316 Mass. 166 | Mass. | 1944
This is an appeal by the board of assessors
The case was submitted to the board upon a statement of agreed facts. The specifications of error set forth in the assessors’ appeal relate to the denial of certain of their requests for rulings, and to the granting of the trustees’ requests for rulings. See G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 58A, § 13, as amended. The specifications of error in the refusal of the board to make particular findings of fact have no standing. Summed up, the specifications of error of the assessors properly raise but one question for determination, namely, whether as matter of law the agreed facts warrant the conelusions of the board and the general finding for the trustees. Assessors of Boston v. Garland School of Home Making, 296 Mass. 378, 383-384, and cases cited.
The relevant facts are these: The trustees derive their title to the property involved under a deed of trust executed on January 25, 1898, by Mary Baker G. Eddy, the founder of the Christian Science religion. (See Eustace v. Dickey, 240 Mass. 55.) By that deed title to certain goods and chattels connected with a publishing business conducted for the promotion of the interests of Christian Science was
The assessors’ contentions are that the board erred in ruling that the property in question is used or appropriated for religious purposes within the meaning of the statute, and in ruling that the income from the property is used or approprinted for religious purposes and that therefore the property was exempt from taxation.
General Laws (Ter. Ed.) c. 59, § 5, Tenth, the governing-statute, provides for exemption from taxation of “Personal property owned by or held in trust within the commonwealth for religious organizations, whether or not incorporated, if the principal or income is used or appropriated for religious, benevolent or charitable purposes.”
We have not been referred to nor have we discovered any case that has arisen hitherto under this clause. It is not, however, to be read alone, but must be read together with all the provisions of § 5 relative to exemption from taxation in accordance with the familiar rule that “A statute as a whole ought, if possible, to be so construed as to make it an effectual piece of legislation in harmony with common sense and sound reason.” Morrison v. Selectmen of Weymouth, 279 Mass. 486, 492. Acford v. Auditor of Cambridge, 300 Mass. 391, 395, and cases cited. Tilton v. Haverhill, 311 Mass. 572, 577-578. Thus considered, much light is thrown upon the construction of clause Tenth, particularly by cases that have arisen under § 5, Third,
The interpretation of § 5, Third, was considered in connection with the taxation of certain real estate in Assessors of Boston v. Garland School of Home Making, 296 Mass. 378, where it is said, at page 384, that the “answer to the question 'whether the institution is . . . charitable . . . within the meaning of . . . [that word] in the statutes’ 'will depend upon the language of its charter or articles of association, constitution and by-laws, and upon the objects which it serves and the method of its administration’ (Little v. Newburyport, 210 Mass. 414, 415), that is, upon its purposes declared and the work done.’” See also Assessors of Boston v. Boston Pilots’ Relief Society, 311 Mass. 232, 236-237. We are of opinion that this principle applies with equal force to the determination of whether the taxpayer in the present case holds the personal property in question in trust for a religious organization and whether “the principal or income [therefrom] is used or appropriated for religious . . . purposes,” within the meaning of the word religious and of the governing statute. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 59, § 5, Tenth. In the determination of that question it must also be kept in mind that the provision of § 5, Third, exempting personal property is broader than that exempting real estate owned and' occupied by a charitable institution for its corporate purposes and that such an “institution as the beneficial owner of real estate does not enjoy the same exemption
We are of opinion that in the present case the agreed facts warranted the finding of the board that the principal of the trust is used and appropriated for religious purposes within the meaning of the statute and the finding of the board that the dominant purpose of the trustees in publishing The Christian Science Monitor is to serve the religious cause of Christian Science. And the ruling of the board, that in “using the words, in clause 10, ‘if the principal or income is used or appropriated for religious, benevolent or charitable purposes’ we [the board] are of the opinion that the Legislature had in mind not an exclusive use but a dominant use such as is described by the court in . . . Emerson v. Milton Academy,” 185 Mass. 414, was right. This ruling also finds support in such cases as Thayer Academy v. Assessors of Braintree, 232 Mass. 402, Newton Centre Woman’s Club, Inc. v. Newton, 258 Mass. 326, and Springfield Young Men’s Christian Association v. Assessors of Springfield, 284 Mass. 1, 8. It is true that in the cases just cited the questions related to the exemption from taxation of the real estate of the institutions involved under § 5, Third; but for reasons already given the same principle applies with even greater force in the present case where the property involved is personal property.
The assessors contend that the board erred in finding and ruling that “the income from the property is used or appropriated for religious purposes,” stressing the various ex*
The assessors’ argument that the application of a part of the profit derived from its other publications, which were religious in character, to make up the loss sustained in connection with the publication of the Monitor was the use or appropriation of income to a nonreligious purpose, must fail in the light of the warranted findings of the board that the dominant purpose of the trustees in publishing the Monitor is “to serve the religious cause of Christian Science” and that it “is a missionary organ serving to carry the name and principles of Christian Science to all parts of the world and to cultivate goodwill for the Christian Science movement.”
The question whether the ultimate finding of the board for the taxpayer was warranted by the agreed facts is a question of law. Assessors of Boston v. Garland School of Home Making, 296 Mass. 378, 383, and cases cited. In our opinion that finding was warranted as matter of law upon the agreed facts.
It follows from what we have said that abatement must be granted in the sum of $41,268.40, with interest at the rate of five per cent per annum from October 9, 1937 (the date of payment of the tax and- interest and costs) until October 16, 1939 (the effective date of St. 1939, c. 366, § 1), and thereafter at the rate of four per cent per annum, together with the costs of this appeal. See Assessors of Quincy v. Boston Consolidated Gas Co. 309 Mass. 60, 72-73.
So ordered.