298 U.S. 513 | SCOTUS | 1936
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent, a water improvement, district embracing 43,000 acres in Cameron County, Texas, was organized in 1914 under the laws of that State. Claiming to be insolvent and unable to meet its debts as they matured, it presented to the United States District Court, December 5, 1934, an Amended Petition with plan for adjusting its obligations—$800,000 six percent bonds. This proposed final settlement of these obligations through payment of 49.8 cents on.the dollar out of funds to be borrowed from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation at four percent.
The petition follows and seeks relief under the Act of Congress approved May 24, 1934, c. 345, §§ 78, 79 and 80, 48 Stat. 798; Title 11 U. S. C., §§ 301, 302 and 303
Owners of more than five percent of outstanding bonds-appeared, said there was no jurisdiction, denied the ex
The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. It held—
The petitioner is a mere agency or instrumentality of the State, created for local exercise of her sovereign power—reclamation of arid land through irrigation. It owns no private property and carries on public business only. The bonds are contracts of the State, executed through this agency,, and secured by taxes levied upon local property. Congress lacks power to authorize a federal court to readjust obligations, as provided by the Act. Also, the allegations of fact are insufficient.
The Circuit Court of Appeals took the cause, considered the .points presented, and held that the allegations were adequate to show jurisdiction and to warrant introduction of evidence. Also that Congress had exercised the power “To establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies,” granted by § 8, cl. 4, Art. 1 of the Constitution.. Accordingly, it reversed the trial court and remanded the cause.
The Act of May 24, 1934 amended the Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544, by adding Chapter IX (three sections, 78, 79, 80), captioned “Provisions for the Emergency Temporary Aid of Insolvent Public Debtors and to Preserve the Assets thereof and for other Related. Purposes.”
Section 78 asserts an emergency rendering imperative further exercise of the bankruptcy powers. Section 79 directs that “in addition to the jurisdiction exercised in voluntary and involuntary proceedings to adjudge persons bankrupt, courts of bankruptcy shall exercise original jurisdiction in proceedings for the relief of debtors, as provided in this chapter.”
. Section 80—long and not free from ambiguities—in twelve paragraphs (a to 1) prescribes the mode and eon
The petition for relief must be filed in the District Court and submit plan for readjustment, approved by creditors holding thirty percent , of the obligations to be affected; also complete list of creditors. If satisfied .that the petition is in good faith and follows the statute, the judge shall enter an approving order; otherwise, it must be dismissed. Creditors holding five percent of the indebtedness may appear in opposition.
“A plan of readjustment within the meaning of this chapter (1) shall include provisions modifying or altering the rights of creditors generally, or of any class of them, secured or- unsecured, either through the issuance of new securities of any character or otherwise; and (2) may contain such other provisions and agreements, not inconsistent with this chapter, as the parties may desire.”
Upon approval of the petition, creditors must be notified; if the plan is not seasonably accepted, extension may be granted, étc.
Hearings must be accorded. The judge, with its approval, “may direct the rejection of contracts of the taxing district executory in whole or .in part.” He may require the district to open its books; allow reasonable compensation; stay suits; enter an interlocutory decree declaring the, plan temporarily operative, etc. “But [he] shall.not, by any order.or decree, in the proceeding or otherwise, interfere with any of the political or govern
After hearing, the judge shall confirm the plan, if satisfied that it is fair, equitable, for the best interests of the creditors, does not unduly discriminate, complies with the statute, and has beén accepted by those holding two-thirds of the indebtedness. Also, that expenses incident to the readjustment have been provided for, that both plan and acceptance are in good faith and the district is authorized by law to take all necessary action.
. The provisions of the plan, after order of confirmation, shall bé binding .upon the district and all creditors,' secured or unsecured. Final decree shall discharge the district from all debts and liabilities dealt with by the plan, except as otherwise-provided.
“(k) Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to limit or impair the power of any. State to control, by legislation or otherwise, any political subdivision thereof in the exercise of its political or governmental powers, including expenditures therefor, and including the power to require the approval by any governmental agency of the State of the filing of any' petition hereunder and of any plan of readjustment, and whenever there shall exist or shall hereafter bé created under the law. of any State any agency of such State authorized to exercise supervision or control over the fiscal affairs of all or any political subdivisions thereof, and whenever such agency has assumed such supervision or control over any political subdivision, then no petition of such political subdivision may be received hereunder unless' accompanied by the written approval of such agency, and no plan of readjustment shall be put into temporary effect or finally confirmed without the written approvál of such agency of such plains.”
