24 Ga. App. 771 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1920
This was a suit by W.- L. Norton against the Atlanta Loan & Saving Company for an “amount due overpayment on money borrowed,” and was submitted to and tried before a judge of the municipal court of Atlanta upon an agreed statement of facts, which were, briefly, as follow^: That shortly prior to November 17, 1916, the plaintiff made a written application to the defendant company for a loan of one hundred dollars, for a term of fifty-two weeks, and on December 14, 1916, obtained the loan from the defendant company, giving to it his personal note for one hundred dollars, with two endorsers, and for additional security two $50 shares of the class “C” (installment) stock in that company. This stock had been issued to the plaintiff as a part of the loan transaction, simultaneously with the approval of his application for the loan. Under the terms of the loan agreement, as evidenced by the note, the stock certificate and the constitution and by-laws of the defendant company, this stock was to be paid for in fifty weekly payments of $2 each ($1 per week on each share) payable promptly on Monday of each successive week, one of the provisions of the agreement being that “in the everit the weekly installments due on the shares represented by
From this it will be seen that for, a loan of $100 (from which 8% interest was deducted in advance) the plaintiff repaid in installments weekly, in fifty-two weeks, the sum of $105.20; that $5.20 of this sum represented legitimate fines for failures to pay the installments when due as agreed; and the only question remaining was whether the retention in advance by the loan company of 8% interest on the loan and the repayment in weekly installments of the principal sum constituted the collection of usurious interest, as contended by the plaintiff. Upon this question the trial court found for the plaintiff, and the judge of the superior court, in overruling the certiorari, concurred in that judgment.
In response to certain questions propounded by this court the Supreme Court held substantially as set forth in the 1st and 2d headnotes hereto, and further ruled that “a corporation organized for the purpose set forth in the charter and constitution of the Atlanta Loan & Saving Company falls within the terms there
It may be said, in this connection, that the ease of McIntosh v. Thomasville Real Estate & Improvement Co., 138 Ga. 128, cited and relied on by the defendant in error, was decided before the passage of the act of 1913 (Ga. L. 1913, p. 54) amending section 3878 of the Civil Code, and that the doctrine of that case (the 3d division thereof) and of the authorities therein cited has been modified by the legislative definition of the term “a like association.” For an elaboration of this decision, see the full opinion of the. Supreme Court in this ease, 149 Ga. 805 (102 S. E. 536).
Judgment reversed.