28 Ga. App. 497 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1922
This is a suit upon an open account. The defendant filed a plea denying general liability, and also a special plea in which it alleged that the account sued upon was for a certain punch-board, and that the sale of the same was illegal and void, in that it involved the sale of property which was to be used in
The 3d headnote alone needs elaboration. The evidence introduced upon the trial shows, that, in addition to the assortment of goods, the sale included a device for the distribution of the goods, called a punch-board. This board was two feet square, and in it were many holes. In each of these holes was a small strip of paper, containing a number. These holes were covered, but the cover was so designed as to indicate exactly the location of each hole. A small peg was used to punch the cover of the holes. Ten cents a punch was-charged, and the number on the slip of paper in the hole punched indicated whether or not the customer was rewarded with a prize. The prizes consisted of guns, revolvers, cigarette cases, watches, silver charms, and leather fobs. These articles ranged in value from $1 to $40.
It is well settled that a contract of sale made in violation of a criminal statute is void and unenforceable. Small Grain Distilling Co. v. Davis, 11 Ga. App. 116 (74 S. E. 897). This rule is so well established that any further citation of authority is deemed unnecessary. We come, therefore, directly to the controlling question in the case,— whether, under the evidence submitted upon the trial, the sale was in violation of the law of this State. Section 397 of the Penal Code (1910) declares: “If any person, either by himself or his agent, shall sell or offer for sale, or procure for or furnish to any person any ticket, number, combination, or chance, or anything representing a chance, in any lottery, gift
While it is true that neither the Supreme Court nor this court has held that a punch-board is a gambling device, we and that it has been so held in other judicatories. In the case of State v. Turlington, 200 Mo. App. 192 (2) (204 S. E. 821), it was held: “Although patrons of punch-board, as condition precedent, were required to purchase a three-cents post-card for five cents, there was present the element of chance, the possibility of receiving a knife worth fifty cents or $1.50, in addition to post-card, and the devise was a ‘ gambling device."' In the case of Commonwealth v. Gritten, 180 Ky. 446 (2), it was held: “A punch-board containing holes which the player, on the purchase of a post-card, may punch and obtain certain articles of value corresponding to the numbers indicated by the board, is a machine ordinarily used for gambling purposes.” And in Grove Manufacturing Co. v. Jacobs, 117 Me. 163 (103 Atl. 14), a case directly in point, the headnote is: “Action on the case brought by plaintiff to recover for the sale and delivery of an assortment of goods containing various kinds of articles to the amount of forty-nine dollars. In addition to the assortment of goods, the sale included a device for the distribution of the goods called a punch-board. Held: From the evidence presented, there can be no question of doubt but that the device described and sold to defendant comes fully within the ban of the statutes of the State of Maine as a gambling device,
The mere fact that no charge was made for the punch-board, is insufficient to defeat the purposes of the statute prohibiting the sale of gambling devices. It was the punch-board feature that caused the sale, and the plaintiff was fully cognizant that it was to be used by the defendant in disposing of the articles in question. The disposition of the articles through the medium of the punch-board was a direct appeal to the gambling instinct which, it is said, possesses every man in some degree, and it is the temptation to gratify the instinct that our statute is aimed at; and, therefore, the' mere fact that the punch-board was included in the assortment of goods purchased free of charge shows conclusively a subterfuge or scheme to thwart the beneficent objects and purposes of the law designed to suppress the sale of gambling devices — a thing which the law does not permit of.
It follows, from what has been said, that the court did not err in directing a verdict for the defendant.
Judgment affirmed.