Plaintiffs in this multidistrict litigation seek to hold multiple defendants liable for allegedly financing, sponsoring, conspiring to sponsor, aiding and abetting, or otherwise providing material support to Osama bin Laden and the terrorist organization known as al Qaeda, for the physical destruction, deaths, and injuries suffered as a result of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (the "9/11 Attacks").
During the pendency of Plaintiffs' appeal, Congress enacted the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act ("JASTA"), Pub. L. No. 114-222,
Recognizing that "JASTA was intended to apply to this case[,]" and that its enactment "raise[d] numerous questions that have not yet been addressed by the district court[,]" the parties jointly requested that the Second Circuit vacate this Court's September 29, 2015 Opinion and Order dismissing, under the FSIA, all claims against Saudi Arabia and the SHC and remand the case to this Court for further proceedings in light of JASTA. See Joint Mot. to Vacate and Remand at 2, In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, No. 15-3426 (2d Cir. Oct. 21, 2016), ECF No. 255-1. The Second Circuit granted that motion and remanded the case to this Court to consider how, if at all, JASTA affects the Moving Defendants' claim for immunity under the FSIA. (See Mandate dated March 9, 2017 ("3/9/17 Mandate"), ECF No. 3457, at 1.) On remand, Defendants Saudi Arabia and the SHC have renewed their motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that their immunity under the FSIA remains intact even after JASTA's enactment.
Because Plaintiffs' allegations, accepted as true for purposes of resolving the instant motions, narrowly articulate a reasonable basis for this Court to assume jurisdiction under JASTA over Plaintiffs' claims against Saudi Arabia, this Court will exercise its discretion to allow Plaintiffs limited jurisdictional discovery. Such discovery is be to be conducted under Magistrate Judge Sarah Netburn's supervision and shall proceed in a prompt and expeditious manner by focusing only on those allegations of specific facts described below relevant to the FSIA immunity determination. Accordingly, Defendant Saudi Arabia's motion to dismiss is DENIED. Plaintiffs' recycled allegations as to the SHC, by contrast, remain insuffiсient to overcome the presumption of immunity afforded to it by the FSIA. Defendant SHC's motion to dismiss is therefore GRANTED.
I. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; "[t]hey possess only that power authorized by [the] Constitution and [by] statute." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc.,
"Determining whether this burden is met involves a review of the allegations in the complaint, the undisputed facts, if any, placed before the court by the parties, and-if the plaintiff comes forward with sufficient evidence to carry its burden of production on this issue-resolution of
B. Jurisdictional Discovery
It is well established that district courts have "broad latitude to determine the scope of discovery and to manage the discovery process." See EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina ("EM Ltd. I "),
Accordingly, a court may permit jurisdictional discovery from a foreign sovereign only where the party seeking discovery can "articulate a 'reasonable basis' for the court first to assume jurisdiction." Arch Trading Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador,
II. MOTIONS TO DISMISS
The sole issue presented by the Moving Defendants' renewed motions to dismiss is
A. The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act
Congress enacted JASTA in September 2016 "in part to allow suits against Saudi Arabia for the September 11 attacks." Lelchook v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
is to provide civil litigants with the broadest possible basis, consistent with the Constitution of the United States, to seek relief against persons, entities, and foreign countries, wherever acting and wherever they may be found, that have provided material support, directly or indirectly, to foreign organizations or persons that engage in terrorist activities against the United States,
JASTA, § 2(b), Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. at 853. JASTA seeks to achieve this purpose by, among other things, creating a new statutory exception to the FSIA.
in any case in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for physical injury to person or property or death occurring in the United States and caused by-
(1) an act of international terrorism in the United States; and
(2) a tortious act or acts of the foreign state, or of any official, employee, or agent of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency, regardless [of] where the tortious act or acts of the foreign state occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1605B(b).
The JASTA exception to FSIA immunity thus has four discrete elements, each of which must be satisfied before this Court can exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims against the Moving Defendants: (1) physical injury to a person or property or death occurring in the United States; (2) an act of international terrorism in the United States, and a tortious act or acts by a foreign state, or any official, employee, or agent of that state taken while acting within the scope of that person's office, employment, or agency; (3) causation; and (4) damages. Plaintiffs argue that this new exception to the FSIA "readily encompasses [their] claims" against Saudi Arabia and the SHC. (CAC Opp'n at 8.) The Moving Defendants, in
1. Tortious Acts
In order to give rise to jurisdiction under JASTA, the foreign sovereign defendant's actions, or those of its officials, employees, and agents, must be "tortious." 28 U.S.C. § 1605B(b)(2). Although JASTA does not itself define what acts are considered tortious for purposes of satisfying the statute's FSIA exception, the parties agree that it at least includes the knowing or deliberately indifferent provision of material support to terrorists. (See KSA Mem. at 12-13; SHC Mem. at 14 15; CAC Opp'n at 9-10.) The congressional findings set forth in JASTA suggest that such acts were indeed intended to be covered by the statute. See, e.g., JASTA, § 2(a)(7) ("The United States has a vital interest in providing persons and entities injured as a result of terrorist attacks committed within the United States with full access to the court system in order to pursue civil claims against persons, entities, or countries that have knowingly or recklessly provided material support or resources, directly or indirectly, to the persons or organizations responsible for their injuries.") (emphases added). JASTA does, however, specifically preclude the exercisе of jurisdiction over claims against foreign states on "the basis of an omission or a tortious act or acts that constitute mere negligence," 28 U.S.C. § 1605B(d).
