Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.

ASSOCIATION OF WESTINGHOUSE SALARIED

EMPLOYEES v. WESTINGHOUSE

ELECTRIC CORP. No. 51. Argued November 17-18, 1954. Decided March With petitioner. for the cause argued Feller E. David Thomas Goldberg J. Arthur were brief on

him Harris. E. respondent. cause argued Lewis E. Mahlon Gregg. H. Loyal was brief him

With Mr. Justice Frankfurter announced the judgment the Court and opinion in which Mr. Justice Burton and Mr. Justice Minton join.

Respondent is a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of electrical equipment in inter- state commerce. Petitioner, an unincorporated labor organization and the collective bargaining representative of some 5,000 salaried employees at respondent’s

two of plants, filed this suit against respondent in the United States District Court for the Western District of Penn- sylvania to enforce collective bargaining agreements then in effect between it and respondent. The suit was brought under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. §C. 185, and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 62 Stat. 964, as amended, 28 S.U. C. §§ 2201, 2202.

More specifically, petitioner alleged that under the con- tracts respondent was obligated to pay the employees represented by petitioner their full salary April during 1951, regardless of whether they missed a day’s work, unless the absence was due to “furlough” or “leave ab- sence,” and that respondent had violated the contracts by deducting from the pay of some 4,000 of those employees their wages for April 3, when they were absent. No reason given was for their absence, but it alleged was that the reason was not furlough or leave of absence. The em- ployees were named and were not made parties to the suit. Petitioner requested the court to interpret the con- tracts, declare the rights of the parties, compel respondent to make an accounting (and name the employees involved and the amounts of unpaid salaries), and enter a judg- ment against respondent and in favor of the individual employees for the unpaid wages.

Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on three grounds: the court jurisdiction lacked over the subject matter, petitioner was the wrong party plaintiff under failed complaint and the (a), Proc., Civ. Rules

Fed. The granted. could relief which upon claima to state subject over jurisdiction had that held court district dis- but plaintiff proper awas petitioner and matter relief, for a claim to state failure for complaint missed It held amend. right petitioner’s prejudice without cause to the averments affirmative that, without were absences assumed it must work, from absences not obli- did contracts bargaining and voluntary, absences. voluntary during wages pay respondent gate F. Supp.692. en sitting Circuit, Third for Appeals Court The court’s the district vacated dissenting, banc, judges three and directed merits, complaint dismissing order stating After jurisdiction. lack a dismissal thus federal-question grant “is a § 301 reviewing various right” federal, substantive creates union, between relationship explaining theories bargaining a collective employees employer based theory,” an “eclectic adopted court agreement, Board, v. Labor Co. I. Case in J. language upon primarily Court, said contract, S. 321 U. hire contracts in the include employer obligates had and conditions terms employee each but employer, the and union between settled been hire. contract is not itself contract collective contract individual an into enters employee an until Not become employer does services performs and hire wages. specified employee particular pay bound this breach awas if there Court, that follows, said It contracts employment a breach was case, it Section paid. were who employees individual only courts jurisdiction hand, grants other breaches involving cases over There- employer. union between contract fore, it was concluded, the district court was juris- without diction of the suit. 210 F. 2d 623.

The dissenting judges agreed that a failure to pay wages might well constitute breach of the individual con- hiring tracts as a basis of common-law suits by the employees. But they deemed the breach, if any, also a breach of the collective bargaining contracts and as such cognizable in the federal court under §301. They concluded that Rule 17 (a) permitted the union to sue alone, without joinder of the employees, to vindicate the rights of these employees as a class, such employees being beneficiaries of the collective contracts. They agreed with the district court, however, that, on this complaint, the bargaining contracts did not make respondent liable, since the cause of the absences from work was not alleged. 210 F. 2d, at 630.

The case was brought here for construction of a section of the Taft-Hartley Act which proved a fertile source of difficulty for the lower courts. 347 U. S. 1010.

1. In dealing with an enactment such as § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,1 it is necessary first provides: Section 301 (a) “Sec. Suits for violation of contracts between employer an and a organization labor representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in Act, any between such labor organizations, may be brought any district court of the United States having of the parties, respect without to the amount in controversy or regard without to the citizenship of the parties. “(b) Any organization labor represents employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act any employer whose activities affect commerce as defined in this Act shall be bound by the acts of agents. its Any such organization labor may sue or be sued as entity an and in behalf of the employees whom represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a organization labor in a district court of the United States shall be only enforceable against organization entity against its particularly, more scope, jurisdictional its ascertain to not may as Here, hand. at the suit to extends it whether large in turns question this case, the be infrequently required be would court federal a sources on what measure substantive underlying the determining in upon draw to the deciding whether in case, this parties the of rights —in Congress If asserts. it which right the contract has union courts federal the authorized or law the defined itself question, this governing rules judicial the fashion of power the of scope limit self-defeating be would accomplish necessary is than less courts Congress hand, other If, on aim. congressional this body enforcing for forum a federal furnished merely con- serious provide, States which law contract of juris- threshold at lie would problem stitutional merely is 301§of function Moreover, if diction. good are there law, state for forum providing wording broad despite that, finding for reasons over jurisdiction to confer intend not did Congress suit. type this or member any individual against enforceable shall

assets, and assets. his against by or proceedings of actions purposes “(c) For States, district United of the courts district in the organizations labor organization labor aof have be deemed shall courts principal its maintains organization such in which the district in (1) or officers its^duly authorized any district (2) in office, or members. employee acting for or representing engaged are agents process legal other or subpena, summons, service “(d) labor aof agent or officer an upon States United any court upon service constitute such, shall capacity his organization, organization. labor any determining whether section, in purposes “(e) For such make toas so person of another ‘agent’ acting as person whether question acts, the his responsible person other subsequently actually authorized were performed acts specific controlling.” shall ratified

443 If the section is given the meaning its language sponta- neously yields, it would seem clear that all it does is give procedural directions to the federal courts. “When an unincorporated association that happens to be a labor union appears before you as a litigant in a case involving breach of a collective agreement,” Congress in effect told the district judges, “treat it as though it were a natural or corporate legal person and do so regardless of the amount in controversy and do not require diversity of citizenship.”

