125 Ga. 677 | Ga. | 1906
Lead Opinion
(After stating the facts.)
Judgment reversed on main bill of exceptions, and affirmed on cross-bill.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the judgment in this case, but I ■can not concur in all that is said in the opinion of my able and learned brother. It was decided in Kates v. Atlanta Baggage & Cab Co., 107 Ga. 636, that “Relatively to passengers and their baggage, the duty of a railway companj’', in its capacity as a common carrier, begins with affording to them, and to all of them alike, proper and suitable facilities for entering depots to purchase tickets and take passage, and for checking baggage, and ends with affording to them like facilities for leaving such deposits and obtaining their baggage on presenting the checks therefor. The rights which the law in these respects secures to passengers may be exercised by them either in person or through their chosen agents.” The possession of a ticket is a common evidence of an intention to travel on the train; but it will not do to say that no duty at all on the part of a railroad company to the prospective traveler arises until after the person intending to- take passage has procured a ticket. This clearly - appears from the foregoing quotation. Suppose a railroad company should assert that it had the right to discriminate between persons going to its station to take the train, until after the purchase of tickets, and that it should say that all who come to the station in its cabs, or those of a certain company, will be first admitted to the station and allowed the first opportunity to procure tickets and check baggage. Clearly this would be illegal, although such persons had not actually procured tickets. That some duty on the part of a railroad towards a person who goes to a station to take passage may arise before actual purchase of a ticket,
• If a railroad company violates its public duty to the injury of the traveling public, an action for damages will lie by a proper party plaintiff so injured, or remedy may be had by injunction or mandamus in a proper case; or probably the attorney-general might
It was urged that the plaintiff here could assert the rights of passengers as to the matter involved. But this view does not appear well grounded, certainly not if the plaintiff was neither transporting a passenger, nor his baggage accompanied by -proper. evidence that it was such. I do not mean that the plaintiff’s vehicles, could be prevented directly or by indirect obstruction from entering lawfully upon the depot grounds to carry persons seeking to go-there to take passage, or their baggage, or to carry and deliver their trunks accompanied by a ticket for the purpose of cheeking,, or that in these respects improper discrimination could be made, against it. But this is different from claiming in all respects equal privileges as to storage and the like with another cab and transfer company as a matter of private gain. I do not think that, under the decisions above cited, the plaintiff was so far clothed with the rights of passengers as to be entitled to the injunction which was. granted.
I am authorized by Mr. Justice Beck to say that he concurs in. the views above expressed.
I agree with my brethren in a great deal that has been said by each. There are, however, points of disagreement between us. I can best show where our views are in accord and where they diverge by a brief statement of my views in reference to the-matter. A railway company in its capacity as a common carrier owes to persons about to become passengers a duty to afford to all alike proper and suitable facilities for the purchase of 'tickets and checking of baggage. A railway company may, within limits, fix the rights of persons about to become passengers, by the adoption of reasonable rules. Such a rule must, however, be general in its scope and uniform in its application. If a railway company adopts a rule that no baggage shall be checked until the passenger has sup
A railway company is allowed to employ its own agents, but it must see that its agent complies with the law and the rules of the company. It can not throw off a public duty imposed upon it as such, by employing -an agent and allowing the agent to conduct the business-of the company in such a way as to work a discrimination against those to whom the railway company in its public capacity owes a duty; In the present case it was permissible for the railway companies to employ the Terminal Company and turn over .to it the discharge of those duties relating to the baggage of passengers. It was also permissible for the Terminal Company to employ in like manner the defendant Cab Company, and turn over to it the discharge of its duties which it had undertaken to perform for the railway‘companies. So far as the baggage of passengers is concerned, the defendant Cab Company owes the same duties that the railway companies owed in the first instance. The defendant Cab Company as to its own business, independently of the duties of the railway companies it was performing, is entitled to transact its business as it deems proper, and as is consistent with the law. The defendant Cab Company could, as to its customers, adopt a system of claim-checks, and follow this system as to one class of customers and not as to another. That is, it could transact its own business in just such a manner as it deemed proper in this respect. But as the representative of the railway companies, it would not be allowed this latitude. If it accords to one person about to become a passenger the right of storage in the baggage-room set apart to the .discharge of its duty to the railway companies, then it must accord to every other passenger under similar circumstances the same
I concur in the judgment of reversal solely upon the ground that, under the ruling in the case referred to, the plaintiff was not in a position to complain of the palpable discrimination resulting from the claim-check system. The prospective passenger might complain in behalf of himself; and as the duty violated by the system was a duty owed to the public, the attorney-general, in his official capacity, as the representative of the entire public, might have a right to proceed in a court of equity to enjoin the continuance of such a discriminating system. Mr. Justice Evans authorizes me to say that he concurs in the views above presented.