2. Scope of Office, Employment, or Agency
JASTA waives FSIA immunity for claims caused by the tortious acts of a foreign state, or of any official, employee, or agent of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605B(b). This represents an important change since the last time this Court considered motions to dismiss by the Moving Defendants; whereas the noncommercial tort exception waives immunity only for tortious acts committed by officials or employees of the foreign state, JASTA extends the waiver of immunity to tortious acts committed by its agents. See
The parties dispute which state's laws govern scope-of-employment and related principles of vicarious liability. (Compare KSA Mem. at 11-12 (arguing that law of the place where the injury occurred-here, New York-should apply), with CAC Opp'n at 12 n.8 (arguing that California law should apply since that is where most of the alleged tortious acts occurred). Since the majority of Plaintiffs' injuries arising out of the 9/11 Attacks occurred in New York, and most of the Plaintiffs are domiciled there, this Court looks to New York law to determine the relevant scope of vicarious liability under JASTA.
[1] the connection between the time, place and occasion for the act; [2] the history of the relationship between employer and employee as spelled out in actual practice; [3] whether the act is one commonly done by such an employee; [4] the extent of departure from normal methods of performance; [5] and whether the specific act was one that the employer could reasonably have anticipated.
Smith,
Similar rules govern the liability of a principal for the acts of its agents. "[A]n agency relationship results from a manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and the consent by the other to act." N.Y. Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Tradeline (L.L.C. ),
3. Causation
The parties also disagree about what measure of causation need be shown to establish jurisdiction under JASTA. The Moving Defendants contend that JASTA's "caused by" language incorporates principles of but-for and traditional proximate causation. (See KSA Mem. at 14-18; SFIC Mem. at 20-24.) The Ashton Plaintiffs concede that JASTA requires proximate causation, but assert that that "[n]o terrorism
JASTA's "caused by" requirement was not meant to incorporate principles of "but for" causation for three reasons. First, courts construing the exact same language in other FSIA exceptions have considered and rejected that very argument. See Rux v. Republic of Sudan,
Accordingly, at this stage of the proceedings, this Court adopts the traditional test for proximate causation that has been applied elsewhere in the FSIA context: "some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered." Owens,
* * *
With the foregoing principles in mind, this Court will now turn to Plaintiffs' substantive allegations to assess whether they plausibly "articulate a reasonable basis[,]" Arch Trading ,
B. Tortious Acts Committed By SHC
Plaintiffs allege that the SHC is one of several organizations established by the Saudi government to conduct proselytizing activities and otherwise advance the Wahhabi sect of Islam. (CAC 59-60.) Plaintiffs also allege that SHC and similar organizations provided funding and other forms of material support to al Qaeda during the 1990s that enabled it to acquire the global strike capabilities employed with devastating effect on September 11, 2001. (Id. ¶¶ 30-31.) For example, they claim that from 1992 through 1996, SHC provided financial and logistical support to al Qaeda and its operatives fighting in the Bosnian War, and that from 1996 through 1999, SHC "funneled hundreds of thousands of dollars to al Qaeda" under the pretext of doing construction work in Bosnia. (Ashton Compl. ¶¶ 39(v), 43(s)-(t).) They also claim that in 1993, SHC provided arms to a Somali faction trained by al Qaeda, which were used to fight American military personnel providing security for a United Nations humanitarian mission in Somalia. (Id. ¶ 43(u); Averment of Facts, ECF No. 3463-1, ¶ 313.) Plaintiffs allege further that between 1992 and 1995, the head of the SHC transferred more than $120 million "from his personal accounts and SHC accounts under his control" tо an organization that transferred the funds to al Qaeda fighters operating in the Balkans. (Averment of Facts ¶ 530.) Based on SHC's activities in support of al Qaeda, United States counterterrorism officials included it in a group of terrorist fronts labeled as the "dirty dozen." (CAC ¶ 81.)
In addition, Plaintiffs claim, al Qaeda members were "broadly embedded" in SHC offices and used SHC facilities "to plot attacks against the West." (Id ¶ 96.) They allege that a counterterrorism raid of the SHC's Sarajevo office conducted after the 9/11 Attacks uncovered evidence "confirming the SHC's direct involvement in the portfolio of plots al Qaeda was developing ... to attack the American homeland[.]" (Id. ¶ 94.) That evidence allegedly
These allegations do not provide a basis to assert jurisdiction under JASTA over the сlaims asserted against the SHC. Plaintiffs fail to plead any specific, non-conclusory allegations that the SHC, or any of its employees or agents operating within the scope of their employment or agency, knowingly or with deliberate indifference provided material support directly to al Qaeda to aid in planning or facilitating the 9/11 Attacks. Nor do they plausibly allege that any of the SHC's conduct during the 1990s bears any reasonable connection whatsoever to the 9/11 Attacks. Indeed, all of the factual allegations as to SHC relate to its support of al Qaeda's activities far removed, both in time and place, from the 9/11 Attacks.