Since a statute like the Taft-Hartley Act is an organ- ism, § 301 must be placed in the context of the legislation as a whole. So viewed, however, the meaning which the section by itself affords is not affected. While some sec- tions inAct certain instances may be relevant actions for breach of contract and as such binding also on the States,2 no provision suggests general application of 2Section 1 of the Act states congressional aim to be the enu meration of “legitimate rights” of employers and employees and the practices definition of to be outlawed in the interest of furthering peace. industrial No pertinent inference jurisdictional content of 301 can § be drawn from this introductory generalization. No provision other of the Act indicates that substantive federal law guide was to the determination of the rights contractual and liabilities that are to flow from a collective bargaining contract. Section 302 contains highly a specialized restriction on legality of employers’ agreements to payments make to employee representatives. Section provides 303 right damages recover suffered as a result improper boycotts. Section 8 enumerates unfair labor practices; may these in some instances become relevant to validity or inter pretation of a agreement. procedural Certain safeguards placed are about the collective bargaining agreement: obligation good confer in questions faith on arising it; under duty to follow steps prior certain to terminating or modifying agreement uni laterally. (§§ (d), S (a)(2).) And a limited number sub rights stantive conferred under the may Act incidentally involve the interpretation of the collective agreement. (E. g., (a).) It is § significant, however, that breach of contract is not an “unfair labor law substantive available theretofore

defined arising actions construction conclude would examination This read- any court by is, courts, English section parlia- drawing without written isitas legislation ing construction considering And debates. mentary meaning “plain so-called plain, seems found have we rested time to time fromis construction on rule,” needless inquiry further makes Court, likewise also dominated not has rule that But improper. and'indeed See prevailed. doctrine contrary The decisions. our 41, S. States, U. 278 v. United Co. Gravel & Sand Boston And 561. 554, S.U. Dickerson, 310 v. States United 48; history legislative of examination to proceed we so for search that doubts such raises whether see to itself. statute to limited meaning should surrounding union obstacles with concern Congressional In as early itself manifest began litigation nu- thereafter Congress 78th session first solutions, various proposing introduced were bills merous rights denial incorporation,3 including cause aof creation violators,4 contract Act to Wagner col- of the violation acts other strikes action juris- grants contract,5 and bargaining lective bill, Senate in the contained end was proposal A practice.” parties “Once observation: conference deleted was but enforcement contract made have the law processes usual be left should contract 510, Rep. No. Conf. (H. R. Board.” Relations Labor National law state defers expressly 42.) Act Sess. Cong., 1st 80th (a)(3), (§§8 provision. shop union legality question (b).) 14 Cong., 1st 4960, 79th Sess.; H. R. Cong., 1st 1781, 78th R. 3 H. Sess.; 2d Cong., 318, 79th Res. J. 133; H. J. Res. S. Sess.; S. Cong., 1st Sess. 43, 80th Res. 8; J.H. Res. J.S. Cong., 1st Sess. 1641,79th S. Cong., 267,1430,80th 123; R.H. Sess.; S. Cong., 1st 1656, 79th S. 1st Sess.

diction similar to the present § 301.6 Only one of these, the so-called “Case bill,” was acted upon. This bill, which passed both Houses in 1946, only to fail through President Truman’s veto, included as § 10 a provision somewhat similar to the present section. That section passed the House in the following form: Binding “Sec. 10. collective-bargain- effect

ing contracts. —All collective-bargaining contracts shall be mutually and equally binding and enforce- able against each of the parties thereto, any other law to the contrary notwithstanding. In the event of a breach of any such contract ofor any agreement con- tained in such contract by either party thereto, then, in addition to any other remedy or remedies existing, a suit for damages for such breach may main- tained by the other party parties in any State or United States district court having jurisdiction of the parties.” H. R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. in

Discussion that chamber was not enlightening, due perhaps to the fact that the Case bill had been substi- on tuted the House floor for the text of a very different bill and thus had never been considered in committee. Section 10 presented was as necessary to achievement “mutuality” of obligation between employer and union, but there was no guiding explanation of the nature of the obstacle to mutuality. The language of the section, however, gave support to the view that a federal cause of action towas be created.

After the passed bill the House, hearings were held on it by the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, during which Senator Taft pointed out to Representative Case that, in his view, the section as written failed to deal 6 55, S. 404; H. R. 725, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. Under S. 80th Cong., 1st Sess., system a of federal labor courts to hear all cases arising out of collective bargaining contracts would have been established.

