140 Ga. 52 | Ga. | 1913
(After stating the foregoing facts.)
1. The suit was instituted against the receiver without previous leave of the United States court authorizing it. It is insisted that the suit is not maintainable without such order. This point
2. The measure of damages for the destruction of the easement of way which the railroad company contracted to give the landowner in consideration of his relinquishment of an existing right of access to his property is its effect upon the landowner’s property. It was expressly recognized in the contract between the railroad company and the landowner that the contractual right of way was necessary to the enjoyment by the landowner of his property; it was treated as an easement appurtenant to that property. If the destruction of that easement affects the value of the appurtenant property, then the measure of damages is the difference in
3. Certain witnesses were examined with reference to the value of the property before the way was closed and its value after the way was obstructed. Some criticism is made of the form of the question, as indicating that the witnesses were not confined to the particular road which was closed, as affecting its market value. When the testimony to which objection is taken is considered in connection with the context, we think it clear that the testimony of the witnesses had relation solely to the effect of the particular road described in the contract between the railroad company and the landowner, its effect upon the landowner’s property if maintained according to the contract, and its effect upon the market value by reason of the road being rendered impassable by the construction of the side-track over it. This evidence was competent to show the market value of the property before and after the contractual way was obstructed.
4. It is contended that the recovery is for too large an amount; but after a careful consideration of the evidence, we do not think the verdict is excessive. The verdict is authorized, and has the approval of the trial judge, and no sufficient reason is made to appear to reverse the judgment of the court refusing a new trial.
Judgment affirmed.