The only apparent connection to the 9/11 Attacks are the photographs found in the SHC's Sarajevo offices depicting the World Trade Center before and after the terrorist attacks. But that fact, by itself, does not support the inference that the SHC, or any of its employees or agents, played a role-directly or indirectly-in funding, planning, facilitating, or otherwise participating in the 9/11 Attacks. Even if they suggest that the SHC generally supported al Qaeda's efforts, or had more than a fleeting association with the terrorist organization, they do not implicate the SHC's personal involvement, or that of any of its employees or agents, in any particular tortious act or acts that caused the 9/11 Attacks.
Because Plaintiffs' guilt-by-association allegations as to the SHC do not suffice to rebut the presumption of immunity afforded to it by the FSIA, Defendant SHC's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
C. Tortious Acts Committed By Saudi Arabia
Plaintiffs allege that Saudi Arabia is directly liable for its own tortious actions that proximately caused the 9/11 Attacks. These allegations largely focus on Saudi Arabia's alleged "cleans[ing]" of the 9/11 hijackers' Saudi passports and its issuance of a fraudulent Saudi passport in July 2001 to 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. (See Ashton Compl. ¶¶ 43(k), (m).)
These allegations do not establish a basis for this Court to exercise jurisdiction under JASTA. Plaintiffs' allegations as to Saudi Arabia's involvement in cleansing passports for the 9/11 hijackers are conclusory and entirely based on the incoherent and hearsay-within-hearsay testimony provided by former al Qaeda operative Zacarias Moussaoui. (See Kreindler and Pounian Aff., ECF No. 3780, ¶ 44.) With respect to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Plaintiffs' allegations do not plausibly suggest that Saudi Arabia knowingly issued a passport to him, as he had used a fake alias in applying for one, nor do they suggest that the passport was used in furtherance of the 9/11 Attacks. (See id. ¶ 45.) Although Plaintiffs allege that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed used the Saudi passport to obtain a visa to enter the United States, they concede that "[h]e never used that visa" to do so, offering only that he "may have used the ... passport
Plaintiffs also seek to hold Saudi Arabia responsible for the acts of its officials, employees, and agents, as well as the acts taken by several charity organizations that they claim operated as "arms" of the Saudi state, for allegedly providing material support to al Qaeda and its operatives in connection with the 9/11 Attacks.
1. The Individuals
Plaintiffs' allegations focus on eight individuals, all of whom are alleged employees and agents of the Saudi government who allegedly provided material assistance to the hijackers and plotters responsible for the 9/11 Attacks. To invoke the JASTA exception to FSIA immunity, Plaintiffs must show that these individuals are officials, employees, or agents of Saudi Arabia who, while acting within the scope of their office, employment, or agency, knowingly or with reckless indifference, provided material support to al Qaeda in a manner that bears some reasonable connection to the 9/11 Attacks.
a. Fahad al Thumairy and Omar al Bayoumi
From 1998 through 2001, Fahad al Thumairy was the imam at the Saudi-funded King Fahd Mosque near Los Angeles, California, where he was employed and appointed by Saudi Arabia's Head of Islamic Affairs in Washington, D.C. (CAC ¶ 165; Ashton Compl. ¶ 39(g).) During the same time period, Thumairy was an accredited Saudi diplomat working for Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Islamic Affairs at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, a position in which he reported to more senior officials inside the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C. (CAC ¶ 166; Ashton Compl. ¶ 39(g).) According to Plaintiffs, Thumairy was responsible for orchestrating the U.S.-based support network for two of the 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar, upon their arrival in the United States in January 2000, at the direction of an unnamed senior Saudi official based in the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C. (CAC ¶¶ 160, 169; Ashton Compl. ¶ 44(b).) As detailed in the 9/11 Commission Report, Hazmi and Mihdhar were "ill-prepared for a mission in the United States" as "[n]either had spent any substantial time in the West, and neither spoke much, if any, English." (9/11 Comm'n Report, Decl. of Gregory G. Rapawy, ECF No. 3669, Ex. 1, at 215.) Accordingly, the 9/11 Commission Report concluded, "it is unlikely that Hazmi and Mihdhar ... would have come to the United States without arranging to receive assistance from one or more individuals informed in advance of their arrival." (Id. ) According to Plaintiffs, Thumairy and his associates were charged by more senior Saudi officials to provide Hazmi and Mihdhar with such assistance.
On February 1, 2000, just two weeks after 9/11 hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar arrived in Los Angeles, Thumairy met with an individual named Omar al Bayoumi for an hour inside Thumairy's office at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles.