446 enforce- substantive was which problem, real the jurisdic- obtaining in difficulty procedural ability but Case Mr. organizations. labor unincorporated over tion that reach redrafted should section the that agreed 10,§ without bill reported Committee The problem.7 was section House passed as that asserting respon- legal toas misapprehension a upon “based such that contracts,” such parties sibility courts,” enforceable legally present at “are contracts would concerning them litigation promote and Alexander H. Taft Ball, Senators undesirable.8 conceding report minority a filed Smith con- enforceable legally are “theoretically agreements over- necessary was action contending but tracts” from arising enforcement obstacles practical come They associations. unincorporated as unions status adopted later section worded differently a proposed approximated closely which Houses, both substance 301.9 present wording on Committee Senate Subcommittee Hearings before 11. Sess. 2d Cong., 4908, 79th R.H. Labor

Education Sess. 2d Cong., 1177,79th Rep. No. S. was proposed they section 3-4, 10-14. 2, at Id,., Part follows: as as concluded contract of a violation (a) Suits —. “Sec. labor employer between of collective result Act in this as defined commerce affects contract if such organization having States United court any district brought may be parties. commerce affect activities whose organization Any labor “(b) duly authorized of its by the acts bound be shall Act defined labor said authority from their scope of acting within agents behalf entity and an as sued may or sue and organization States: United of the courts represents whom employees organization labor such against judgment money any Provided, That entity and an organization against only be enforceable shall any individual against enforceable shall assets, and its against assets.” his member

In introducing this proposed amendment, Senator Taft stated:

. . All we provide in the amendment is voluntary associations shall in effect be suable as if they were corporations, and suable in the Federal if courts the contract involves interstate commerce and therefore involves a Federal question. . . 92 Cong. Rec. 5705. This rather casual non sequitur seems to suggest reliance not on the existence or establishment any substantive federal law governing collective bargaining contracts to create “federal question” in the technical sense relevant to jurisdiction of district courts, but on the mere power of Congress to enact such law.10 While some statements on the Senate floor by opponents of the amend- ment are ambiguous,11 all authoritative materials indicate the strictly procedural aim of the section. The aim was open the federal courts to suits on agreements solely because they were between labor organizations employers without providing federal law for such suits.

In the first session of the 80th Congress, bills intro- duced independently in both Houses contained sections strikingly similar to the final version of 10 of § the Case 10During the hearings on the Taft-Hartley bill, Senator sug Taft gested that the fact that the collective bargaining agreement was product of the exercise of federally rights created and duties was adequate justification for jurisdiction. Hearings before Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, on S. 55 and S. J. 22,80th Res. Cong., 1st Sess. 57. 11See the statements of Senators Murray Magnuson seemed suggest 10 would § create rights.” “Federal Cong. Rec. 5720, 5411-5415. Senator Murray, however, appears have thinking been only procedural of the jurisdictional rights admittedly conferred Magnuson Senator § spoke before Sen ator Taft introduced the containing amendment 10, and may have understood that it differed considerably from the House version.

448 generalities While analytical. more was Discussion

bill.12 was reappear, enforceability mutuality and praise in procedural remove towas desire specific evident Pep- Senator the union. against by and suit to obstacles deemed Schwellenbach Labor Secretary and per on suits forum” Federal provide “to one measure this assumed It was law.13 on local based contracts would in turn enforceability, which mutual result would Secretary testimony The harmony. labor further unions' labor together (who Schwellenbach Houses,14 and in both reports minority 301), opposed directed the Senate15 floor on statements opposition Cong., 1st 1126, 80th S. §302; 12 Cong., 1st Sess. 3020, 80th R.H. 301. Sess. § Welfare Public Labor on 13 Committee Senate Hearings before During these 58. Sess. Cong., 1st 22, 80th Res. J. and S. 55S. necessary the field “Since stated: Secretary Schwellenbach hearings gates why the reason no narrow, I see sois action legislative isas litigation, invite as to so wide opened should courts Federal former lawyer and aas Speaking section. proposed by this done abandon objection have I judiciary, Federal of the member contro amount $3,000 requirement of the field this inment right ais This jurisdiction. Federal prerequisite versy aas courts. Federal by the Congress by the guarded jealously been in litigation petty mass great up with cluttered them have To posi back bring them $3,000 would than less volving amounts they became days when prohibition during occupied they tion which insofar court average police level above bit little just a concerned. was work criminal diver- abandon field necessary why it is see do “I aban- it can I doubt fact In requirement. citizenship sity of suits know, limits you Constitution, as constitutionally. doned the Constitution arising under cases courts Federal in the Id., citizenship.” diversity of involving States United of the laws at 105, Rep. No. 108-110; S. Sess. Cong., 14 1st 80th Rep. No. H. 2,13-15. Sess.,Part Cong., 1st 80th (Senator id., at 4768 Murray); (Senator 4033,4906 Cong. Rec. Thomas).

attention to the fact that state law govern would actions under 301 and that this, diversity jurisdiction apart, would raise a substantial constitutional question. No denial of first these assertions appears. Senator Taft did not justify § 301 as dependent on federal substantive law governing interpretation of collective bargaining contracts:

“Mr. President, title III of the bill . . . makes unions suable in the Federal courts for violation of contract. As a matter of law unions, of course, are liable in theory on their contracts today, but as a practical matter it is difficult to sue them. They are not incorporated; they have many members; in some States all the members must be served; it is difficult to know who is to be served. But the pending bill provides they can be sued if they were corpora- tions and if a judgment against found the labor organization, even though it is an unincorporated association, the liability onis the labor union and the labor-union funds, and it is not on the individual members of the union, where it has fallen in some famous cases the great financial distress individual members of labor unions.” 93 Cong. Rec. 3839.

Legislative history, in its relevant aspects, thus rein- forces the meaning conveyed by the statute itself as a mere procedural provision.

