60 So. 233 | La. | 1912
In this suit a fi. fa. and a seizure under it are enjoined on the ground of homestead; the property in question (a house and lot in the city of Monroe) being the home of the plaintiff in injunction.
As it is contended that the enjoined judgment was rendered for a debt secured by vendor’s privilege against which the homestead cannot be invoked, and that it is res judicata of the question of homestead vel non, we give the history of this judgment.
The mere fact that the money loaned was used in paying the vendor’s privilege debt did not have the effect of subrogating Hirsch to the vendor’s claim. The conditions prescribed by the Code for the taking place of legal subrogation did not exist, and there was no conventional subrogation.
In the case of Decuir v. Benker, Sheriff, 33 La. Ann. 320, this court said:
“The dependency must not only be actual, but necessary, and it must also be a dependency supported by some sort of natural claim or right. A debtor would not be allowed to assume the support of persons having no natural claim upon him as a foundation for the homestead claim.”
In Galligar v. Payne, 34 La. Ann. 1057, the syllabus reads:
“A person cannot claim the benefit of the homestead laws, on the ground that she has 'brought up and is supporting in her house orphan children, who constitute her family, and are dependent upon her for such support.”
In other words, the support must not be purely voluntary, but must be in fulfillment of the legal obligation to support. 21 Cyc. 467.
It was therefore all important in the present case for the plaintiff to have shown that this child was the legitimate issue of her son. This she ought to have been able to do easily if such was the fact, for at the time of the birth of the child her son and
Considering that the mother of the child is still living, and that the son of plaintiff is married to another woman, a strong inference arises, in the absence of all proof, or even suggestion, of a divorce having taken place, that plaintiff’s son and the mother of the child were not married. Moreover, it is improbable that this young negro should have married twice within so short a time. Under the circumstances, we feel compelled to accept as true the positive testimony of plaintiff’s daughter-in-law to the effect that her husband was not married to the mother of the child. The consequence is that the child is illegitimate, and as such has no legal claim upon the plaintiff for support, and that therefore plaintiff has no one de'pendent upon her for support within the intendment of the homestead law, and is not entitled to the homestead.
Judgment affirmed.