The City of Atlanta (City) and the Atlanta Independent School System (System) entered into an “Agreement For Sharing Revenue,” whereby the System received an amount equal to 30 percent of the City’s local option sales tax receipts. Mr. William Lane, in his capacity as a city resident and taxpayer, brought suit challenging the validity of this agreement and also seeking mandamus relief as to the repayment of amounts previously paid thereunder. The City filed its own suit challenging the validity of its agreement with the System. The suits were consolidated and the trial court held that the agreement was violative of the Georgia Constitution. However, the trial court denied mandamus relief as to the issue of repayment. It is from this order of the trial court that the System appeals against the City and Lane and that Lane cross-appeals against the City and the System.
Case Nos. S96A0160 and S96A0163
1. Relying upon
Kelly v. City of Atlanta,
With regard to constitutional issues, this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving construction of the Constitution of the State of Georgia and of the United States and all cases in which the constitutionality of a law, ordinance, or constitutional provision has been called into question. Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II (1) of the Georgia Constitution. The appeal in Kelly was filed in this Court, but was transferred to the Court of Appeals. That transfer merely represents this Court’s determination that Kelly was not a case involving a constitutional issue over which we had exclusive jurisdiction.
There are a number of reasons why a case can fail to come within this Court’s exclusive jurisdiction under Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II (1) of our state constitution. The constitutional issue that is raised on appeal may not be one which is within our exclusive jurisdiction. Unless the issue raised on appeal relates either to the constitutional construction or to the constitutionality of a law, ordinance or constitutional provision, jurisdiction is in the Court of Appeals. Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. Ill of the Georgia Constitution. Although the constitutional issue raised on appeal may be one which otherwise would be within
*658
our exclusive jurisdiction, that constitutional issue may already have been resolved by this Court.
Phillips v. State,
There may be other reasons why a case fails to come within this Court’s exclusive jurisdiction and must be transferred to the Court of Appeals. Therefore, any decision which holds that such a transfer represents this Court’s determination that no constitutional issue in the case has merit is erroneous and is hereby overruled. See, e.g.,
Kelly v. City of Atlanta,
supra at 366 (1);
Ryals v. State,
2. Article VIII, Sec. VI, Par. I (a) of the Georgia Constitution provides for the financing of this state’s school systems through the levying of local ad valorem taxes which are not to exceed a 20-mill rate. The predecessor to this constitutional provision was construed as establishing an exclusive financing method, such that school systems subject to its mandate were prohibited from receiving funds from any local tax source other than such ad valorem taxes as were raised in accordance therewith.
City of Lithonia v. DeKalb County Bd. of Ed.,
Whether the System qualifies for the exemption from the 20-mill cap on ad valorem taxation authorized by Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Par. I (c) is immaterial here. Compare
Bd. of Public Ed. &c. For Bibb County v. Zimmerman,
3. The System urges that the agreement does not violate Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Par. I (a) because it requires only the payment of an amount equal to 30 percent of the City’s local option sales tax receipts, rather than the direct payment of that portion of the actual tax receipts. However, this distinction is immaterial. What is controlling is that the agreement is for the City’s payment and the System’s receipt of funds from a local tax source other than ad valorem taxes raised in accordance with Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Par. I (a). In order to comply with the agreement and at the same time meet its budget, the City would be required to encroach upon funds derived from other tax sources by an amount equal to the sums paid over to the System “and would thus be doing by indirection the very thing the Constitution in Art. VIII, Sec. [VI], Par. I [(a)] forbids to be done directly.”
Harrison v. May,
4. The System urges that the agreement must nevertheless be upheld as an inter-governmental agreement authorized by Art. IX, Sec. Ill, Par. I (a) of the Georgia Constitution. Under that constitutional provision, a valid inter-governmental agreement “must deal with activities, services, or facilities which the contracting parties are authorized by law to undertake or provide.” By law, the City may be authorized to expend its tax receipts for educational purposes. As previously discussed, however, the System is constitutionally precluded from financing its support and maintenance of education from a local tax revenue source other than ad valorem taxes raised in accordance with Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Par. I (a). Compare
Youngblood v. State of Ga.,
5. The System’s remaining enumeration of error is moot and need not be addressed.
Case No. S96X0162
6. Lane urges that the trial court erred in denying the mandamus relief that he sought against the System. However, mandamus relief applies prospectively only. It will not lie to compel the undoing of acts already done and this is so even though the action taken was clearly illegal.
Hilton Constr. Co. v. Rockdale County Bd. of Ed.,
7. Lane further urges that he is entitled to mandamus relief against the City, compelling the City to bring suit against the System. In such a suit, however, the City would be seeking reimbursement for its past contractual payments, rather than attempting to recover for its provision of past services. Compare
Screws v. City of Atlanta,
Mandamus should be denied “when it would prove unavailing, and when no result [would] be accomplished, or the status changed by its issuance. [Cit.]”
Smith v. Hodgson,
Judgments affirmed.