2. From this conclusion inevitably emerge questions regarding the constitutionality of grant a of jurisdiction to federal courts over contract governed entirely by state substantive law, jurisdiction not based on diversity of yet citizenship one in which a federal court would, as in diversity cases, administer the law the State in which it sits. The scope of allowable federal judicial power that this grant must satisfy is constitutionally defined as Constitu- under arising Equity, Law “Cases, made, Treaties States, United Laws

tion, Ill, Art. Authority.” their under made, shall or which §2. general decisions exception, without Almost similar strikingly jurisdiction grants statutory terms tested have wording, constitutional cause plaintiff's part integral anas presence, application interpretation calling an issue action, sug- been sometimes Although law.16 of federal federal from derive must action” “cause that gested fed- aspect some sufficient found been has law,17 litigation- success.18 plaintiff’s essential law eral degree been has problem provoking and case forefront in must law peripheral. or remote, collateral constitu- full assumed been generally has It ju- general these by exhausted been has power tional decision, under lines two inAnd statutes.19 risdictional fed- against by actions grants jurisdictional special 20 in bank- trustees organizations incorporated erally despite sustained been has jurisdiction ruptcy,21 theory question” “federal traditional fact satisfied if latitude considerable jurisdiction 109. Bank, 299 U. S. 16 Gully First Nat. v. g.,E. Co., 241 U. S. Layne Bowler & 17 v.Co. Works Well American See 257, 260. S. 180. Co., U. 255 Trust & 18 City Title v. Kansas Smith Courts, District “Question” 19 Federal Mishkin, The g., See, e. Jurisdic Some Jaegerman, 160; 157, Shulman Rev. L. 53 Col. 47; 405, n. L. J. Procedure, Yale 45 Federal Limitations tional Code, Judicial Revision Jurisdiction Wechsler, Federal 216,225. Contemp. Prob. &Law13 738; States, Wheat. Pacific 9 20 the United Bank v. Osborn 1.S. Cases, U. Removal Railroad Austrian, v. 367; Williams Beeler, 293 U. S. v. 21 Schumacher S.U.

contingent likelihood of presentation of a federal question. Analysis of these cases in terms of that theory reveals anal- ogies to § 301. For federal law is, in certain respects, the background of any action on a collective bargaining agreement affecting commerce: § 301 vests rights and lia- bilities, which under state law are distributed among the union members, in a legal “entity” recognized by federal law for purposes of actions on collective bargaining agree- ments in the federal courts; such actions, the validity of the agreement may be challenged on federal grounds— that the labor organization negotiating it was not the rep- resentative the employees involved, or that subsequent changes in the representative status of the union have affected the continued validity of the agreement.22

Federal based solely on the fact of federal incorporation has, however, been severely restricted by Congress,23 and this Court has cast doubt on its con- tinued vitality.24 Whether the precedent might be ex- tended to meet the substantial difficulties encountered 301§ pose would a serious problem. constitutional

Recognition of jurisdiction in the bankruptcy cases, de- spite the fact that the actions might be governed solely by state law, draws on the reach of the bankruptcy power, which may reasonably be deemed to sweep within its scope interests sufficiently related to the main purpose of to bankruptcy call for organic treatment. To attempt to reason from these cases to § 301 raises the if equally more question serious of what, if anything, is encompassed 22Cf. La Telephone Crosse Corp. v. Employment Wisconsin Rela Board, tions 336 U. S. 18. 2362 934, Stat. 28 U. S. C. 1349: § “The district courts shall not jurisdiction have any of civil against action or any corporation upon ground the that it was incorporated by or under an of Act Congress, unless the United States is the owner of more than one-half of its capital stock.” 24 Gully See v. First Bank, Nat. 299 109, U. S.

452 of laws “arising cases over jurisdiction “federal traditional that beyond States” United recognizes.25 theory

question” federal lower problems, these avoid effort In3. have Most answers. discordant given have courts federal “substantive of creation 301§to ascribed agreements subjection rights” course, must, We law.26 common federal body Con power concerning the 25 advanced views some For ques any “federal absence despite jurisdiction to confer gress Tide v. Co. Ins. Mutual sense, National see traditional tion” v. Union Workers 600; Textile 582, S.U. Co., 337 water Transfer Wechsler, The and 137; Hart Supp. Co., F. 113 Thread American Wechsler, Federal 744r-747; System, Federal and Courts Federal & Code, Law 13 the Judicial Revision and Jurisdiction “Question” Federal Mishkin, The 224; 216, Prob. Contemp. 157, 184. L. Rev. Courts, Col. 53 District applied, to be law state 26 held court federal one At least federal as law of state incorporation theory of federal on perhaps Co., Ins. v. Prudential Union International Agents’ Insurance law. Thread v. American Union Workers Textile 869; see Supp. F. 122 Cf. possibility). such (suggestion 137, 140 Supp. F. Co., 113 F. Co., 119 Lumber River v. McCloud Woodworkers International diversity on was based where applied (state law 475 Supp. Supp. aff’d F. 1291, 107 v. Local Co. 301); Isbrandtsen aswell § state federal appeal, on present; again (diversity 2d 495 F. 204 avoided); law applicable question the same law found & v. United Professional Co. Ins. Office Mutual Hancock Life John ground denied court federal (removal 296 Supp. Workers, F. framed were complaints rights, federal gives if even § law). solely state reference sub federal created however, hold courts, Most state between choose upon to called and, when rights stantive & Electrical, Radio g., United E. latter. law, apply Cream Ice& 376; Milk 2dF. Corp., 205 v. Oliver Workers Machine Corp., Products Gillespie Milk v. Union Employees Dairy & Drivers Hod Carriers v. International Co. Shirley-Herman 650; 2dF. 203 Local v. Co. Motor 806; International Plainfield 2dF. Union, 182 Workers, Sugar United v. Agr. Co. 683; Waialua Supp. F. 123 343, Union, Workers v. Textile Co. Mfg. & Sales 243; Ludlow Supp. F. 114 defer to the strong presumption as to such techni —even cal matters as federal jurisdiction Congress —that legis lated in accordance with the Constitution. Legislation must, if possible, be given a meaning that will enable it to survive. This rule of constitutional adjudication is normally invoked to narrow what would otherwise be the natural but constitutionally dubious scope of the lan guage. g.,E. United States v. Delaware & Co., Hudson 213 U. S. 366; United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41. Here the endeavor of lower courts has resulted adding to the section substantive congressional regulation even though Congress saw fit not to exercise such power nor to give the courts any guidance concrete for defining such regulation. To be sure, the full scope of a regulation substantive

