102 Ala. 184 | Ala. | 1893
The appeal in this case is from the decree of the chancery court sustaining demurrers to the bill of complaint and dissolving the injunction.
The case made by tho bill is, in substance, as follows : In 1886, S. M. Winchester conveyed to Obal Christopher
On the 30th day of October, 1888, Winchester granted to Ob al Christopher the right to mine the hard ore on the same lands, by lease containing substantially the same stipulations embraced in the lease above deá&ribed; except as to the price of the ore and the quantity to bo mined and shipped per month and per annum. The price of the hard ore being 'fixed at 12-2- cents per ton, and minimum quantity to be shipped monthly and annually being, respectively, 2,000 and 24,000 tons.
■ Both leases’, the bill avers, were duly transferred and assigned to the Attalla Mining and Manufacturing Company, tho appellant, with the consent or acquiescence of the lessor, who has since accepted and received payments of royalty under the terms of said leases. The bill further shows that notwithstanding the stipulation in the leases that possession should be given of all said property at the time mentioned in the leases, that neither appellant nor any of its predecessors under said, lease had ever been able to obtain possession of that part of the leased property designated in the leases as the'Rhea lands, but possession thereof had been forcibly withheld (but by whom is not stated) from the original lessees, and 'the siiccessive assignees of said leases (including appellant), by which the right to mine both soft and'hard ore on that portion of the property had been lost to appellant. That frequent demand had been made'(upon the lessor by appellant and its predecessors under said
The bank is made a party defexrdant with Winchester ; and the prayer of the bill is for an injunction against the further maintenance of said suits, and for an • accounting pursuant to the terms of the leases. The case was submitted on demurrer to the bill and on motion to dissolve the injunction. The chancery court sustained ' the' demurrers and dissolved the injunction.
The frame of the bill indicates that its equity is based upon the undoubted jurisdiction of courts of equity to grant relief against forfeitures incurred under agreements for the payment of money, in cases where the damages accruing from a breach of the agreement may be compensated by the payment of the amount actually due, with interest; the general rule being that where ■ the agreement is simply one for the payment of money, a forfeiture incurred by its non-performance will be set-aside at the instance of the defaulting party, or relieved against in any other manner made necessary by the circumstances of the case, on payment of the debt, interest' and costs, if any have accrued, unless by his- inequitably
As applicable to cases involving leases, the rule has been stated to be, that when a lease contains a condition that the lessor may re-enter, and put an end to the lessee’s estate, or even that the lease shall be void,' upon the lessee’s failure to pay the rent at the time specified, a court of equity will relieve the .lessee, and set asidé a forfeiture incurred by his breach of the condition, whetherfthe lessor has, or - has not entered and dispossessed the tenant. The reason and philosophy of the rule, in such cases, are that such condition and forfeiture áre intended merely as security for the payment of money. — 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 450, 453:
In Root v. Johnson, 99 Ala. 90, we said: ' “Forfeitures ; are not- favorites in equity, and, unless; the penalty is fairly proportionate to the damage suffered by the-breach, relief will be granted when the court can give by way of compensation all that could be reasonably expected.” While the doctrine of equitable relief in cases of forfeiture is clearly settled, as- we have shown, it is by no means clear, that the bill of com-, plaint in-.this cause makes out a case within that ground of equity, jurisdiction. .Indeed, construing the allegations of the bill most strongly against the pleader, as we must, .on demurrer, we are constrained to hold that it not only fails to show a- forfeiture incurred, against which relief is necessary in equity, but, on the contrary, that there has been a full compliance by appellant with the-terms of -the lease, and consequently that no forfeiture-has accrued, and furthermore, that if a forfeiture has Occurred, it has been waived by the lessor.
While ..the bill - shows that Winchester, the lessor, claims a.forfeiture-of .the leases, because of appellant’s alleged failure to mine and pay royalty on the minimum quantity of ore required by the terms of the leases, it further shows that This failure is protected by the express stipulations of the leases . which provides against such failure when caused by strikes and blow-outs. We ' quote briefly from the. 8th paragraph of the bill as’-fol-’" lows : ‘ 'But the amount of ore actually mined by your orator, with the credits and reduction to which your
We also quote further from the statements of the-amendment to the bill of February 27, 1893, as follows : “That complainant has paid rents and royalties to the said assignee’s agent and representative of’ said defendant, Winchester, since the assertion of said alleged forfeiture, and since the institution of said ejectment suit, and such -payments have been applied to and for the benefit of said defendant, Winchester, and so received and accepted by him.” The language employed in the bill to show such waiver would be wholly insufficient for that purpose had it been set up in answer to a bill to enforce the forfeiture. — Brooks v. Rogers, 99 Ala. 433. But, as .employed in the bill, before us,' and on demurrer, we must construe it most strongly against the pleader, and, therefore, hold that it implies-the rent s'o received by Winchester accrued after'th0 alleged breach of condition,- and was. so received under1 the lease with knowledge‘of all the circumstance's. - So construing it, the bill shows a frill and complete defense to Winchester’s action of ejectment on two grounds,
From what we have said, it is clear the bill can not be maintained, for the reason that it fails to show a necessity for equitable relief against the forfeiture, or that pecuniary compensation can not be made for the breach. It is, however, urged, that other grounds of equitable interposition are shown, and that if any one ground is established, the court should not only assume jurisdiction, but go on and determine all the questions in controversy, although it might involvo the adjudication of matters of purely legal cognizance. The principle contended for is undoubtedly correct. We have frequently recognized it in our decisions. — Va. & Ala. Min. &. Manfg. Co. v. Hale, 93 Ala. 542. But we are unable to perceive that the bill contains any ground upon which equitable jurisdiction attaches.
It can not be maintained upon the ground of avoiding a multiplicity of suits, because but two suits are shown to bo pending, as to both of which clear and unembarrassed defenses at law are shown to exist, and the bare allusions in the 13th paragraph of the bill to threatened suits is too vague and indefinite to add any thing to this alleged ground of equity.
Nor does the bill show mutual or complicated accounts, which a jury could not examine, and state with requisite accuracy. The bill shows that the necessary data are readily ascertainable sufficient to enable a jury to determine what deductions, according to the terms of the lease, should be allowed on account of strikes and blowouts, fro'm the required out-put of ore, and from the royalty agreed to be paid. There is no such complexity or intricacy in the accounts, appearing from the averments óf fact in the bill (outside of the mere statement of the pleader’s conclusions), as show a necessity for a resort to equity for a statement thereof. The jurisdiction of equity- on this ground was denied by us in a case showing much greater difficulties in the statement of the account than is here shown.— Va. & Ala. Min. & Manfg. Co. v. Hale, supra.
We will not discuss the other alleged grounds of equity jurisdiction urged in support of the bill. We simply cite the authorities which show conclusively that neither
The chancery court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to the original and amended bills, and in dissolving the injunction.
Its decree is affirmed.