Following the meeting with Thumairy at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, Bayoumi traveled to a Middle Eastern restaurant in the Los Angeles area where he met with Hazmi and Mihdhar and offered to help them settle in San Diego, the city that al Qaeda leadership had designated as the preferred location for the hijackers to carry out their preparations for the 9/11 Attacks. (CAC ¶ 172; Averment of Facts ¶ 172.) Three days later, on February 4, 2000, Hazmi and Mihdhar arrived in San Diego and sought out Bayoumi to take him up on his offer of help. (Averment of Facts ¶ 173; 9/11 Comm'n Report at 219.) Bayoumi immediately assisted Hazmi and Mihdhar by finding them an apartment in San Diego, co-signing their lease as a guarantor, helping them open a bank account, and paying their rent on occasion. (CAC ¶ 173; Ashton Compl. ¶ 44(d); 9/11 Comm'n Report at 219.) Bayoumi also provided Hazmi and Mihdhar with his cell phone until a landline telephone was installed in their apartment. (9/11 Comm'n Report at 516 n.26.)
In addition, the same day Hazmi and Mihdhar arrived in San Diego, Bayoumi put them in contact with Anwar al Aulaqi, an imam and covert recruiter for al Qaeda.
Based on these alleged facts, Plaintiffs claim that Thumairy and Bayoumi were directed by someone within the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C. to help Hazmi and Mihdhar acclimate and settle in the United States to begin their preparations for the 9/11 Attacks. (CAC ¶¶ 244-45; Ashton Compl. ¶ 44(b).) According to Plaintiffs, around the same time that Hazmi and Mihdhar arrived in the United States, Bayoumi received a sharp increase in the stipend he received from Saudi Arabia of about $4,000, which Plaintiffs attribute to the assistance Bayoumi was providing to the hijackers. (Ashton Compl ¶ 39(k); Averment of Facts ¶ 186; 9/11 Comm'n Report at 515 n.18.) Also coincident with the hijackers' arrival in the United States, Bayoumi's telephone records reveal that he placed telephone calls to Saudi Consulates in the United States approximately seventy-four timеs between January and March 2000, including thirty-four calls to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, where Thumairy worked. (CAC ¶ 226.)
These allegations, unrebutted by any contrary evidence from Saudi Arabia, are sufficient to create a reasonable basis for this Court to exercise jurisdiction over the claims Plaintiffs assert against Saudi Arabia to justify allowing jurisdictional discovery to proceed as to Thumairy and Bayoumi. The only apparent arguments advanced by Saudi Arabia in support of its motion to dismiss with respect to these two individuals are that this Court previously rejected similar allegations and that the 9/11 Commission Report's conclusions foreclose Plaintiffs' claims. (KSA Mem. at 26-28, 31-32.) Neither argument is availing.
First, this Court did, in fact, reject Plaintiffs' past attempts to assert jurisdiction over Saudi Arabia based on the alleged tortious acts of Thumairy and Bayoumi but only because there were insufficient allegations that they provided material support to Hazmi and Mihdhar "within the scope of [their] employment." Terrorist Attacks XI ,
Second, neither the 9/11 Commission Report, nor any other governmental report, adequately and specifically refutes Plaintiffs' allegations. As to Bayoumi, the 9/11 Commission Report found that Bayoumi was an "unlikely candidate for clandestine involvement with Islamist extremists." (9/11 Comm'n Report at 218.) The 9/11 Commission Report further found that Bayoumi did not give money directly to Hazmi or Mihdhar, (Id. at 219.) Saudi Arabia also cites a joint FBI and CIA report from 2005, which found "no information to indicate that" Bayoumi was an "intelligence officer[ ] of the Saudi Govemment[.]" (2005 FBI/CIA Report, Decl. of Gregory G. Rapawy, Ex. 4, at 2.) None of these findings, however, directly contradict Plaintiffs' allegations that Bayoumi was tasked by Thumairy, at the behest of a more senior Saudi official, with providing
Accepting Plaintiffs' well-pled allegations as true for purposes of resolving the instant motion, and in the absence of contrary evidence from Saudi Arabia, Plaintiffs have therefore articulated a reasonable basis for Saudi Arabia to be held responsible for the conduct of its agents, Thumairy and Bayoumi, as well as those whom they appointed as subagents. Since, however, the nature and scope of the agency is somewhat unclear in this case, and the party in the best position to shed light on that inquiry is Saudi Arabia, Plaintiffs shall be permitted to conduct limited and targeted jurisdictional discovery critical to answering that question, i.e. whether and to what extent Thumairy, Bayoumi, and their agents took actions in 2000, at the direction of more senior Saudi officials, to provide assistance to Hazmi, Mihdhar, and other 9/11 hijackers. See Kamen v. Am. Tel & Tel. Co.,
b. Osama Basnan
Plaintiffs allege that Osama Basnan
These allegations are insufficient to permit this Court to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims against Saudi Arabia. Plaintiffs do not adequately allege that Basnan was an employee or agent of the Saudi govеrnment, or that he provided material assistance to Hazmi, Mihdhar, or any of the other 9/11 hijackers within the scope of his employment or agency. More specifically, there is no allegation or evidence that the funds transferred to Basnan and his wife were used to aid the hijackers or otherwise help facilitate the 9/11 Attacks. Nor is there any allegation or evidence that Basnan continued working for the Saudi Embassy after 1993, or that his contacts with Hazmi and Mihdhar were within the scope of his undefined relationship with the Saudi government.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' allegations as to Osama Basnan are insufficient to permit jurisdiction under JASTA.
c. Mohammed al Qudhaeein and Hamdan al Shalawi
Like Basnan, Mohammed al Qudhaeein and Hamdan al Shalawi were also "undeclared employees and agents of the Saudi government," who allegedly worked on behalf of Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Islamic Affairs. (CAC ¶ 267.) Qudhaeein, who was in the United States as a student, was in contact with various Saudi government offices throughout the United States and received money from the Saudi government. (Id. ¶ 268.) Shalawi was a "long time employee of the Saudi government as well," and he, too, received a stipend from the Saudi government. (Id. ¶ 272.) Both are alleged to have conducted a "dry run" for the 9/11 Attacks by twice attempting to enter the cockpit on a 1999 flight from Phoenix to Washington, D.C. to test and learn airline security protocols and procedures. (Id. ¶ 270; Ashton Compl. ¶ 44(k).) At the time, both were on their way to a symposium hosted by the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C. and had their trаvel expenses paid by the Saudi Embassy. (CAC ¶¶ 273-74; Ashton Compl. ¶ 44(l).) According to Plaintiffs, Shalawi had also trained in a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan in 2000, where several 9/11 hijackers were simultaneously receiving training. (CAC ¶ 279; Ashton Compl. ¶ 44(m).) Plaintiffs also allege that Qudhaeein and/or Shalawi met with 9/11 hijacker Hard Hanjour at some point between 1997 and 1999 at a Saudi-funded mosque in Tempe, Arizona. (Ashton Compl. ¶ 44(m).)
These allegations fail to support jurisdiction over the claims asserted against Saudi Arabia for two independent, but related, reasons. First, there is no specific, non-conclusory allegation that at any relevant time period, Qudhaeein and/or Shalawi were acting as officials, employees, or even agents of Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, their acts may not be used to establish jurisdiction under JASTA over Plaintiffs' claims against Saudi Arabia. Second, even if there were allegations adequately connecting the two individuals to Saudi Arabia, Plaintiffs do not allege or come forward with evidence showing that any of their actions provided material assistance to the 9/11 hijackers or otherwise caused the 9/11 Attacks. For example, even assuming that Qudhaeein and Shalawi did, in fact, conduct a dry run for the 9/11 Attacks, there is no allegation that they conveyed their knowledge or any information they obtained to the 9/11 hijackers, let alone that such information was used in some material
For these reasons, Plaintiffs' allegations as to Mohammed al Qudhaeein and Hamdan al Shalawi fall short of demonstrating that this Court may exercise jurisdiction under JASTA over Plaintiffs' claims against Saudi Arabia.
d. Saleh al Hussayen
Saleh al Hussayen was a senior Saudi cleric who held various positions in the Saudi government over many years, including as an employee of the Ministry of Interior. (CAC ¶¶ 281, 285.) Plaintiffs allege that Hussayen was in the United States in the weeks before the 9/11 Attacks on a fundraising mission with members of the Islamic Association of North America, a "radical Islamic organization" based in Michigan. (Id. ¶ 282.) They allege further that on September 6, 2001, he arrived in Herndon, Virginia, and that just days before the 9/11 Attacks, he abruptly moved from his original hotel to the hotel where 9/11 hijackers Hazmi, Mihdhar, and Hanjour were staying on the evening of September 10, 2001. (Id. at ¶ 283; Ashton Compl. ¶ 44(o).)
This Court previously held that it could not exercise jurisdiction over claims asserted against Saudi Arabia based on these allegations since they "do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." See Terrorist Attacks XI ,
e. Muhammed Jaber Fakihi
Muhammed Jabar Fakihi was employed by Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Islamic Affairs and, beginning in June 2000, served аs head of the Islamic Affairs Office in the Saudi Embassy in Berlin, Germany. (CAC ¶ 288; Ashton Compl. ¶ 39(m).) Plaintiffs allege that Fakihi was in direct contact with members of the al Qaeda cell in Hamburg, Germany, that coordinated the 9/11 Attacks. (CAC ¶¶ 289 90; Averment of Facts ¶ 258.) They also allege that Fakihi sought to turn the A1 Nur Mosque in Berlin into a center for Islamic missionary activity aimed at populations in Eastern Europe and that he arranged for Saudi charities to fund the expansion of the mosque. (CAC ¶ 293; Averment of Facts ¶ 257.) According to Plaintiffs, Fakihi ensured the delivery of at least $1 million from the Saudi Embassy in Berlin to support al Qaeda in Germany and the A1 Nur Mosque. (Ashton Compl. ¶¶ 39(m)-(o).)
These allegations are also insufficient to give rise to jurisdiction under JASTA over claims against Saudi Arabia. Assuming Fakihi was acting at all relevant times within the scope of his office, employment, or agency, there is no allegation or evidence that the funds he diverted from the Saudi Embassy in Berlin were ever provided directly to al Qaeda, or that the funds were in any way used to help plan or facilitate the 9/11 Attacks. Nor is there any allegation or evidence that his contact with members of the al Qaeda cell in Hamburg consisted of assistance that he provided as an agent or employee of the Saudi Embassy.