frequently dispute and must await authoritative deter- mination by courts. Congress declares its purpose im- perfectly or partially and the judiciary rounds it out com- patibly. inBut this case we start awith provision which is wholly jurisdictional and as such bristles with consti- 108 F. Supp. 45; Pepper Potter, & Inc. v. 977, Local 103 F. Supp. 684; Fay v. Cystoscope American Makers, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 278; Textile Workers Union v. Mfg. Aleo Co., Supp. 626; F. Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, Supp. 83 F. 162; Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co. v. International Union, 76 F. Supp. 493, aff’d 33; 168 F. 2d International Union v. Dahlem Co., Const. 193 F. 2d 470 (semble); see Drilling, Rock Local Union No. 17 v. Mason & Hanger Co., 217 F. 2d 691; Schatte v. Alliance, International 182 F. 2d 158, 164. Cf. Textile Workers Union v. Arista Co., Mills 193 F. 2d 529 (refusal pass on whether substantive rights created; federal law apparently applicable viewed as to issue any raised event). At least two courts have drawn a distinction between the law to be applied to matters of right” “substantive “remedy.” Hamilton Foundry & Machine Co. v. International Union, Molders 193 F. (federal 2d rights created but state statute of applied); frauds Textile Workers Union v. American Co., Thread 113 F. Supp. 137 (whether or not federal applies law to other matters, federal law regarding enforcement arbitration applies). clauses them, avoid To III. Article problems tutional proposed. been has regulation substantive of

interpolation that determination a draw we to are materials what From to clearly appears it what than something other is 301§ the of in view vexing particularly is problem be? of state the alternatives that policy of choice difficult very conse- the as to uncertainty the present law federal or creating in justified Court Is the choice. the of quences of delicate matters in choice problems difficult these all Congress'and from any direction without policy legislative which provision ato effect giving sake the for merely are far How subject? different deal to seems obvious transforming reshaping in go to courts for some- validity to achieve order in Congress design Mr. words In the fashioned? not Congress thing think “We Court: whole speaking Cardozo, Justice places whatever flood toas strong is so light striven have Courts dark. be otherwise might statute path along construction canalize to times at mightily suscepti- reasonably is statute . . When . safety. mean- preferred have they interpretations, two ble . . . destroys. that meaning to preserves ing pressed not be will difficulty of a avoidance 'But intention ‘Here . . . evasion/ disingenuous point tous permit distinctly too revealed Congress ” power/ misgivings mere because ignore S. 296 U. Cleary, v. Assn. & Loan Savings Federal Hopkins 334-335. proceeding justified would we assuming that But federal permits section suggestion further, the govern- code amore without out work courts from us free does contracts ing difficulties. multi- courts involve would a task Such without solved could problems plying them. raise intended never Congress disclosing Application of a body of federal common law would inevitably lead to one of the following incongruities: (1) conflict in federal and state court interpretations of col- lective bargaining agreements; (2) displacement of state law by federal law in state courts, not only in actions between union and employer but in all actions regarding collective bargaining agreements; or (3) exclusion of state court over these matters. It would also be necessary to work out a federal code governing the inter- relationship between the employee’s rights and whatever rights were found to exist in the union. if Moreover, general unfolding of such broad application of federal law were designed, the procedural objectives of Congress would have been accomplished without the need of any special jurisdictional statute. Federal rights would be in issue, and, under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 and Federal Rule 17 (b), the suit could be brought in any district court by or against the union anas entity. The only effect §of 301 would then be to dispense with the requirement of amount in controversy and to adopt certain other minor procedural rules.

It has been suggested that a more modest role might be assigned to federal law. The suggestion is that, in view of the difficulties which originally plagued the courts called upon to identify the nature of the legal relations by created a collective contract27 view of gener- 27The agreement collective was variously (1) viewed as: the mere usage formulation of or custom relevant to the interpretation of employment individual contract; (2) a contract between the employer and the individual member-employees, negotiated by the union as the employees' agent; (3) a contract between the union and employer for the benefit of the individual employees; (4) by held the court below, a contract between the union and employer giving the union rights, certain including the right to insist that employer contract with his employees consistently with the terms of the agreement, giving but the union no right obligations enforce running to individuals under their of contracts hire. 301 § of history legislative statements alized 301 agreements, collective of enforceability

