131 Iowa 232 | Iowa | 1906
Plaintiff received an injury, breaking one of the bones of his forearm. The acident occurred September 23, 1900. TIis certificate was issued July, -1898, and provided. that if a member in good standing should accidently break his arm or leg, he should receive “ one-tenth the amount his beneficiary would have been entitled to receive in case of the death of the member.” The certificate also contained this provision: “ This certificate, the articles of incorporation, the fundamental laws, by-laws, rules, and regulations of the society now in force, or which may be hereafter adopted, and the application for membership, including physician’s report, a copy of which is hereto attached, shall together constitute the exclusive contract between this society, the member, and the beneficiary.”
Defendant relies upon what is called Section E. Division 13, of its fundamental law, reading as follows: “ It will pay, within ninety days from the receipt of satisfactory proofs of the accidental breaking of an arm or leg, one-tenth the amount the beneficiary would have been entitled to in case of death of the member, provided that complete and satisfactory proofs of such- accidental injury shall be filed with the supreme secretary within thirty days of such accident. The breaking of an arm for which payment will be made is specifically defined to be the breaking of the shaft of the bone of the arm between the shoulder and elbow joints, or the breaking of the shafts of both bones between the elbow and wrist joints.” This was adopted by defendant’s board of directors, in lieu of the provisions of
Section 8. of defendant’s articles of incorporation provides that “ the board of directors may at any regular meeting adopt such by-laws as may be necessary, the same not to conflict with the fundamental laws of the fraternity.”
Among the so-called fundamental laws we find the following :
Sec. B. The articles of incorporation or fundamental laws of this fraternity may be amended by the supreme lodge at any regular or special meeting thereof, by a two-thirds vote of those present and voting. •
Sec. C. The board of directors may at any regular meeting adopt such by-laws as may be necessary, provided, that they do not conflict with the fundamental laws of the fraternity, and until the first convention of the supreme lodge, the board of directors may, by a two-thirds vote, amend the articles of incorporation or fundamental laws of the fraternity, and all such amendments made by the board of directors, shall be in full force and effect until repealed or set aside by action of the supreme lodge.
The records of the directors show that at a regular meeting of the board held on August 4, 1899, the following
and the only authority, conferred upon the board of directors. In amending or substituting another section of the fundamental law, the board was clearly acting without authority. Having no authority from the articles to amend the fundamental laws, it could not give itself such authority by saying that it had the power, as it attempted 'to do by the- so-called by-law adopted in July, 1897. Moreover, it is fundamental that a by-law cannot be so made as to destroy or impair a right. It is nothing more than a provision for the internal management of a corporation. Kirkpatrick v. Keota Church, 63 Iowa, 372; Peck v. Elliott, 47 U. S. App. 605 (79 Fed. 10, 24 C. C. A. 425, 38 L. R. A. 616); Com. v. Turner, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 493.
But we need not go into this as a matter of general law, for the members agreed, by and through the articles of incorporation, that the board of directors could not make bylaws in conflict with the fundamental laws; and it is clear that this was what the board attempted to do in adopting a substitute for section E, division 13, before referred to. We may assume that the body itself, acting as a supreme lodge, might change its fundamental laws; but, as this was not done or attempted until after plaintiff received his injuries and his-rights became vested, such action did not and could not affect
The judgment allowing plaintiff the amount promised in his benefit certificate is correct, and it is affirmed.