70 N.J. Eq. 536 | New York Court of Chancery | 1905
. The complainant, under a special charter granted by the legislature in 1874, has since that time been manufacturing and selling illuminating gas to the city and inhabitants of Atlantic City. The defendants, recently incorporated under the general act regarding corporations of like character (P. L. 1S76 ¶. 309),
The section of the act invoked 'to support this bill provides that all pipes that may he laid" by any corporation organized under the act shall be placed at the greatest practicable distance from the nearest part of any other gas pipe then laid,
“and shall be laid at a horizontal distance of four feet at least from the nearest part of any such water or gas pipe, unless in cases where it shall be unavoidably necessary to lay the gas pipe across or nearer to any water or gas pipe, in which case the said gas pipe shall be laid under the said water or gas pipe at the greatest practicable distance therefrom, this distance in no case to be less than twelve inches, and shall form therewith a right angle, or as near thereto as the situation will admit, and in no case shall any pipe be laid, or apparatus used that will interfere in any way either with the present or future supply pipes of any water or gas company, or that may interfere with or increase the expense of replacing, removing or repairing the supply pipes or apparatus of any water or gas company.”
The complainant insists that the restrictions contained in this act are conditions imposed upon the corporate conduct of the defendants, and that any violation of its terms by the defendants creates a situation where it becomes permissible for the complainant to have the aid of this court in restraining the defendants from placing its pipes in the streets of Atlantic City, unless they are laid according to the letter of the act, without necessity ou the part of the complainant to show that it suffers any special damage resulting from the want of such strict compliance. Under this view the complainant would have a standing in this court for the purpose now claimed if the pipes of the defendant company were laid within four feet horizontally of any gas or water pipe of a third party.
The affidavits in support of the bill of complaint show that the main or distributing pipe of the defendants was at two points laid over and in direct contact with the pipes of the complainant; that at six other points where it crossed the pipes of the complainant, defendants’ main was laid within twelve inches of complainant’s pipe; but it also appears that, with perhaps the exception of the pipe on Logan avenue, all of .the conduits described in the bill of complaint as pipes are service or supply pipes, used for conducting the gas from complainant’s main or distributing pipe to the buildings of consumers. The pipe on Logan avenue is shown to be a small one running from the main of the complainant to a dead end, from which pipe service is made to eight or nine dwellings along Logan avenue. It was on the argument insisted that this use brought this pipe under the denomination of a main, but it is unnecessary to determine this question, for, in my_ judgment, the complainant has not shown that it has been or is likely to be injured by the construction put down by the defendants at this place.
The affidavits submitted by the defendants in opposition to the allowance of the restraint show beyond question that in the laying of their mains they have, to the best of their ability, observed, except as to service pipes, the requirement of the law
“and in no case shall any pipe be laid or apparatus used that will interfere in any way either with the present or future supply pipes of any water or gas company, or that may interfere with or increase the expense of replacing, removing or repairing the supply pipes or apparatus of any water or gas company,”
and, in my opinion, the proximity of a main or distributing pipe to a service pipe is not limited or controlled beyond the.restriction not to interfere with it in the manner described in the act. As the complainant has not made it appear that any 'such interference exists, except as to one point,'to which I will refer, it follows that, as no injury has been suffered by the complainant or is threatened by the future acts of the defendants, no reason exists justifying a preliminary injunction. It did appear that at one point the pipes were so closely laid as to perhaps warrant the inference that there might be some interference with the repair of complainant’s pipe, but that single instance constitutes no such irreparable injury as to justify the restraint of this public work. The case shows that during the progress of the whole of this work the complainant had a representative present, who made no objection at the time, and I entertain no doubt but that the defendants would have avoided this interference if complainant’s inspector had at the time called attention to it.
The rule to' show cause will be discharged.