favor authorization congressional aas viewed may nature concept out to work courts questions detailed leaving contract, collective law. state interpretation Con- attribution sophisticated excessively is an This was Congress wanting that wholly is Evidence gress. bargain- taken views diverse aware interfering were they event, any inor, agreement ing right of Moreover, once objective. any law, state granted contracts into enter union interpretation questions really are problems these If federal contracts. drawn ambiguously language be- would it ambiguities, these to resolve undertook law interpretation of questions inextricably involved come between Discrepancies contracts. of language of inevitable so not treatment, while court state federal interpre- task entire undertook law federal as where state between any difference And result. would tation, present would enforceability theories forum-shopping. for opportunities viable out working agency an into turn § To agreement a collective the nature theory of view to reasonable it seem does Nor unreality. smacks hands discretionary into delivery aas section of such Court, of this finally judiciary, difficul- These field. subtle complicated important, hold- a discussion illustrated may ties Its case. present in the Appeals Court ing agreement collective aof nature theory” “eclectic is contrary, and, statute, in the support no has example, For (1) it. repugnant ways in some preserve (a) in 9§ seeks Act Relations Labor National griev- up take employee individual anof “right” suggested ever one no but employer; his ances grievances these may not be up taken by the union. (2) It excludes from the court stage the party is recognized in the required preliminary stages. The union that is empowered to negotiate and settle the controversy before suit is barred from bringing suit when settlement reached. (3) This would tend to impair the union’s power to negotiate a mutually satisfactory settlement. As a practical matter, the employees expect their union just secure agreement par- but more ticularly to procure for the individual employees the bene- promised. fits If the union can secure only promise and is impotent procure for the individual employees the promised benefits, then it is bound to lose their sup- port. And if the union cannot ultimately suit, resort to it is encouraged to resort to strike action.

Perhaps the prime example of an individual cause of action, as distinguished from a union cause, Court of Appeals’ “eclectic theory,” would be the case of the discharge of a single employee. To make the situa- tion vivid, assume that there is no dispute whatever to the propriety of the alleged ground for the discharge and that only matter in controversy is the question of fact whether the employee did or did not commit the offense alleged. Yet precisely such incidents pull often the trigger of work stoppages. When stoppages do occur, they most frequently grievance involve a with respect to one employee or a few employees much smaller in number than those involved in the stoppage. such That stoppages are wildcat and officially unauthorized merely emphasizes the of fact group in interest the incident. It is a matter of industrial history that stoppages of work because of disciplinary penalties against individuals, or of because failure to the pay rates claimed, or of because the promotion or layoff of one employee rather than another, or for similar reasons, have been frequent occur- rences. A legal rule denying standing to the to union a deemed be tois what rights individual

protect indis- such encourage would individuals contract ultimately the though even true is this And cipline. industrial of matter ait make tois policy social desirable on grievances such for remedy a for rely to habit pro- grievance the on but on lawsuits or work of stoppage strong group in fact is There industry. within cedure prom- the benefit employee the for procuring in interest agreement. in the promise the well ised as interest, group press and represent can union If the group cannot, the it avoided; if may be stoppage the cannot holding below The self-help. wildcat to resorts manifes- its stimulate it can interest; group this eliminate a strike. way by tation drawn Appeals Court the which line the Is contract particular the interpretation result the parties the power beyond lawof rule aof or line can then former, is If alter? to and contract; in language express obliterated They language. suitable find trusted can unions or constitutions their amendment to secure quick were Court decision avoid in order statutes S. 325 U. Burley, v. R. Co. & Eastern Elgin, Joliet basis latter, what it is If 661.28 S. 327 U. employee in fear found to be It is rule? Stand their amended Engineers of Locomotive Brotherhood The to the members of all consent automatic provide for ing Rules Triennial Tenth their at grievances prosecution Brotherhood’s Locomo Brotherhood The April 1947. in March Convention Consti to their provision similar added Enginemen Firemen tive Railway Con Order Convention 35th their tution at fashion similar in a “statute” their amended Brakemen ductors 1946 Con their at Trainmen of Railroad The Brotherhood in 1946. Brother empowered Rule General a new adopted vention where cases “Except individual grievances prosecute hood notice written seasonable serve involved members member contrary.” to the Brotherhood may not be able to sue. To hold that the union may sue, it is not necessary to hold that the employee may not sue in any forum, and vice versa. At least when the union and the employee are in agreement, there no reason why either or both should not be permitted to sue. Such is the situation under (a)9§ of the National Labor Rela- tions Act with respect to the adjustment of grievances without suit. When the employee union are in disagreement, question is not which may sue, but rather extent which the one may conclude the other.

Speculative reflection reveals other possible substantive additions which might be made to § 301. When tested against the limitations which must judicial restrict elabo- ration of legislation, however, all possibilities meritorious are either specialized too to reach this case or too insig- nificant an addition to dissipate the constitutional doubts which have revealed themselves.

4. In the present case, however, serious constitutional problems may be avoided, and indeed must be, through the orthodox process of limiting the scope of doubtful legislation. We cannot adopt the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in reaching our conclusion that § 301 does not extend present case. That court relied upon an assumed federal concept of the nature of a col- lective bargaining agreement which is justified either in terms of discoverable congressional intent or considera- tions relevant to the function of the agreement in the field of labor relations. The same objections do not, however, prevail against the view that whether or not the applicable substantive law—in our view state law— would recognize right in the union, Congress did not intend to burden the federal courts with suits of type.

