420 S.E.2d 344 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1992
The facts relevant to the resolution of the instant appeals are as follows: At an intersection, there was a collision between a vehicle op
1. Former OCGA § 33-34-7 (a) (3) provided that no-fault benefits were payable for accidental bodily injury sustained “as a result of being struck by the owner’s motor vehicle while a pedestrian. . . .” It is undisputed that appellees were pedestrians who were struck by a vehicle. The question presented for resolution is whether appellees were struck by Williams’ vehicle.
Appellees were not struck by Williams’ vehicle, in the sense of immediate physical contact between their persons and her vehicle. It was only Taylor’s vehicle which made physical contact with appellees. However, “ ‘[t]he “striking” force can be either the force which most immediately comes in contact with the object struck, or it can be the force setting in motion a chain of events leading up to the striking of an object.’ ” Johnson v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co., 177 Ga. App. 204, 205 (1) (338 SE2d 687) (1985). It is undisputed that the force of the collision with Williams’ vehicle set in motion a chain of events leading up to the striking of appellees by Taylor’s vehicle. “[Wjhere one vehicle is propelled by another vehicle into a . . . pedestrian, both the propelling vehicle and the propelled vehicle have ‘struck’ the . . . pedestrian within the meaning of [former] OCGA § 33-34-7.” Collins v. Intl. Indem. Co., 256 Ga. 493, 496 (349 SE2d 697) (1986) (On Motion For Rehearing). Since Taylor’s vehicle was “propelled” into appellees by the force of the collision with Williams’ vehicle, they were struck by both vehicles.
It is true that the collision itself may have been caused by Taylor rather than Williams. However, a determination of who was at fault in causing the collision is irrelevant to the determination of appellees’ entitlement to no-fault benefits. In order for appellees to be entitled to no-fault benefits under Williams’ policy, it is only necessary that the force of a collision in which her car was involved set in motion the chain of events leading up to the striking of appellees. Regardless of who was at fault in causing the collision, it is undisputed that it was
2. “The insurer’s good faith or lack thereof is generally a question for the jury. [Cits.] This is such a case. [Cits.]” Wages v. Atlanta Metro Taxicab Group, 193 Ga. App. 601, 602 (388 SE2d 733) (1989). Accordingly, the trial court correctly denied summary judgment as to appellant’s liability for statutory penalties and attorney’s fees.
3. Appellees’ motions for frivolous appeal damages are denied.
Judgments affirmed.