delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiff (defendant in error), was a fireman employed by the defendant. On October 5, 1907, he was injured by its negligence while working upon a train-running from South Carolina to North Carolina. He brought this *200 action on January 7, 1910, and judgment was ordered for a certain sum by the Supreme Court of the State. 163 N. Car. 186. The Supreme Court assumed that the case was governed by the Employers’ Liability Act of April 22, 1908, c. 149; 35 Stat. 65. Two errors are assigned. First, in holding that statute applicable to the cause of action, and second, in allowing a recovery under it in an action begun more than two years after the cause of action accrued. Id.,. § 6, p. 68. The case was not argued in this court on behalf of the defendant in error, but we gather from the record and the opinion that while, at the trial, the Railroad, upon issues hot before us, insisted that the Federal statute was not applicable, the contrary was admitted before the Supreme Court; so that although the admission seems to have been made with the second question only in view, the first point would appear not to have been drawn to the attention of either court and there was no discussion of how the case would stand apart from the act. The second objection was met by deciding that the limitation of two years imposed by § 6 could not be relied upon for want of a plea setting it up.
It would seem a miscarriage of justice if the plaintiff should recover upon a statute that did not govern the case, in a suit that the same act declared too late to be maintained. A right may be waived or lost by a failure to assert it at the proper time,
Burnet
v.
Desmornes,
*201
In dealing with the enactments of a paramount authority, such as Congress is, within its sphere, over the States, we are not to be curious in nomenclature if Congress has made its will plain, nor to allow substantive rights to be impaired under the name of procedure.
Central Vermont Railway
v.
White,
The ground that we have stated is sufficient for the reversal of the judgment so far as it proceeds upon the Act of 1908, arid therefore we are relieved from the necessity of deciding whether the record is in such shape that the even more fundamental objection to the application of the Act cannot be considered by this court.
Judgment reversed.