Considering the nature of a collective bargaining con- tract, which involves the correlative rights employer,

460 301 § read to disposed might we union,

employee due With case. this in sue to the union allowing would which difficulties constitutional to the regard interpretation an such fact in view raised, range extensive an courts federal bring to would con- we States, entertained heretofore litigation was There result. this will did Congress clude its attention when time aat Congress, suggestion no partic- courts, in the congestion directed was open areas, intended industrial heavy ularly griev- flood of a potential courts doors comply failure employer’s upon based ances compensation, relating agreement of a terms is their benefit individual in the peculiar terms a cause violated, give when which, matter subject have employees employee. individual to the action in the rights individual their to enforce able been always by the hampered been have They courts.29 state prior to courts 29 state by employees suits such examples of For Barton, 164 v. see Gulla passed, Taft-Hartley was Act 1947, when the Landau, v. 23 Co.& 952; Blum Supp. H. Y. 293, N. 149 Div. App. W. 408, 215 S. Ark. Salo, 140 154; Mastell v. E. 426, N. 155 App. Ohio ; 953 2d 696, 51 S. W. Ky. Co., 244 & N.R. McGregor v. Louisville 583; suit); (class 564 507, S. E. 195 Hicks, 185 Ga. v. Spread O’Jay Co. 694;W. 493, N. 253 Co., Neb. 126 R. Pac. Missouri v. Rentschler App.); (La. 678 Co., 156 So. Amusement v. Volquardsen Southern 669; Cross So. 4, 133 Sideboard, Miss. 161 v. R. Co. V.M.& Yazoo Hall 692; and 2d 461, 9 S. W. Ault, 157 Tenn. v. Coal Co. Mountain 2d 431, 28 S. W. App. Co., 224 Mo. R. Francisco Louis-San v. St. I. Case 630; J. Co., S.U. 312 R. Central Illinois v. Moore also See Disputes and Teller, Labor 336; I Board, S.U. 321 v. Labor Co. 166-168; II Supp.), (1940, §§ Cum. 1947 Bargaining Collective 1936), 379A. (rev. ed. § Williston, Contracts v. Con- g., E. being entertained. Dufour still are suits such And Donahoo 489; 2d 296, 68 So. Inc., Miss. Lines, Southern tinental Bank, Riggs Nat. v. 104; Marranzano 2dW. S. Thompson, 270 v. Inc., Loew’s, MacKay v. 349; F. 2d 195, 184 C. App. D. S. 87 U. (1954 Contracts, 379A Williston, case); II (diversity 2d 170 F. Supp.). Cum.

rules governing unincorporated associations. To extent, the collective bargaining contract has always been “enforceable.”

Nowhere the legislative history did Congress discuss any show recognition of the type of suit involved here, in which the union is suing on behalf of employees for accrued wages. Therefore, we conclude that Congress did not confer on the federal courts over a suit such as one.

Affirmed. Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Mr. Chief Justice Warren, with whom Mr. Justice Clark joins, concurring.

We agree with the decision but not with all that is said in opinion. the The only question we see here is one of statutory interpretation. For us the language of 301§ is not sufficiently explicit nor its legislative history suf- ficiently clear to indicate that Congress intended authorize a union to in enforce a federal court the uniquely personal right anof employee for whom it had bargained to receive compensation for services rendered his em- ployer. Thus viewed, it becomes unnecessary for us either to make labor policy or to raise constitutional issues.

Mr. Justice Reed, concurring.

My analysis of this case leads me to concur on grounds stated later without the extensive comment and broad treatment given by opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter.

What is there said as to the substantive law to be applied in § 301 actions will be pertinent in cases which are deemed to have been properly brought under that section —that is, where there set is forth the based agreement aof

violation carry union employer either failure appropriate is It other. undertakings with its out which law to as views my state me to therefore express doing to so actions those applied bewill by raised doubts constitutional with disagreement my Frankfurter. Justice Mr. opinion unions make towas 301§of purpose Assuming that for venue provisions corporations, if suable courts district federal gave also service, it commerce interstate related matters certain over Labor Congress. powers legislative within thus Rela- Management Labor 1.S. Cases, 301 U. Board regulation primarily 1947, directed Act, tions means through affecting commerce relations labor questions contract all While bargaining. of collective covered are actions 301§in arise may law substantive some furnishes Act statute, guiding forth sets It cases. those applied bewill it, under made contracts on bear will principles those reaching machinery controls also it may parties things the many out points It agreements. as such Acts, as other just commerce, in do not may the contracts Thus do. Act, Commerce Interstate into entered been have will actions 301§in upon sued law federal although law; and federal accordance breach, constitutes what just explicitly forth set does actions over jurisdiction federal by granting 301, unions employers between those either themof make breaches contracts, does make may unions that fact actionable. parties Gov- Federal bar does law state contracts conflict, In case field. in its legislation from ernment laws in federal as true is It prevails. law power gives enact power laws in state it 200. 195, at S. Co., 273 U. Oil Prairie v. Jones interpret. It may proper litigation under § 301 it will be necessary for federal courts to largely draw on state law for the solution of issues. In such instances state law is relied upon because application its is not contrary to federal policy, but supplements and fulfills it. Board of Comm’rs v. States, United 308 U. S. 343, 351. It has been held that a suit in equity aon right in a fed- eral court does not necessarily follow a state statute of limitation. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392. The general rule is that federal interpretation controls a fed- eral act. v. Jerome States, United 318 U. 101, S.

