160 P. 828 | Cal. | 1916
This is a proceeding in certiorari to test the validity of an order of the railroad commission, requiring the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company to construct and put into operation a line of railroad between Oceanside, in San Diego County, and Temecula, in Riverside County. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company (which we shall herein term the "Santa Fe company"), operates a transcontinental line of railroad, connecting with a number of lines in this state. It has succeeded to the property and railroad lines of the Southern California Railway Company, which was in turn the successor in interest of the California Southern Railroad Company. *579 The last-named corporation was organized about the year 1880, to build and operate a railroad from the Bay of San Diego to a point of connection with the line of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad, running easterly from Barstow, in San Bernardino County, and now forming a part of the main line of the Santa Fe system. The line of the California Southern Railroad Company was constructed from San Diego to Oceanside, thence northeasterly to Fallbrook Station, thence through the Temecula Canyon to Temecula, and thence northeasterly through Riverside and San Bernardino Counties to Barstow. The distance from Fallbrook Station to Temecula through the Temecula Canyon is about twelve miles. In the year 1891 this portion of the road was washed out by a flood, and it has never been rebuilt. Theretofore, in 1888, another line had been built connecting San Diego and Oceanside with San Bernardino via Santa Ana. This road, while longer than the one through the Temecula Canyon, could be operated to better advantage, because it avoided unfavorable grades and curves. It has also passed into the ownership and possession of the Santa Fe Company.
The proceeding now under review was instituted before the railroad commission by the complaint of various civic and commercial organizations in San Diego, joined by citizens of the vicinity, who sought an order requiring the Santa Fe Company to re-establish railroad operations between Fallbrook and Temecula in order to give direct service over this line to persons residing in the territory beyond Temecula. Prior to the construction of the original line, the California Southern Railroad Company had received donations of money and land, aggregating several millions of dollars in value, as an inducement to the construction of a railroad from the Bay of San Diego to a connection with the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad. An agreement to that end had been made between a representative of the intending donors and a group of men who undertook to form a corporation for the proposed construction. Pursuant to this agreement the California Southern Railroad Company was formed, and its line built.
The commission filed an elaborate opinion, in which it recited the foregoing facts and many others. It went carefully into the question of the cost of reconstructing the road through the Temecula Canyon, and made estimates of the *580 extent of territory which would furnish traffic in consequence of the proposed connection. Suggestion having been made that an alternative route could be constructed from Oceanside to Temecula without going through the Temecula Canyon, the commission also found the cost of constructing this line. The findings of the commission included the following:
"Eighth. That the re-establishment of a direct connection between San Diego and Temecula, either by way of the Temecula Canyon or by way of the so-called alternative line, both of which said lines are described in the preceding opinion, is a public necessity and will greatly benefit all of the country affected by this railroad.
"Ninth. That it is reasonable to order the defendant to make such connection, and that the present and prospective traffic justify the expenditure of the sum of money necessary to establish this connection."
On these findings an order was made requiring the Santa Fe company to present to the commission for its approval plans and estimates for a line connecting Oceanside and Temecula, either through the canyon or by the alternative route, and requiring it within twelve months after the approval by the commission of such plans and estimates to construct, complete, and put into operation such line of railroad and operate thereover regular passenger and freight service. This is the order which is attacked in the present proceeding.
The railroad commission seeks to find authority for its order in section 36 of the Public Utilities Act. So much of the section as is material here reads as follows:
"Sec. 36. Whenever the commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon complaint, shall find that additions, extensions, repairs or improvements to, or changes in, the existing plant, equipment, apparatus, facilities or other physical property of any public utility or of any two or more public utilities ought reasonably to be made, or that a new structure or structures should be erected, to promote the security or convenience of its employees or the public, or in any other way to secure adequate service or facilities, the commission shall make and serve an order directing that such additions, extensions, repairs, improvements or changes be made or such structure or structures be *581 erected in the manner and within the time specified in said order."
In assailing the validity of the order, the petitioner makes a number of contentions. These, generally speaking, divide themselves into two branches. One challenges the authority of the railroad commission to order the construction of a line of railroad, under the circumstances here shown, regardless of the consideration that the operation of the new line might, in a financial view, be beneficial to the company, while the other turns more specifically on the inquiry whether, under the evidence in this particular case, the construction directed to be made would be justified by the showing of probable earnings to accrue to the company. The first of these questions is the more fundamental, and in view of the conclusion we have reached on it we do not find it necessary to go into an analysis of the evidence that would have to be considered in passing on the second.
