60 Kan. 4 | Kan. | 1898
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This action was brought by James Smith against the railroad company to recover damages for alleged malicious prosecutions. The petition charges that on the 26th day of January, 1893, the defendant procured three complaints to be made by one Fritter, its agent at La Junta, Otero county, Colorado, before a justice of the peace, charging the plaintiff with the crime of burglary and larceny in freight-cars on the defendant’s railroad; that the plaintiff was arrested under warrants issued on these complaints, committed to jail, and that the prosecutions were afterwards dismissed by the prosecuting attorney ; that after the discharge of the plaintiff from these prosecutions he was again arrested on four warrants issued by a justice of the peace of Las Animas county, Colorado, on complaints filed by E. B. Leonard, the agent of the defendant at Trinidad, acting under the defendant’s direction, charging him with like burglaries and larcenies in Las Animas county ; that these prosecutions were also terminated by the prosecuting officer, who dismissed the cases ; that on the 28th day of January,
“ The plaintiff avers that he brings this suit as one cause of action; that he avers the fact to be that the defendant, actuated by a malicious intention and design to ruin the plaintiff, to cause him expense he could not bear, and to causelessly punish him, did perform and cause to be performed all the acts aforesaid, and that all said acts were taken by defendant in pursuance of said design originally formed.”
A motion was made to dismiss the case on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the order to state and number his causes of action separately. This motion was overruled. After the overruling of a demurrer to the petition the defendant answered, denying generally the matters charged in the petition. On the 4th day of February, 1896, the case was called for trial, and the defendant asked a continuance on the ground that the issues had not been made up in time for trial at that term of court. This was refused and a jury was thereupon impaneled. The plaintiff offered in evidence certain of the papers and copies of the records in the cases prosecuted against him in Colorado, testified in his own behalf,
•The objection urged against the sufficiency .of the petition on the ground that it states in one count a number of separate and distinct causes of action is not good. The plaintiff had a right to treat all the prosecutions as connected, instituted and carried on under a continuing purpose to injure him.
It is unnecessary to discuss the minor questions raised by counsel for the railroad company. The principal question decisive of this case is whether the prosecutions complained of were instituted without probable cause. This was submitted to the jury as a question of fact. As there was no substantial conflict in the testimony bearing on the question it should have been determined by the court as a matter of law. (Drumm v. Cessnum, 58 Kan. 331, 49 Pac. 78, and cases cited.) It appears from the plaintiff’s own testimony that a large amount of property had been stolen from the cars of the railroad company, and that much of it was found in the house of Crotty, a conductor of a freight-train which was sometimes hauled by the engine in charge of the plaintiff as engineer. A detective named Landon had been put at work as a brakeman on the part of the road where property was being sto
The testimony of the prosecuting attorneys tends to show that they received their information -as to the connection of the plaintiff with the burglaries from Mr. Swain, who represented himself to be the general manager of a detective agency and the sheriff of Otero county. On this information complaints were drawn, and sworn to by Fritter, the agent of the railroad com
That the prosecutions and the hostile attitude of the railroad company toward the plaintiff have resulted in serious injury and loss to him is clear. He was not only discharged from the service of the defendant, but the discharge was made under such circumstances as to leave him resting under the suspicion of guilt, which it has refused to. make any effort to remove. For an innocent man thus to be deprived of all opportunity to follow that calling for which he was trained and especially fitted, through unjust suspicions and prosecutions, cannot fail to excite strong sympathy, but courts have no license to be guided by their sympathies. Before the defendant company can be held to respond in damages for these prosecutions it must appear that they were instituted maliciously and without probable cause. (Counsel for the defendant very
The principal question is, Was there probable cause to believe that the plaintiff was a party to the crimes for which he was prosecuted? Many such crimes were committed on the line of the defendant’s railroad, and that they were committed by coemployees of the plaintiff, engaged in operating the trains hauled by the engine under the plaintiff’s charge, is a conceded fact. It is also clear that it was the duty of the railroad company, not only to itself but to the general public, to make a vigorous effort to ferret out the criminals and bring them to justice. Having caught Crotty, the conductor, in possession of a large amount of the plunder, they obtained from him a confession and a statement as to who were his accomplices. Among them the plaintiff was named. It is strenuously insisted that Crotty, being not only a thief but a man of bad character m every particular, ought not to have been believed, and that his mere statement was insufficient to warrant an arrest. In the detection of crime it is often found necessary by prosecuting officers to act on the statements of confessed criminals, and their testimony, when corroborated by circumstances, is often accepted and acted on by juries. In this case it was not Grotty’s statements alone that tended to. cast suspicion on the plaintiff, but these were corroborated by the fact that larcenies were com
Under all these circumstances we are forced to the conclusion that there was probable cause for a prosecution against the plaintiff, and that the evidence tends to show that the prosecution was instituted rather for the purpose of punishing a man believed to be guilty than of maliciously oppressing an innocent one. The statements of the plaintiff as to what was said by the general manager, while indicating that he still entertained a belief of the plaintiff’s guilt, do not show any malicious purpose to injure him. Under the plaintiff’s own showing we are forced to hold that there was probable cause for the prosecutions and that no cause of action was proved against the company. The judgment is, therefore, reversed.