The respondent was organized in 1914 as Cameron County Irrigation District No. One, to furnish water for irrigation and domestic uses; in 1919, it became the Cameron County Water Improvement District,No. One, all as authorized by statutes passed under § 52, Art. 3, Constitution of Texas, which permits creation of political divisions of the State, with power to sue and be sued, issue bonds,- levy and collect taxes. An amendment to the Constitution—§ 59a, Art. 16—(October 2, 1917) declares the conservation and development of all the natural resources of the State, including reclamation of lands and their preservation, are “public rights and duties.” Most of the bonds now in question were issued during 1914; the remainder in 1919.
By Act approved April 27, 1935, the Texas Legislature declared that municipalities, political subdivisions, taxing districts, &c., might proceed under the Act of Congress approved May 24, 1934.
It is plain enough that respondent is a political subdivision of the State, created for the local exercise of
The pertinent doctrine, now firmly established, was stated through Mr. Chief Justice Chase in Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725.—
“We have already had occasion to remark at this term, that ‘the people of each State compose a State, having its own government, and endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence/ and that ‘without the States in union, there could- be no such political body as the United States.’ Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and independent autonomy to the States, through, their union under the Constitution, but it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.”
Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 125, 126—
“Such being the separate and independent condition of the .States in our complex system, as recognized- by the Constitution, and the existence of which is so indispensable, that, without them, the general government itself would disappear from the family of nations, it would seem to follow, as a reasonable, if not a necessary .consequence, that the means and instrumentalities employed for carrying on the operations of their governments, for preserving their existence, and fulfilling the high and responsible duties assigned to them in the. Con
In Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570, 575, et seq., relevant cases are collected and the following conclusion announced—
“This principle is implied from the independence of the national and state governments within their respective spheres and from the provisions of the Constitution which look to the maintenance of the dual system.” Notwithstanding the broad grant of power “to lay and collect taxes,” opinions here plainly show that Congress could not levy any tax on the bonds issued by the respondent or upon income derived therefrom. So to do would be an unwarranted interference with fiscal matters of the State—essentials to her existence. Many opinions explain and support this view. In United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322, 329, this court said—
“A municipal corporation like the city of Baltimore is a representative not only of the State, but is a portion of its governmental power. It is one of its creatures, made for a specific purpose, to exercise within a limited sphere the powers of the State. The State may withdraw these local powers of government at pleasure and may, through its legislature or other appointed channels, govern the local territory as it governs the State at large. It may enlarge or contract its powers or destroy its existence. As
See also Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 586; 158 U. S. 601, 630.
The power “To establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies” can have no higher rank or importance in our scheme of government than the power “to lay and collect taxes.” Both are granted by the same section of the Constitution, and we find no reason for saying that one is impliedly limited by the necessity of preserving independence of the States, while the other is not. Accordingly, as application of the statutory provisions now, before us might materially restrict respondent’s control over its fiscal affairs, the trial court rightly declared them invalid.
If federal bankruptcy laws can be extended to respondent, why not to the State? If voluntary proceedings may be permitted, so may involuntary ones, subject of course to any inhibition of the Eleventh Amendment. In re Quarles, 158 U. S. 532, 535. If the State were proceeding under a statute like the present one, with terms broad enough to include her, apparently the problem would not be materially- different. Our special concern is with the existence of the power claimed—not merely the immediate outcome of what has already been attempted. And it is of the-first importance that due attention be given to the results which might be brought about by the exercise. of such a power in the future.
The especial purpose of all bankruptcy legislation is to interfere with the relations between the parties concerned—to change, modify or impair the obligation of their contracts. The statute before- us expresses this design in plain terms. It undertakes to extend the supposed power of the Federal Government incident to bankruptcy over any embarrassed district which may ap
If obligations of States or their political subdivisions may be subjected to the interference here attempted, they are no longer free to manage their own affairs; the will of Congress prevails over them; although inhibited, the right to tax might be less sinister. And really the sovereignty of the State, so often declared necessary to the federal system, does not exist. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 430. Farmers & Mechanics Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U. S. 516, 526.
