be a convenience to the neighborhood. *41 and of public utility; and that tlie health of the neighborhood will not Be injured- but that of the plaintiff’s ' ■* family will — tho’ to what extent or what рrobable extent, it is not said. The argument is, that this is sufficient ; for it is impossible for a jury to say, which fever is caused by the pond, or by the general insalubrity of the climate ; and that though the lower part of the state be unwholesome, yet the pestilence ought not to be aggravated by аrtificial causes. True; that is, from wantonness or for mere gain’s sake; which would be wicked gain indeed. But where a general convenience is involved, it constitutes a preponderating consideration, unless in itself it also produce a general mischief, or no compensation is awarded for tho invasion ofprivate right. Compensation is in this case amply provided for by the inquisition of a jury upon the amоunt of damages.. The general mischief consists in corrupting the atmosphere, so as to affect the general health of the neighborhood. If it extend only to one family, it cannot, as a general rule, he held a nuisance, under this head, to be redressed by abatement оr injunction. Á case may arise, as supposed at the bar, of the pond of an insignificant mill, throwing off vapours destructive to the healthfulness of a large landed estate; a case, in which between the public convenience and private suffering there is no kind of cоmparison; wherein the court would act. But the circumstances must he specially shown. None such appear here. There is nothing in this case but the interest ofa single individual, to weigh against public utility. This will not suffice. Wc must take notice, that in this climate a less injury than that can hardly ho expected from any mill. Wc , , , , múst.take notice, that the legislature was as much aware of that fact as wo are; ami yet that they havе encouraged the building of mills by restraining meces- sivc actions for tlie private, injury, and also authorized the County Courts to order the building on the lands of another, unless the mill would “ create á nuisance to the neighborhood(Jlctofl777, Rev. c. 122.) This is ah exposition ofa principle from the source of the law, which ihe court must respеct.
*42 It might he material too, that the plaintiff, and those-under whom he claims, submitted for forty years to this grievance; that he bought liis land in ¡795, while it subsisted, and allowed its continuаnce for five and twenty-years. That is indeed no positive bar to a remedy ; but it is a powerful reason, why this court should leave him to his legal remedy. He and the. defendant must both have calculated the value and the incouvenicnce of the mill, and its attendant consequenсes, when they made thei r punch ases.
But the stress of the ease lies in the other circumstances. Less harm cannot follow the building of a mill in the alluvial region of the State, than the rendering of one plantation less salubrious. To perpetuate this injunction, would be to issue onе against the erection of another mill below the falls in our rivers.
The cases heretofore in this court arc entirely distinguishable. Attorn ey-Gen. v. Blount, and Attorney-Gen. v. Hunter, werе founded on facts diametrically' opposite to the present. There the health of towns was put in jeopardy'. Crudup v. Carpenter * turned materially on the contract, and the extent of damage, ascertained by the verdicts at law, in comparison with the value of the mill property. Upon neither of those princiрles, nor any other compatible with legislative policy . or chancery-precedents, can this bill be sustained. It must therefore be dismissed with costs.
Per Curiam. — Bum dismissed-).
Notes
This case was not reported, as it was- decided solely upon the spo, cial terms of an agreement.