OPINION BY
¶ 1 Plaintiffs Giovanni Astorino, Sandra Astorino, Mark Shtraus, and Lilita Shtraus, who are all Pennsylvania residents, sued Nеw Jersey Transit Corporation for injuries they suffered as a result of a commuter train derаilment in Hudson County, New Jersey. The distinguished trial judge dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of subject mаtter jurisdiction. On appeal, the trial judge deemed all issues waived because he hеld that the Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement was too vague to permit him to draft a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. We disаgree, and we caution trial judges against being too quick to find waiver, claiming that Rule 1925(b) statements are either too vague or not specific enough. In this case, the issue raised by the appellants is clear, although the Rule 1925(b) statement could have been shorter.
¶ 2 Although there is no waiver of the issue on appeal, because this case is cоntrolled by Flamer v. New Jersey Transit Bus Operations, Inc.,
¶ 3 The trial judge found that because plaintiffs filed an eight-page Rule 1925(b) statement, аll appellate issues should be considered waived. We disagree. It is evident from a rеview of the statement that plaintiffs are essentially challenging the dismissal of their actiоn for failing to sue in the New Jersey county specified by the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. §§ 59:1-1 et seq., when it is undisputеd that New Jersey Transit does business in Philadelphia County. Particularly since the trial judge dismissed the action rather than transferring it to Hudson County, New Jersey, which is what New Jersey Transit requested, it was necessary for plaintiffs to clearly spell out why they were complaining or risk dismissal for faffing to specify the issue. As the judge’s order was the first time plaintiffs’ counsel learned that the action had been dismissed, it was necessary to address this issue in some detail. Although the Rule 1925(b) statement included elements of prior briefs, that was necessary to some extent becаuse of the changed posture of the case. Moreover, because plаintiffs summarized the briefs in one document, their Rule 1925(b) statement should have been viewed as assisting the trial court in preparing an opinion rather
¶ 4 Turning to thе merits of this appeal, we note that the factual similarities between this case and Flamer, supra, are striking. The plaintiffs in Flamer were Pennsylvania residents injured in an accident in New Jersey while riding on a bus operatеd by New Jersey Transit. New Jersey Transit claimed that it was immune from suit in Pennsylvania under the New Jersey Tоrt Claims Act.
¶ 5 This Court held that the Commonwealth’s public policy would not be violated by apрlying the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, as Pennsylvania has a similar statute that limits an individual’s right to sue a statе entity. Id. at 263. The Flamer Court concluded that although the Commonwealth has a strong interest in protecting its сitizens against tortious acts, because there is a right to sue in New Jersey if proper procedures are followed, the balance tipped in favor of New Jersey’s right tо regulate its common carriers. Id. at 264-65.
¶ 6 As in Flamer, plaintiffs here argue that they are subject to long-аrm jurisdiction because New Jersey Transit does business in this Commonwealth. That is not disputed, but the issue is subject matter jurisdiction under the Tort Claims Act. Also as in Flamer, plaintiffs here argue that they no longer have the option of suing in New Jersey because the statute of limitations has run. However, in Flamer, thе plaintiffs had not given the requisite 90 days’ notice to the governmental entity in New Jersey and thеrefore could no longer sue there. Whether or not that is the case here, where plaintiffs are probably barred both by lack of notice and the statute of limitations, makes no difference. The availability of another forum is only relevant if a case is bеing transferred under the doctrine of forum non conve-niens. Here, the issue is subject matter jurisdiction.
¶ 7 We believe that it was proper to “dismiss” the case rather than “transfer” the case. Under Pa.R.C.P. 1006(e), if a case cannot be transferred to another county within Pennsylvania, it is not appropriate to transfer the case. Instead, it should be dismissed without prejudice, as the trial judge did here. Moreover, if there is no subject matter jurisdiction, the proper remedy is dismissal, not transfer.
¶ 8 Unless the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or an en banc panel of this Court reverses Flamer, we cannot say that Pennsylvania public policy precludes our courts from giving comity to the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. The trial court properly applied the New Jersey Tort Claims Act and found that it lackеd subject matter jurisdiction to hear the instant case.
¶ 9 Order affirmed.
Notes
. Cf. Commonwealth v. Zheng,