Thus, Plaintiffs' threadbare allegations as to Muhammed Jaber Fakihi are insufficient to create a basis for this Court to exercise jurisdiction under JASTA.
f. Omar Abdi Mohamed
Omar Abdi Mohamed entered the United States in 1998 as a religious worker.
Between December 1998 and May 2001, the WSRA issued 65 checks totaling nearly $400,000 to Dahab Shil, a money transfer agency whose office in Pakistan was controlled by 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. (CAC ¶ 305; Ashton Compl. ¶ 39(d)-(c).) According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the 9/11 plotters spent between $400,000 and $500,000 over the two years preceding the 9/11 Attacks to plan and facilitate the attacks. (9/11 Comm'n Report at 172.) The Report indicates further that the 19 hijackers were funded through wire transfers or cash provided by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.
After oral argument, Plaintiffs moved to supplement the record as to Omar' Abdi Mohamed with two newly discovered pieces of evidence. (See Mot. for Leave to Supplement the Record, ECF No. 3926, at 1.) The first concerns statements made in a legal memorandum filed by Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), in connection with its removal proceedings against Mohamed (the "ICE Memorandum").
Even assuming that the funds the WSRA provided to al Qaeda were actually used to help plan and facilitate the 9/11 Attacks, Plaintiffs allege no non-conclusory facts, and provide no evidence, to support the claim that Mohamed did so within the scope of his employment as a missionary. Plaintiffs' newly discovered evidence does little to change that conclusion. Plaintiffs argue that the ICE Memorandum shows that Mohamed was not a "propagator," but rather an undercover intelligence officer working for the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. (Id. at 2.) The ICE Memorandum,
Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to jurisdictional discovery with respect to Mohamed because Saudi Arabia "holds the key evidence sought... regarding [his] employment, authority and instructions, [Saudi Arabia's] involvement in the WSRA scheme, the WSRA's records[,] and the ultimate beneficiary of the covert funds sent to Dahab Shil." (Ashton Opp'n at 19.) While that may be the case, Plaintiffs must first demonstrate that a reasonable basis for jurisdiction exists based on Mohamed's alleged tortious acts. In this regard, Plaintiffs' allegations as to Omar Abdi Mohamed come up short.
2. The Charities
Plaintiffs identify several charity organizations, including Defendant SHC, that Plaintiffs allege operated as fundraising fronts for al Qaeda and provided financial and logistical support to al Qaeda during the decades preceding the 9/11 Attacks. (See CAC ¶¶ 75, 86; Ashton Compl, ¶¶ 39, 42-44.) These recycled allegations fail for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs do not articulate a valid basis for holding Saudi Arabia vicariously liable for the acts of the charity organizations. Second, even if the tortious acts of the charity organizations, or those of any of their officials, employees, and agents, may be attributed to Saudi Arabia, Plaintiffs still fail to adequately allege that those acts caused the 9/11 Attacks.
a. Vicarious Liability for the Acts of the Charities
Defendant Saudi Arabia contends that the actions taken by the charity organizations may not be attributed to it for purposes of establishing vicarious liability because of the Supreme Court's decision in First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba ("Bancec "),
The Bancec "presumption of separateness" is supported by sound public policy justifications. EM Ltd. II,
An alter-ego relationship sufficient to rebut the Bancec presumption may be established if: "(1) the instrumentality is so extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent is created; or (2) the recognition of an instrumentality's separate legal status would work a fraud or injustice."
Here, Plaintiffs seek to predicate Saudi Arabia's vicarious liability for the acts of the charities based only on the "extensive control" prong. (See CAC Opp'n at 66-71; Ashton Opp'n at 27-29, 33-36.) They claim that the charities were established and created by the Saudi government; that they receive financial support and other аssistance from the Saudi government; that the Saudi government appoints, and has the power to remove, their officers and directors; that Saudi government officials and employees were also employed by the charities; that the Saudi government provides them with "administrative guidance"; that Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Islamic Affairs supervises and directs their operations and activities; and that Saudi diplomats and embassies provide assistance to their offices located abroad. (See CAC ¶¶ 121-27, 130-31; Ashton Compl. ¶ 46.) The same allegations are repeated virtually verbatim with respect to each of the identified charity organizations. (See Ashton Compl. ¶¶ 47-51.)
Plaintiffs' allegations fail to show that the charity organizations were alter-egos of Saudi Arabia. This Court previously considered and rejected substantially similar allegations as those alleged here as inadequate, "conclusory, [and] largely boilerplate," Terrorist Attacks XI ,
Plaintiffs make three additional arguments in support of Saudi Arabia's vicarious liability for the acts of the charities, none of which are availing. First, Plaintiffs argue that Saudi Arabia can be held liable for the acts of the charities because they are "organs" of the Saudi government.
