153 Pa. 472 | Pa. | 1893
Opinion by
In the absence of any opinion by the learned court below, and even of a paper book by appellee, we are left in the dark as to the ground upon which the judgment was stricken off, but the order cannot be sustained.
Defendant’s affidavit did not pretend to set up actual payment of the judgment by himself, but that plaintiff had received the amount of his claim from another party primarily liable. From this state of facts satisfaction would ordinarily be inferred as a matter of law, but plaintiff in his affidavit, in opposition to the rule, set up a contract by defendant which completely prevented such inference. The contract was entirely valid and
The act of April 13, 1791, sect. 14, 3 Sm. Laws, 32, affords a remedy by action for a penalty against a judgment creditor who has been paid but refuses after demand to enter satisfaction on the record; the act of April 14, 1851, P. L. 612, gives in Philadelphia a summary jurisdiction over judgments more than ten years old; and the general equity powers of the courts reach all proper cases by opening the judgment and directing an issue to determine the fact of payment. The act of 1876 was not a substitute for any or all of these remedies, but only a short and inexpensive way of ending clear cases of undisputed actual payment. To these it must be confined.
The order is reversed and the judgment thereby stricken off is reinstated.