The Constitution was careful to provide that “No State shall pass any Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” This, she may not do under the form of a. bankruptcy act or otherwise. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 191. Nor do we think she can accomplish the same end by granting any permission necessary to enable Congress so to do.
Neither consent nor submission by the States can enlarge the powers of Congress; none can exist except those which are granted. United States v. Butler, decided January 6, 1936, 297 U. S. 1. The sovereignty of the State essential to its proper functioning under the Federal Constitution cannot be surrendered; it cannot be taken away by any form of legislation. See United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287.
■Like any sovereignty, a State may voluntarily consent to be sued; may permit actions against her political subdivisions to enforce their obligations. Such proceedings against these subdivisions have often been entertained in federal courts. But nothing in this tends to support the view that the Federal Government, acting under the' bankruptcy clause, may impose its will and impair state powers—pass laws inconsistent with the idea of sovereignty.
The power to regulate commerce is necessarily exclusive in certain fields and, to be successful, must prevail
The difficulties arising out of our dual form of government, and the opportunities for differing opinions concerning the relative rights of State and National Governments are many; but for a very long time this court has stéadfastly adhered to the doctrine that the taxing power of Congress does not extend to the States or their political subdivisions. The same basic reasoning which leads to that conclusion, we think, requires like limitation upon the power which springs from the bankruptcy clause. United States v. Butler, supra.
The challenge to the validity of the statute must be sustained. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed. The cause will be returned to the District Court for further action, consistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
Originally, this was limited to two years. By Act approved April 10, 1936, it was extendéd to January 1, 1940, c. 186, 49 Stat. 1198.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
The question is a narrow one: Is there power in the Congress under the Constitution of the United States to permit local governmental units generally, and irrigation or water improvement districts in particular, to become voluntary bankrupts with the consent of their respective states?
Cameron County Water Improvement District Number One is a public corporation created by the laws of Texas. It has issued bonds for the construction of a canal system, which bonds are outstanding in the amount of $802,000. Default has been suffered to the extent of $147,000, either
What is true of Cameron County Water Improvement District Number One is true, in essentials of thousands of other public corporations in widely scattered areas. The hearings by committees of the Congress before the passage of the statute exhibit in vivid fashion the breadth and depth of the mischief which the statute was designed to remedy.
The next step in the inquiry has to do with the power of the Congress to eradicate the mischief. Is the Act in question, adopted May 24, 1934, to continue for two years (§§ 78, 79 and 80 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended by 48 Stat. 798; 11 U. S. C. §§ 301, 302, 303),
Throughout that evolutionary process, the court has hewn a straight path.
Cameron Water Improvement District Number One has no assets to surrender. If it shall turn out hereafter that there are any not exempt, the creditors may have them. Cameron Water Improvement District Number One is a debtor in an amount beyond its capacity for
The question is not here, whether the statute would be valid if it mad,e provision for involuntary bankruptcy, dispensing with the consent of the state and with that of the bankrupt subdivision. For present purposes one may assume that there would be in such condition's a dislocation of that balance between the powers of the states and the powers of the central government which is essential to our federal system. Cf. Hopkins Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Cleary, 296 U. S. 315; United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175. To read into the bankruptcy clause an exception or proviso to the effect that there shall be no disturbance of the federal framework by any bankruptcy proceeding is to do no more than has been done already with reference to the power of taxation by decisions known of all men. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316. The statute now in question does not dislocate the balance. It has been framed with sedulous regard to the structure of the federal system. The governmental units off the state may not act under this statute except through the medium, of a voluntary
To overcome an Act of Congress invalidity must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 270; Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 718. Sufficient reasons do not appear for excluding political subdivisions from the bankruptcy jurisdiction if the jurisdiction is so exerted as to maintain the equilibrium between state and national power. Persuasive analogies tell us that consent will preserve a balance threatened with derangement. A state may not tax the instrumentalities of the central government. It may do so, however, if the central government consents. Baltimore National Bank v. State Tax Commission, 297. U. S. 209. Reciprocally, the central government, consent being given, may lay a tax upon the states. Cf. United States v. California, supra. So also, interference by a state with interstate or foreign commerce may be lawful or unlawful as consent is granted or withheld. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 311; Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431. The prevailing opinion tells us in summing up its conclusions that the bankruptcy power and the taxing power are subject to like limitations when the interests of a state are affected by their action. Let that test be applied, and the Act must be upheld, for jurisdiction is withdrawn if the state does not approve.
