135 Ga. 545 | Ga. | 1910
1. The act referred to in the questions propounded by the Court of Appeals, known as the “headlight law,” was duly deposited in the office of the secretary of State as an enrolled act of the General Assembly, after having been duly signed by the president of the Senate and the speaker of the House of Representatives, and approved by the Governor. The provision of the constitution referred to in the 1st question propounded is as follows: “No bill shall become a law unless it shall receive a majority of the votes of all the members elected to each house of the General Assembly, and it shall, in every instance, so appear on the journal.” Civil Code, § 5777. An act with the status above named can not be attacked as being invalid, under the constitu
If an act is not invalid under the provisions of the constitution above quoted when the legislative journals fail to show that it received a constitutional majority, it would not be invalid when the journals affirmatively show that it did not receive such majority. If
The 1st question propounded by the Court of Appeals must be answered in the affirmative. In answering this question, having ruled that an enrolled act duly signed by the presiding officers of both houses, approved by the Governor, and deposited with the secretary of State is conclusively presumed to be a valid law so far as its enactment is concerned, the special plea referred to in the 7th question was subject to be stricken on the general demurrer thereto, and the certified copy of the substitute referred to in the 7th question was not admissible in evidence “for the purpose of supplementing, varying, or explaining the entries in the journal of the Senate.” This ruling makes it unnecessary to determine whether or not the journal of the Senate shows that the act in question was, or was not, in fact passed in conformity to the above quoted provision of the constitution.
2. The full text of the title and the body of the act referred to in the questions propounded to us is as follows:
“An act to require all railway companies in the State to equip and maintain each and every locomotive used with sufficient electric headlight, to prescribe a punishment for the failure to so equip, and for other purposes.
“Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Georgia, and it is hereby enacted by authority of the same, that all railroad, companies are hereby required to equip and maintain each and every locomotive used by such company to run on its main line after dark with a good and sufficient headlight which shall consume not less than three hundred watts at the arc, and with a reflector not less than twenty-three inches in diameter, and to keep the same in good condition. The word main line as used herein means all*553 portions of the railway line not used solely as yards, spurs, and sidetracks.
“ Sec. 2. Be it further enacted, that any railroad company violating this act in any respect shall be liable to indictment as for a misdemeanor in any county in which the locomotive not so equipped and maintained may run, and on conviction shall be punished by fine as prescribed in section 1039 of the Code of 1895.
“Sec. 3. Be it further enacted, that this act shall go into effect July 1, 1909.
“See. 4. Provided, this act shall npt apply to tramroads, mill-roads, and roads engaged principally in lumber or logging transportation in connection with mills.
“Sec. 5. Be it.further enacted, that all laws and parts of laws in conflict with this act be and the same are hereby repealed.”
The act requires “all railroad companies” to equip every locomotive used by “such company to run on its main line” after dark with a light of the kind named, and provides that “any railroad company” violating the act shall be liable to indictment and to be punished by fine as prescribed in the Penal Code, § 1039. Does the term “railroad company” include a natural persoh, so that the latter would be subject to indictment if such natural person owned and operated a railroad and failed to comply with the provisions of the act? In construing the term “railroad company,” we should look to all the provisions of the act and give proper consideration to the object intended to be accomplished by the act. Section 4 of the act provides: “Provided, this act shall not apply to tram-roads, mill-roads, and roads engaged principally in lumber or logging transportation in connection with mills.” It should be observed that in making this exception the act does not say that the owner or operator of the roads designated should be excepted, but simply provides that “this act” shall not apply to such “roads,” indicating that the purpose of the act was to make the requirement in reference to the use of the named headlights on all other railroads, regardless of whether owned by a corporation or natural persons. The evident purpose was to except certain roads, but not to make any exception in favor of any particular owners of other roads. The object of the act was to require certain headlights on all railroads except those of a named class, and the term “railroad company” was intended to include natural persons as well as corr
The act does not violate the equal-protection clauses of,the State and Federal constitutions because it provides: “Provided this act shall not apply to tramroads, mill-roads, and roads engaged principally in lumber or logging transportation in connection with mills.” The roads to which the act does not apply do not serve the public generally, but their work is mainly that connected with lumber mills. Their principal business is not the transportation of
