Fortunately the facts in these cases are not in dispute.
It is contended that the purchases of the motor vehicles are taxable under the provisions of Section 5546-1, General Code, which reads in part as follows:
" 'Retail sale’ and 'sales at retail’ include all sales excepting those in which the purpose of the consumer is * * * (b) * * * to use or consume the thing transferred directly in the production of tangible personal property for sale by manufacturing, processing, refining, mining * * * or floriculture * * *; or directly in making retail sales or directly in the rendition of a public utility service * *
Likewise involved are the following provisions of rule 46, promulgated by the Tax Commissioner:
"Sales of tangible personal property to public utilities, as above defined, to be incorporated into the production, transmission or distribution systems of gas, electric, telephone, or water utilities, or of street, suburban and interurban, railroad or railroad companies, and tools for the maintenance of such systems are not subject to the tax.”
Two of the appellant public utility companies are engaged in the business of supplying telephone service to the public in different sections of the state. The third company generates and distributes electric energy for public use principally in the northern part of the state.
Are these vehicles used “directly in the rendition of a public utility service?”
The question is said to be one of first impression in this state.
The reasoning of the Board of Tax Appeals was in part as follows:
“If the items in question were vehicles, like a motor cycle or car used primarily to relay messages to subscribers whose service was then interrupted, this board could readily agree with the appellant’s viewpoint. These trucks and cars are not a part of their communicating system. Messages may be dispatched when they stand idly by. They are not a part of their lines of communication. They help to keep those lines in repair and able to transmit messages over them. They but carry employees, tools and supplies with which the transmission lines are kept in repair and are, therefore, used indirectly in the public utility service rendered. True, they are necessary and indispensable items in maintaining service such as the public and the*560 Public Utilities Commission demands. * * * but necessity and indispensability is not tbe test of except-ability from tbe sales tax.”
The Board of Tax Appeals relied on the decision of this court in the case of Tri-State Asphalt Corp. v. Glander, Tax Commr.,
In the syllabus in the Tri-State case, supra, this court held:
“Boom and bucket cranes- the sole function of which is the conveying of ingredients to a place of processing, and which have no part in the actual processing itself, are not used or consumed directly in the production of tangible personal property for sale by processing and, under Section 5546-1, General Code, their sales are not excepted from taxation.”
It is important to observe that that case involved a different provision of the statute relating to personal property used or consumed “directly in the production of tangible personal property for sale.” The same is true of the Fyr-Fyter and Mead cases, supra. It is true also of other cited cases such as Saunders Mills, Inc., v. Evatt, Tax Commr.,
The instant cases do not involve the production of property. Instead it is the rendition of service.
Is this difference in the General Assembly’s language important? This court is of the opinion that the contrast is significant and may not be disregarded. It seems unnecessary to labor the point that “production of property” and “rendition of service” are not synonymous terms.
Even in the cases of France Co. v. Evatt, Tax Commr.,
The appellee commissioner relies on the decision of this court in the case of Midwest Haulers, Inc., v. Glander, Tax Commr.,
But it is insisted that these motor vehicles are not ■“incorporated” into the systems operated by the appellants, as required by rule 46, promulgated by the Tax Commissioner. This is correct, and it indicates the conflict between the rule and the statute. Inasmuch as administrative agencies are creatures of statute and possess only such rule-making power as is delegated to them, this conflicting part of the rule obviously must fall.
Hence, it is the view of this court that the decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals affirming the orders of the Tax Commissioner holding these sales taxable must be reversed.
Decisions reversed.