• The Act does not authorize the states to impair through their own laws the obligation of existing contracts. Any interference by the states is remote and indirect. Cf. In re Imperial Irrigation District, 10 F. Supp. 832, 841. At most what they do is to waive a personal privilege that
'The Act is not lacking in uniformity because applicable only to such public corporations as have the requisite capacity under the law of the place of their creation. Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, supra, at p. 190. Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U. S. 605, 613. Capacity existing, the rule is uniform for all. Ibid.
No question is before us now, and no opinion is intimated, as to the power of Congress to enlarge the privilege of bankruptcy by extending it to the states as well as to the local units. Even- if the power exists, there has been no attempt to exercise it. There is room at least for argument that within the meaning of the Constitution the bankruptcy concept.does not embrace the states themselves. In the public law of the United States a state is a sovereign or at least a quasi-sovereign. Not so, a local governmental unit, though the state may have invested it with governmental power. Such a governmental unit may be brought into.court against its will
No question as to the merits of any plan of composition is before us at this time. Abrams v. Van Schaick, 293 U. S. 188. Attention, however, may be directed to the fact that by the terms of the statute, subdivision c (11), the judge “shall not, by any order or decree, in the proceeding br otherwise, interfere with '(a) any of the political or governmental powers of the taxing district, or (b) any of the property or revenues of the taxing district necessary in the opinion of the judge for essential governmental purposes,- or - (c) any income-producing property, unless the plan of readjustment so provides,” and that “the taxing district shall be heard on all questions.” These restrictions upon remedies do not take from the statute its quality as one affecting the “subject of Bankruptcies,” which, as already pointed, out, includes. a readjustment of the terms of the debtor-creditor relation, though there are no- assets to be .distributed. On the other hand, the restrictions are important as indicating the care with which the governmental powers of the state and its subdivisions are maintained inviolate.
The statute is constitutional, and the decree should be affirmed.
See Senate Committee Hearings, supra, at p. 12.
See the statistics gathered in 46 Harvard Law Review 1317.
For a collection of the cases, see 3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2nd ed., § 1262.
The cases are collected in 33 Columbia Law Review 28, 44.
Warren, Bankruptcy in United States History (1935), p. 9: “The trail [of the bankruptcy clause] is strewn with a host of unsuccessful objections based on constitutional grounds against the enactment of various provisions, all of which are now regarded as perfectly orthodox features of a bankruptcy law. Thus, it was at first, contended that, constitutionally, such a law must be confined to the lines of the English statute; next, that it could not discharge prior contracts; next, that a purely voluntary law would be non-uniform and therefore unconstitutional; next, that-any voluntary bankruptcy-was unconstitutional; next, that there could be no discharge of debts of any class except traders; next; that a bankruptcy law could not apply to corporations; next, that allowance of State exemptions of property would make a bankruptcy law non-uniform; next, that any composition-was unconstitutional; next, that there could be no composition without an adjudication in bankruptcy; next, that there could be no sale of mortgaged property free from the mortgage. All these objections, so hotly and frequently asserted from period to period, were overcome either by public opinion or by the Court.”
The Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of 1933 was condemned in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, supra, because destructive of rights of property protected by the Fifth Amendment.
For taxing districts other than drainage, irrigation, reclamation and levee districts, the requisite percentages are 51% and 75% respectively.
“(k) Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to limit Or impair the power of any State to control, by legislation or otherwise, any political subdivision thereof in the exercise of itpolitical or governmental powers, including expenditures therefor, and including the power to require the approval by any governmental agency of the State of the filing of any petition hereunder- and of any plan of readjustment, and whenever there shall exist or shall hereafter be created under the law of, any State any agency of such State authorized to exercise supervision or control over the fiscal affairs of all or any political subdivisions thereof, and whenever such agency has assumed such supervision or control over any political subdivision, then no petition of such political subdivision may be received hereunder unless accompanied by the written approval of such agency, and no plan of readjustment shall be put into temporary effect or finally confirmed without the written approval of such agency of such plans.”