93 Wis. 362 | Wis. | 1896
The substance of the provision is that the prescribed notice “ shall be given to -such corporation.” It may, no doubt, be properly delivered to a general officer of such corporation or any agent thereof having a general authority to act for the corporation in respect to the subject matter to which it relates. Compliance with the common-law rule as to the party to whom notice may be given is clearly sufficient, Eor all the purposes of the business to which the general agency applies, the agent having a general authority to act for the ■ corporation in respect to such part, branch, or department of its business is, fro hao vice, the corporation itself. Accordingly, notice to such an agent, in relation to-transactions within the scope of his agency, is notice to the-principal, although the principal be a corporation. 1 Beach, Priv. Corp. § 185. The rule applies equally to a corporation as to a natural person. Angelí & A. Corp. § 305.
The statute is mandatory that the prescribed notice shall be given to the corporation, but the provision that it may be given in the manner required for the service of summons-in courts of record is permissive, in order to enable the-party the more readily to give the notice to any railroad or railway corporation whose general officers or general agents may reside at a considerable distance or without the state. In cases arising under sec. 1339, R. S., concerning actions-for injuries received on highways, the requirement is, not-that the notice shall be given to the county, town, city, or village, but it is required that it shall be given “ to the clerk of the county, a supervisor of the town, one of the trustees of the village, or mayor or city clerk of the city, against
The instructions of the circuit court on the subject of giving notice were substantially correct, although the evidence on the question as to when the fire ceased burning on the plaintiff’s lands, so as to fix the time within which notice was required to be given, as well as the time when Piersol was on the premises, is not entirely clear or satisfactory. Still, these were matters for the determination of the jury. There is no finding to show when the fires ceased burning on the plaintiff’s lands, so as to show when the event causing such damage could be said to have happened, in order to determine the sufficiency of the notice in point of time. If, however, the notices were received at the general claim office, by the general claim agent, within a year after the fires ceased burning on the plaintiff’s lands, as the jury have found, substantially, that would be sufficient.
By the Oourt.— The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.