The issue to be determined is this: Has the railroad commission authority to require a railroad company to extend its line of railroad, or to build a new line, so as to connect with its existing line points that have not theretofore been connected and which the company has not undertaken to so connect? In thus stating the question, we eliminate from consideration the contract found to have been made between citizens of San Diego and the incorporators of the California Southern Railroad company, as well as the fact that a line had once been run from Fallbrook to Temecula.
While the commission, in its opinion, dwelt at some length upon the moral obligations arising from this contract, its conclusion was not, perhaps, in a legal sense, based upon it. The first finding of the learned commissioner who heard the testimony, after referring to the grants made under the contract, concludes as follows:
"I do not, however, find that the moral or legal obligations resulting from this contract are of necessity a deciding factor in this case."
But whether or not the existence of the contract may, in some degree, have influenced the commission in reaching its conclusion, it is clear that grounds must be sought elsewhere for supporting the order here under review. We may pass, without expressing an opinion of its validity, the petitioner's suggestion that the Santa Fe company was not *582
a party to the contract, but was a purchaser under foreclosure of the properties of the corporation in whose behalf the agreement had been made, and therefore not bound by the contractual duties of its predecessor. (See Hoard v. Chesapeakeetc. Ry. Co.,
Nor is the fact that a railroad line had once existed between Fallbrook and Temecula a factor of any moment in the present inquiry. No question is made of the authority of the railroad commission to compel a railroad company or other public utility to restore a service which it has been furnishing. Here, however, the line between Fallbrook and Temecula had been destroyed for about twenty years before the action of the commission was invoked, and, indeed, before the enactment of the law upon which the commission relies for its authority to act. It is expressly found that "that portion of the line was left abandoned and service discontinued. It has remained abandoned ever since." In view of this fact, it cannot be doubted that any obligation of the predecessor of the Santa Fe company to maintain and operate the line from Fallbrook to Temecula had long since ceased (Public Service Com. v.Philadelphia etc. Ry. Co.,
The solution of the problem thus presented must be found in a definition of the character of the order complained of. Is the railroad commission, in ordering the construction of a railroad line, regulating the service which the petitioner has undertaken to give to the public, or is it compelling the railroad company to dedicate its property to a new service? If the former, the commission is acting within its jurisdiction; if the latter, it is attempting to exercise an authority which the statute either has not attempted or is unable to confer upon it. Section 36 of the Public. Utilities Act authorizes the commission to make an order directing that "additions, extensions," etc., be made in the plant or facilities of any public utility. It might be argued that this language is broad enough to include additions to the plant, even though such additions may involve a service never contemplated nor undertaken by the owner of the utility. But if this be taken to be the true meaning, the section expresses an intent which cannot, under the restrictions of the federal constitution, be given effect. As was said by Henshaw, J., in Pacific Tel. Tel. Co. v. Eshleman,
Again, in Del Mar Water etc. Co. v. Eshleman,
The views thus announced, when applied to the facts of the case before us, lead inevitably to the conclusion that the commission exceeded its power in ordering the construction of a new line of road to connect Oceanside and Temecula. A public utility, undertaking to supply a given public need, submits itself to the regulation and control of public authority with respect to the service which it has thus undertaken. Thus, a water company having a franchise to supply water to the inhabitants of a given city assumes the public duty of supplying that community with water. It may be compelled to extend its mains in order to furnish the service to such inhabitants. (Lukrawka v. Spring Valley Water Co.,
Various decisions upholding orders of regulating bodies with respect to railroads are cited, but we think they do not, in any instance, meet the necessities of the case at bar. Much stress is laid upon Wisconsin etc. Co. v. Jacobson,
"It must be remembered," said Mr. Justice Brewer inInterstate Commerce Com. v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co.,
As we have already indicated, we are cited to no authority which supports the power of the state, acting through its railroad commission, or otherwise, to compel the extension of a railroad line in the manner here attempted. On the contrary, such decisions as have come to our attention tend, rather, to deny the existence of any such power. In Public *589 Service Commission v. Philadelphia etc. Ry. Co.,
The order is annulled.
Shaw, J., Melvin, J., Henshaw, J., Lawlor, J., and Angellotti, C. J., concurred.