Conceding, without deciding, that receivers of railroads are not within the provisions of the act, we do not think this fact would make the act void as a violation of the equal-protection clauses of the State and Federal constitutions. A receiver appointed by a court is one of its officers; and in the absence of any statute imposing a duty on a receiver of a railroad thus appointed, he must handle the property placed in his charge-in accordance with the instructions of the court appointing him. His possession and operation of the road are those of the court. Should the court, through its receiver, have possession of a railroad whose engines were not equipped with the required headlight, or purchase other engines, the presumption is that the court — a branch of the government co-ordinate with the General Assembly — would conform to the policy of the State as declared by the General Assembly, in the exercise of the police power, and equip the engines with such headlights as it had by law required of railroad companies. A railroad is never retained possession of and operated by the court longer than is necessary. 'The court does not permanently operate railroads; on the contrary, it only operates them for a short time and from necessity. If the act applies to a receiver, and if a receiver were appointed by the court for a railroad whose engines were not equipped with the required headlights, how could such receiver operate the engines without such lights without subjecting himself to numerous prosecutions and fines, should the court require
3. All property is held subject to the police power of the State. The determination by the railroad company that the reflector and the light in use by it constitute an adequate light can not be conclusive on the General Assembly, which has the authority to exercise the police power of the State,' and in the interest of public safety to declare Such light inadequate. It is a matter of great importance for the protection of persons and property in the train, the persons on the locomotive, persons and property on the track, and persons and property on other trains with which a collision may be had, that there should be an adequate headlight on such locomotive. The General Assembly, in the exercise of the police power of the State, has the right to require adequate headlights on such engines; and if in conformity to the requirements of such law the railroad company is compelled to do away with the headlights already in use by it and substitute others therefor at its own expense, there is no taking of property without just compensation, in violation of the due-process clauses of the State and Federal constitutions. In such a case, there is no taking of property. The due-process clauses are not intended to limit the right of the State to properly exercise the police power in the enhancement of the public safety. The fact that the railroad company will, in order to equip its engines with the required headlights, be forced to do away with the reflectors and lights which it has in use is only incidental to a compliance with the police regulation and requirement made in the act, 'which is a valid and reasonable requirement. Damages can not be recovered by one because he incurs expense in obeying a police regulation enacted for the common welfare and safety of the public. See, in this connection, State v. St. Paul etc. Ry. Co., 98 Minn. 380 (108 N. W. 261, 120 Am. St. R. 581, 8 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 1047); 1 Thomp. Corp. § 449; C., B. & Q. R. Co. v, Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 (17 Sup. Ct. 581, 41 L. ed. 979); C., B. & Q. Ry. v. Drainage Commis
The act is not void on the ground that it absolutely and without exception makes the company guilty of a crime when it fails to equip .its locomotives with the required headlights and operates them on its main line without such headlights. It is contended that the act is void for the reason that in case of accident or other unforeseen cause, if the light which the company had provided in conformity with the requirements of the act were injured or destroyed, no provision is made allowing the company to operate its engine without the required headlight to a repair-shop, or to the place where another engine could be obtained, without violating the act and becoming liable to punishment thereunder. Every statute must be construed to have a reasonable intendment, and be construed in connection with other .statutes. While we will not undertake to detail instances in which the company would be guilty of no offense under the act in question while operating an engine without the required headlight, an act will not be eon-, strued so as to require the performance of an impossible act, if any other construction can be legitimately given it. See Southern Ry. Co. v. Atlanta Sand Co., 135 Ga. 36 (68 S. E. 807). The statutes requiring railroad companies to erect blow-posts 400. yards on either side of public crossings and to blow the whistle on approaching such crossings, to furnish light and water for.paá
4. The commerce clause of the Federal constitution is a limitation on, hut is. not a destruction of, the police power'of the States. The police power has never been surrendered by the States. A railroad company driving an engine engaged in interstate commerce through the territory of this State, with a headlight which endangers the lives and property of the people, can not claim that under the commerce clause of the Federal constitution it is not subject to reasonable police regulations of this State requiring an adequate headlight for the protection of the lives and property of the people. The act in question does not restrict or prohibit interstate commerce. It is an exercise of the police power, designed to protect persons and property in this State, and does not prohibit or regulate interstate commerce. The statute is not directed against interstate commerce; so far as the act affects interstate commerce, it is in aid thereof. It protects the persons and property on trains brought from another State into this State, as it also does persons and property not so brought; and it is the duty of the State to protect the former as well as the latter. One of the highest duties of government is the protection of the lives and property of the people. To the exercise of the police power all rights of natural persons and corporations are subject. If an engine doing an interstate business should come into this State from another State, or go out of this State into another State, when such other State had a law requiring a headlight on the engine other than an electric light and a reflector of a size different from that required by the act in question, the mere fact that this would necessitate changes of lights and reflectors, thereby causing expense, loss of