The fact that a considerable amount of state law may be applied in suits under § 301 should not affect the validity of the statute. This Court sustained jurisdictional grant of § 23 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act, Stat.

despite the fact that causes action brought thereunder were created governed solely by state law. Schu macher v. Beeler, 293 U. S. 367; v. Austrian, Williams U. S. 642. See also Osborn v. Bank the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, and Railroad Removal Pacific Cases, 115 U. S. 1, 11. Cf. the Federal Tort Act. Claims Since Congress legislative power over labor matters affecting interstate commerce, may grant to the federal courts try incidents of that activity raise legal issues, and dictate what law should be applied. The application of federal law raises no constitutional problem. If state law is to be applied, it is state oper law ating at the direction of and by permission of Con gress. State law is, in effect, incorporated by reference. Since the contract entered into through provisions of the Labor Act rights creates over which Congress has legisla tive authority, a breach of the contract is likewise within power. its Congress by § 301 has manifested purpose its to jurisdiction vest over breaches, to a certain extent, in the federal courts. Whether the rules of substantive law applied by the federal courts are derived from federal fed- truly are rules The immaterial. is sources state

or of contract for breach action of cause The state. not eral, the law, under arising action of a cause thus is the of Ill Art. under power judicial of source Constitution. regu- to Congress of power of the recognition the From R. Texas & Houston affecting commerce matters late S. 234 U. Doctrine), Shreveport (The States United v.Co. (1937), Cases, S. 301 U. Board Labor to (1914), incidents local over Congress power the as to questions changes legal advocates plagued commerce national to Congress power constitutional to the as doubts with recog- full the With effectually. relations labor regulate national, the the local integration the nition when commerce, authority national use to power the late this occasion, at no I see established. was needed, obscure to day another fog allow date, to reason by time problems these interest national —this 2 of subdivision Cf.. Constitution. of the III Article opinion. Frankfurter’s Justice Me. from recover cannot union think, I reason, The claim is that 301§ under suit in this employer hiring separate from arises employees for wages for The employee. each and employer between contracts employer work do to not undertake does union be, there any if duty, The workers. furnish even con- individual from arises employee an wages pay from employee, and employer between tract set is there Therefore agreement. employer an between contract aof no violation out confer required is organization labor aof violation alleged an show facts The employee an employer —a between contract statute. covered situation para- preceding in the contained interpretation sug- avoids section words conforms graph gesting constitutional limitations that would cripple creation of a national system for the enforcement of statutes concerning labor relations.

Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Black concurs, dissenting.

I agree with Mr. Justice Reed that Congress in the Taft-Hartley Act created federal sanctions for collective bargaining agreements, made the cases and controversies concerning them justiciable questions for the federal courts, permitted those courts to fashion from the federal statute, from state law, or from other germane sources, federal rules for the construction and interpre- tation of those collective bargaining agreements.

My dissent is from the refusal of the majority to allow the union standing to bring this suit. The complaint alleged reason of a collective bargaining agree- ment the employer was obligated to pay each employee, whom the union represents, his full salary during April 1951, regardless of whether he missed a day’s work, unless the employee’s absence was due to “furlough” or “leave of absence.” The complaint further alleged that employer had violated the collective bargaining contract by deducting from the pay of some 4,000 employees their wages April 3 on account of their absence, that absence not being a “furlough” or “leave of absence” within the meaning the collective bargaining agreement. The union requested a declaration of rights under the collec- tive bargaining agreement. Though the employees af- fected were not parties to the suit, the complaint prayed for an accounting of the amount owed each employee and a judgment in favor of the individual employees for the unpaid wages.

We make mountains out of molehills in not allowing the union to be the suing as well as the bargaining agency for its members as respects matters involving the con- enforcement

struction result employment of contracts Individual agreement. those But agreement. bargaining collective each from bargaining collective the of resultant the are contracts operate and function to continues that system a system, of collective concept The made. are contracts the after C. S.U. (29 statute the in contained bargaining the of negotiation the course, includes, of (a)) 159§ of terms the of settling the and agreement collective bargaining collective the But contracts. individual the Taft- sure, the beTo there. end does relationship in changes no shall there that provides Act Hartley C. S.U. term, during its agreement of the provisions the collective the that mean does that But (d). 158§ agree- the once picture out drops agent bargaining prac- trade-union enough know We made. is ment bargaining of collective advent know tices relationship between organized permanent, a produced day-to-day involving employer, and union Act The agreement. the collective administration far. right extends indeed collec- bargain . . “. provides specifically For obligation mutual performance is tively employees of the representative and employer faith good confer times reasonable at meet con- terms other hours, wages, respect with agreement, anof negotiation or employment, ditions 142, 61 Stat. ,”. . . arising thereunder question any or added). (italics (d) 158§C.S. 29 U. Act recognized grievances processing The performs organization labor which function aas “labor defines (5) 152§C.S. 29 U. For perform. may employers, deals agency organization” National As grievances.” “concerning alia, inter Co., Tool Hughes stated Board Relations Labor grievances, adjustment “The 326, B.R.L.N. viewed the larger aspect, constitutes, to great degree, the actual administration of a collective-bargaining contract.”

The administration of the collective agreement is its life and meaning. adjustment and settlement of grievances, the development of an administrative practice concerning the collective agreement give it force and authority-. The right of individual employees present their own

grievances is recognized by the Act. 29 TJ.S. C. (a). 159§ But even when they desire to speak for themselves, rather than through the union, Congress attached two important conditions. First, any adjustment of the individual grievance must not be “inconsistent with the terms a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect.” Second, the union must given “opportunity to present at adjustment.” such Id.

It is I plain, think, the grievance procedure is a part of the collective bargaining process. And a lawsuit is one of the ultimates of a grievance. A lawsuit, like negotiation or arbitration, resolves the dispute and settles it.

In short, the represents union the interests of the com- munity of employees in the collective bargaining agree- ment. The wide range of its interests are envisaged by the Act, which gives the collective bargaining agency exclusive authority to bargain “in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of em- ployment.” 29 U. S. §C. 159 (a). The range of its authority is the range of its interests. What the union obtains the collective agreement it should be entitled to enforce or defend in the forums which have been pro- vided. When we disallow it that standing, we fail to keep the law abreast of the industrial developments of this age.

Case Details

Case Name: Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.

Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States

Date Published: May 9, 1955

Citation: 348 U.S. 437

Docket Number: 51

Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS