Sеction 21 (a) of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (33 USCA § 921 (a) provides that a compensatiоn award shall become final thirty days after it has been filed “unless proceedings for the suspension or setting aside of suсh order are instituted as provided in subdivision (b) of this section”; subdivision (b), 33 USCA § 921 (b) places no time limit upon the bringing of such proceedings.
On Dеcember 12, 1931, an award was' made under the act in favor of John Thomas who was injured while in the employ of W. J. Jones & Sons, Inе., one of the appellants herein. On January 11, 1932, a bill of complaint was filed by Thomas against the Deputy Commissioner tо set aside the award on the ground that there had been error in the method of computation and praying that the mаtter be referred back to the Deputy Commissioner with instructions to correct the award. After having obtained permission to intervene in that suit, the Associated Indemnity Corporation, one of the appellants herein, on March 1, 1932, filed аn answer and a eross-complaint alleging that the Deputy Commissioner; had erred in making a greater award than the law permitted and that the complainant was indebted to the intervening defendant in the' amount of the over-payments аlready received.
On August 16, 1932, the bill of complaint m the instant suit was filed, attacking the amount of the award. The prayer was! thаt the award be set aside, and that a finding be made that the defendant John Thomas had no further compensation due him but on the contrary had been overpaid in the amount pf $416.60.
The appeal is from the order of the District Judge dismissing this latter bill оf complaint, apparently on the ground that it had not been filed until after the expiration of the statutory thirty-day period when the award became final as against the-plaintiffs therein. The cross-complaint of the Associated Indemnity Corporation in the suit instituted by John Thomas was also dismissed, probably for the same reason; hut that order is not before us fоr review.
Appellants contend that their complaint was not filed too late because appelleе Thomas’ suit, commenced within the thirty-day period of the statute, prevented the Deputy Commissioner’s order from becоming final. According to this contention, the institution of suit by one party would permit suit by the other party at any time before the сonclusion of the first suit. Such an interpretation is not required by the wording of section 21 and comports ill with the general scheme of
the
act. Although there is no limitation in section 21 (b) on the time of bringing suit to set aside an award, a thirty-day limitation, at least when there has been no earlier suit 'by the other party, is quite clearly implied from section 21 (a). See Twine v. Locke, 68 F. (2d) 712, 714 (C. C. A. 2, 1934); Globe Stevedoring Co., Ine., v. Peters,
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Appellants contend that this interpretation will encourage litigation. It is
suggested
that it would be to the advantage of a party-intending to litigate to dеlay filing suit until the end of the thirty-day period in order to catch off guard an adverse party, who, although he had substantial grounds for challenging the award, might prefer not to indulge in the expense of litigation unless forced
to do so
by the other party. In order to protect himself in case of such a last minute attack, such a party would be forced to file suit to set aside the award. The dangers thus suggested are not substantial enough to offer a persuasive guide to interpretation; moreover, one who has not appealed may intervene to sustain an award against attack. Cf., United States Casualty Co. v. Taylor,
The supplemental decree referring to the Deputy Commissioner the fixing of Thomas’ attorney’s compensation, without notice to or knowledge of appellants, was not erroneous. Appellants had no interest therein; it was a matter solely between Thomas and his attorney as it came оut of, but could not increase, Thomas’ award. Moreover, as the District Judge stated, the direction though announced in court, had been omitted from the decree by inadvertence.
Affirmed.