MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
In this whistlеblower action, Plaintiff, Benjamin Ashmore, alleges that Defendants, CGI’ Group Inc. and CGI Federal Inc. (collectively, “CGI”), violated the anti-retaliation provisions of § 806 of the Sar-banes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“the Sarbanes-Oxley Aet”), codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (“Section 806”).
BACKGROUND
I. CGI arid the Section 8 Program
In 1974, the Housing Act of 1937 was amended to create the Section 8 Housing
.. A. restructuring of HUD was announced in 1997, including reforms aimed at transferring HUD’s loan and contract administration functions and responsibilities to capable state, local, and other entities. Id, ÍÍ 7; CMS, 745 F,3d at 1382. In.May 1999, HUD issued, a request for proposals (“RFP”) seeking bids from contractors, i.e. qualified PHAs, which would provide administrative services for most of the project-based Section 8 HAP contracts then being administered by HUD. PL 56.1 ¶¶ 9-10. These administrative services are performed pursuant to a performance-based ACC (“PBACC”)..entered into, .between HUD and the qualified PHA. Id. ¶ 10. A PHA that enters into a PBACC is referred to as performance-based contract administrator (“PBCÁ”). Id. ¶ 11.
CGI provides subcontracting services to PHAs. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. CGI agrees to perform tasks necessary for compliance with the Section 8 Program in exchange for a share of revenues. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. In 2009, HUD announced a nationwide rebid of all the' PBACCs previously awarded through the RFP because the terms of the original contracts had expired and HUD sought to control costs associated with the current PBCÁ program. Id. ¶ 15. Upon announcement of the rebid, Marybeth Car-ragher, vice president of consulting services and leader of CGI’s nationwide PBCA practice, assembled a strategy team tasked with the responsibility of both maintaining CGI’s current subcontracting relationships and expanding CGI’s presence. Id. ¶¶ 16-18; Carragher Decl. ¶¶ 1, 19-20, ECF No. 117. This strategy team, the Rebid Assessment Team, was known within CGI as the “Rat Pack.” Pl. 56.1 ¶ 17.
I. The Rat Pack and the Shell Company Scheme
In May 2009, CGI hired Plaintiff as a government services delivery manager. Id. ¶ 25; Carragher Decl. Ex. 1, at 1, ECF No. 117-1. Before taking this position, Plaintiff worked for HUD, where his duties included overseeing PBCAs. Id. ¶¶ 26, 29. When Plaintiff commenced em
On January 14, 2010,. Carragher learned that HUD proposed to limit the number of units on which a PHA or a PHA subcontractor: could bid during the rebid process. PI. 56.1 ¶ 23. The prospective “unit cap” was to be fixed at 300,000 units, a number that fell below CGI’s intended expansion objectives.
At his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he first learned of the shell company scheme over drinks at a hotel in Fairfax, Virginia. Klein Decl. Ex., 11, Ashmore Dep. 334:18-335:2, ECF Nos. 116-14, 116-15. Plaintiff stated that Les Pierce, a member of the Rat Pack, initially raised the shell company idea, and although Plaintiff testified that he did “not think[] there was much seriousness to it,” he stated that he voiced objections to the scheme’s efficacy. Id. at 339:13-15, 340:3-341:5. Plaintiff testified that the idea was next raised during a regular Rat Pack strategy call that took place after the Virginia meeting. Id. at 348:3—14, 349:13-20^. Plaintiff stated that the. reintroduction of the issue made him realize that the shell company idea was more than “just baek-of-the-envelope ideas being tossed at a table” and that he voiced his position that the scheme was illegal. Id, at 352:9-354:8. Plaintiff stated that following this discussion, the topic “dropped off the radar” and that the Rat Pack was in a “holding pattern.” Id. at 355:11-14. He further tеstified that at this time “[tjhere were no concrete steps ... no action items, ... nothing planned beyond a discussion about is this a way to do it” and.that he was not aware of particular steps being taken to implement the scheme. Id. at 357:6-358:2.
Plaintiff stated that this changed on May 11, 2010, when the scheme moved beyond a “broad idea” and crystallized into “an actual breakdown ... of which states would go with which directors.”
CGI contends that the shell company scheme did not exist and was not discussed during Rat Pack meetings. PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 109, 111, 113, 115-16. Several current and former employees of CGI testified that the scheme was, at most, an idea that was raised in jest during a Rat Pack conference call and promptly dismissed as unfeasible. Id. ¶¶ 134-37; Klein Decl. Ex. 13, Carragher Dep. 128:21-130:24, ECF Nos. 116-19, 116-20, 116-21; Klein Decl. Ex. 12, Kyprianou Dep. 220:8-221:23, ECF Nos. 116-16, 116-17, 116-18; Herbst Decl. Ex. 1, Gorris Dep. 51:5-19, ECF No. 134-1; Rudy Dep. 48:2-13. However, the testimony of at least two of these individuals indicates that the idea of CGI forming separate entities or independent CGI subsidiaries was discussed in more serious terms. Kyprianou Dep. 217:11-220:4; Gorris Dep. 45:16-48:12, 49:10-50:4, 51:20-54:20.
In addition to the shell company scheme, CGI considered alternate methods for dealing with the unit cap, including the “49/51 strategy.” PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 111, 147. The 49/51 strategy is premised on the idea that a subcontractor may exclude particular units from its unit cap count so long as the PHA and subcontractor certify in the rebid proposal that the subcontractor will perform less than 50% of the work under the contract. PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 111, 145; Herbst Decl. Exs. 44, 45, ECF Nos. 134-44, 134-45; Ashmore Dep. 322:7-19. Plaintiff testified that the 49/51 strategy was a “separate and distinct avenuef ]” for dealing with the unit cap and that he “did not [inform CGI] in such a clear way that the 49/51 scheme was illegal.” Ashmore Dep. 321:4-18. Plaintiff, however, testified that he did “object[ ] to pursuing that avenue without [first obtaining] clarification from HUD.” Id. at 318:14-21.