Second, Plaintiffs assert that the tortious acts of the charities are attributable to Saudi Arabia because they perform "core functions of the Saudi state." (CAC ¶ 105; CAC Opp'n at 71.) The Second Circuit held in Garb v. Republic of Poland ,
Similar reasoning was applied in Servaas, where the court held that the Iraqi Ministry of Industry was a political subdivision of the state, in part, because it "is charged with reviewing and recording applications for trademark registration, a regulatory function that we view as quintessentially governmental."
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the acts of the charities may be attributed to Saudi Arabia under ordinary agency principles without having to demonstrate alter-ego status. (CAC ¶ 105; CAC Opp'n at 14, 70.) Indeed, JASTA does permit a foreign sovereign to be held liable for the tortious acts of its agents, see 28 U.S.C. § 1605B(b)(2), and "[t]he level of state control required to establish an 'alter ego' relationship is more extensive than that required to establish 'agency.' " Kirschenbaum ,
The acts of the charity organizations identified in Plaintiffs' complaints therefore cannot be attributed to Saudi Arabia or used to provide a basis under JASTA for this Court to exercise jurisdiction over the claims Plaintiffs assert against it.
b. Tortious Acts Committed by the Charities
Plaintiffs' allegations principally focus on a number of charity organizations that, they claim, provided material support to al Qaeda and enabled it to carry out the 9/11 Attacks. More specifically, Plaintiffs principally allege that the charities knowingly provided:
• Financial support to other entities who, in turn, provided al Qaeda and its operatives with funds, including through donations to a mosque in Germany frequented by several of the 9/11 hijackers, (Ashton Compl. ¶¶ 39(n)-(o), (q), (t)-(v), (x), (z), (aa); Averment of Facts ¶¶ 350, 354, 363, 367, 417, 425, 504);
• Funds, equipment, and supplies to establish terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and to enable al Qaeda operatives-including "some or all of the September 11 hijackers"-to travel to such facilities, (CAC ¶¶ 80, 86; Ashton Compl. ¶¶ 42-43; Averment of Facts ¶¶ 315, 377-78, 382, 422);
• Travel documentation and visas, including for travel to terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, (Ashton Compl. ¶ 43(n); Averment of Facts ¶ 377); and
• Secret courier services for al Qaeda, (Ashton Compl. ¶ 43(o) ).
These allegations do not provide a basis to exercise jurisdiction under JASTA over Plaintiffs' claims against Saudi Arabia.
In short, Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that any of the support the charities provided al Qaeda or its operatives was used to help fund or facilitate the 9/11 Attacks in any meaningful way. Because the alleged tortious acts by the charities did not proximately cause Plaintiffs' injuries, they provide no basis under JASTA for this Court to exercise jurisdiction over the claims asserted against Saudi Arabia.
D. Saudi Arabia's Constitutional Challenge to JASTA
Defendant Saudi Arabia challenges JASTA's constitutionality on two separate but related grounds. First, it argues that JASTA violates the separation of powers in attempting to direct a certain outcome in this case and thereby infringing on the judicial power of the courts under Article III. (KSA Mem. at 70-71.) Second, it claims that Congress overstepped its bounds by creating a new set of legal rules to apply to cases that had already been decided.
Moreover, it is well established that the political branches, Congress included, enjoy wide latitude in exercising control over foreign affairs. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, --- U.S. ----,
Saudi Arabia's reliance on Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,
In addition, it is clear that once the judgments were reopened, courts must apply the law that exists at the time, including newly enacted legislatiоn given retroactive effect, like JASTA. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
Accordingly, Saudi Arabia's constitutional challenges to JASTA are without merit.
III. CONCLUSION
Defendant SHC's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, (ECF No. 3670), is GRANTED. Defendant Saudi Arabia's motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 3667), is DENIED. Limited jurisdictional discovery on specific factual allegations critical to the immunity determination shall proceed promptly and expeditiously in the manner described above as to the alleged tortious acts by alleged Saudi agents Fahad al Thumairy and Omar al Bayoumi.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motions at ECF Nos. 3667 and 3670 accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
The relevant procedural background of this multidistrict litigation was discussed at length in this Court's September 29, 2015 opinion, (ECF No. 3046), and is incorporated by reference herein. This Court will only restate relevant factual background as necessary to address the pеnding motions.
Unless otherwise indicated, all references made herein to the docket sheet refer to the main docket sheet for this multidistrict litigation, 1:03-MDL-1570-GBD-SN.
After the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded these cases to this Court on the parties' consent, as noted below, the Plaintiffs' Executive Committees filed the CAC on behalf of plaintiffs in nine separate actions that are part of this multidistrict litigation (the "CAC Plaintiffs"). (See CAC at 101-04.) Since that time, plaintiffs in a number of actions have either filed notices to conform their pleadings to the CAC or adopted its allegations through short-form complaints in the manner approved by Magistrate Judge Sarah Netburn. (See Order dated May 3, 2017, ECF No. 3543.) Plaintiffs in three cases-Bowrosen, et al. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, No. 16-cv-8070, DeSimone v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, No. 17-cv-348, and The Underwriting Members of Lloyd's Syndicate 53, et al. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, et al, No. 17-cv-2129-have filed their own complaints that are substantially similar to the CAC but which do not formally incorporate its allegations. The plaintiffs in Ashton also filed their own complaint against Saudi Arabia. (See Ashton Compl.) Defendants move to dismiss against all of these respective pleadings. (See Mem. in Supp. of Saudi Arabia Mot. to Dismiss ("KSA Mem."), ECF No. 3668, at 10 n.15; Mem. in Supp. of SHC Mot. to Dismiss ("SHC Mem."), ECF No. 3671, at 7-8.)
Also pending before this Court are three motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction brought by Defendants National Commercial Bank ("NCB"), Al Rajhi Bank ("ARB"), and the Saudi Binladin Group ("SBG"). (See ECF Nos. 3691, 3700, 3702.) For logistical reasons, however, this opinion addresses only the motions to dismiss brought by Saudi Arabia and SHC; the motions to dismiss brought by NCB, ARB, and SBG are addressed in a separate opinion filed today.
The parties do not dispute that Defendant SHC is an agency or instrumentality of Saudi Arabia within the meaning of the FSIA. (KSA Mem. at 1; SHC Mem. at 1; Ashton Opp'n at 42; CAC Opp'n at 62.)
JASTA changes the relevant statutory landscape in two other significant ways. First, it permits United States nationals to assert claims against foreign states under the ATA, provided that the requirements of its newly-created FSIA exception are otherwise met. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605B(c). Pre-JASTA, the ATA had explicitly barred claims brought thereunder from being asserted against foreign states. See 18 U.S.C. 2337. Second, JASTA also amends the ATA to specifically authorize claims against "any person who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed ... an act of international terrorism." See
The choice-of-law analysis is ultimately of little practical significance since, as Plaintiffs concede, the relevant legal principles under New York and California law are largely the same. (See CAC Opp'n at 12 & n.9.)
The Moving Defendants' reliance on the Supreme Court's opinion in Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.,
An earlier decision in the Owens litigation, presumably the one referenced in JASTA's legislative history, used the same principal formulation. See Owens v. Republic of Sudan,
Although the stated purpose of the trip was to resolve a visa issue and obtain Islamic religious materials, Bayoumi allegedly told at least one person he was traveling to the Los Angeles to pick up visitors. (Averment of Facts ¶ 161.)
Dallah Avco, a contractor for Saudi Arabia's civil aviation authority, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Dallah al Baraka Group, which is owned by a wealthy Saudi businessman named Saleh Abdullah Kamel. (Averment of Facts ¶¶ 150, 156.) According to Plaintiffs, Kamel has been publicly identified on the "Golden Chain" as one al Qaeda's principal financiers. (Id. ¶ 156.)
Aulaqi left San Diego in mid-2000 and took a position with a mosque in Falls Church, Virginia. (CAC ¶ 181.) When Hazmi and fellow 9/11 hijacker Hani Hanjour arrived in Virginia in April 2001, they immediately sought out Aulaqi, who put them in contact with a Jordanian national named Eyad al Rababah. (Id. ¶ 182.) Rababah found Hazmi and Hanjour an apartment in Alexandria, Virginia, where they were joined one month later by 9/11 hijackers Ahmed al Ghamdi and Majed Moqed. (Id. )
Basnan is sometimes spelled as "Bassnan" in the various pleadings.
The 9/11 Commission Report also notes, however, that there has been "no credible evidence that any person in the United States" or foreign government or official supplied substantial financial assistance to the 9/11 hijackers. (9/11 Comm'n Report at 172.)
ICE initiated removal proceedings against Mohamed in or about 2004 after he was indicted in federal court for failing to disclose material facts on his naturalization application, including the fact of his employment by Saudi Arabia. (See ICE Memorandum at 1.)
The charities identified in Plaintiffs' complaints as alleged front organizations for al Qaeda include the SHC, the Muslim World League, the International Islamic Relief Organization, the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, the Al Haramain al Masjed al Aqsa, the Rabita Trust, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, the Saudi Red Crescent Society, the Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo and Albania, and the Benevolence International Foundation. (See CAC ¶ 31; Ashton Compl. ¶ 9.)
For purposes of the FSIA, an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" is defined to include any entity:
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section 1332(c) and (e) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third country.
See infra Section II.C.2.b.
Saudi Arabia also contends that JASTA violates its due process rights by purporting to extend personal jurisdiction to conduct not expressly aimed at the United States and by creating new liability and penаlties for conduct that occurred in the past. (KSA Mem. at 74-75.) However, as Saudi Arabia concedes, (id. at 75), it is well settled that foreign sovereigns do not have standing to assert due process claims. See Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org.,
As explained more fully in this Court's September 29, 2015 Opinion and Order, Judge Casey, who presided over this multidistrict litigation until 2007, issued an opinion in 2005 granting Saudi Arabia and the SHC immunity under the FSIA and holding that the discretionary function exclusion to the noncommercial tort exception applied to bar Plaintiffs' claims. Terrorist Attacks XI,
Even if JASTA were enacted for the narrow purpose of affording relief to victims of the 9/11 Attacks, it would still pass muster. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, --- U.S. ----,