Plaintiff alleges that following his exclusion from Rat Pack discussions the fraudu
II. Plaintiff’s Job Performance and Termination
In early April 2010, Plaintiff was reassigned to Kyprianou’s supervision. PI. 56.1 ¶ 34. At their depositions, Carragher and Kyprianou testified that the transition was implemented so that Plaintiff could be placed on billable projects that would better utilize his time. Carragher Dep. 195:14-196:4; Kyprianou Dep. 56:13-58:9, 63:11-17. Shortly after this transition, Carragher gave Plaintiff his 2010 written performance review, which rated Plaintiff as “meets expectations”—the middle of five evaluation levels—in all performance categories. PI. 56.1 ¶ 38; Carragher Decl. Ex. 3, ECF No. 117-3. The evaluation provided positive assessments of Plaintiffs initiative, independence, and dependability but criticized Plaintiffs communication, time-management, and focus. PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 37-38; Carragher Decl. Ex. 3.
At the time Plaintiff was transferred to Kyprianou’s supervision, Plaintiff was serving as project manager on an Oakland Housing Authority (“OHA”) project. PI. 56; 1 ¶51. Plaintiff assigned himself five recertifications. Id. ¶¶52, 54. An employee working on the OHA project inquired with Plaintiff about the status of the recertifications, noting that twelve days had passed since Plaintiff had assigned himself the task. Id. ¶ 57. In response, Plaintiff reassigned the recertifica-tions to the inquiring employee,- indicating that he was “swamped” on a different matter. Id. ¶¶ 57-58. In a May 18, 2010 email, Kyprianou criticized Plaintiff for reassigning his OHA recertifications and for not providing slides for a separate project. Id. ¶ 63. Kyprianou also expressed general dissatisfaction with Plaintiffs failure to provide regular updates on his activities and referenced a May 5, 2010 email, in- which Kyprianou specifically re
During his short tenure as- Plaintiffs supervisor, Kyprianou criticized other aspects of Plaintiff’s performance. For instance, on several occasions Plaintiff requested last-minute changes - in his work schedule. PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 43-47, 49. Although CGI does not have a formal attendance policy for managerial employees, Klein Decl. Ex. 4, at 2, EOF No. 116-4, Kypria-nou told Plaintiff in an April 8, 2010 e-mail that “advance notice, except for emergencies, is required for time off or working from home requests,” PI. 56.1 ¶ 45. This issue resurfaced in June, when Plaintiff asked Kyprianou for additional time off. Id. ¶ 77. In a June 7, 2010 e-mail, Kypria-nou asked Plaintiff to submit a request specifying dates and times. Id.; Kypria-nou Decl. Ex. 16, at 3, EOF No. 118-16. Finding Plaintiffs response inadequate, Kyprianou, in a June 8, 2010, e-mail again asked Plaintiff to specify particular days and blocks of time. PI. 56.1 ¶ 79; Kypria-nou Decl. Ex. 16, at 2. Plaintiff responded that he found the situation “frustrating” and that he felt Kyprianou was “babysitting [him].” PI. 56.1 ¶ 81.
In addition, Kyprianou criticized Plaintiffs- management of the HUD transformation initiative project.- Because of apparent miscommunication between Plaintiff and the prime contractor on the project, the contractor contacted several CGI employees whom Plaintiff had failed to notify that they were involved in the project. Id. ¶¶ 69-72; Kyprianou Decl. Ex. 14, EOF No. 118-14 (e-mails related to project). While Plaintiff was absent from work dealing with a personal issue, Kyprianou informed Plaintiff he was “taking the lead” on the project. PI. 56.1 ¶ 73. Kyprianou sent an e-mail to Plaintiff on June 4, 2010, complaining that Plaintiff failed to follow his instructions regarding the shift in leadership. Kyprianou Decl. Ex. 15, at 2. Plaintiff responded, expressing his displeasure with Kyprianou’s “accusatory e-mails” and stating that he believed Kyprianou was “outright wrong” in his criticisms. Kyprianou Decl. Ex. 15, at 1-2, EOF No. 118-15. In response, Kyprianou noted that he was “not happy with [Plaintiffs] performance.” PI. 56.1 ¶ 76.
On June 14, 2010, Kyprianou e-mailed CGI’s human resources department recommending thаt Plaintiff be discharged. PL 56.1 ¶82; Kyprianou Decl. Ex. 17, ECF No 118-17. On June 16, 2010, after Carragher conferred with Richard Schmitz, her supervisor, Kyprianou fired Plaintiff.
IV. Plaintiffs Compensation Terms
Plaintiffs offer letter sets his base salary at $126,000 and states that he is eligible to participate in GGI’s profit participation program. PI. 56.1 ¶ 159; Carragher Deck Ex. 1. Plaintiff testified that his supervisors “would have discretion to award [him] a bonus based upon .,. performance,” but he noted that he believed it was discretionary “insofar as ... he met his performance metrics.” PI. 56.1 ¶ 160, Plaintiff did not reсeive documents indicating that bonus compensation was mandatory or that all employees would receive an annual bonus. Id. ¶ 161. CGI’s fiscal year runs from October 1 to September 30. Id. ¶ 156.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is no' genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
The moving party initially bears the burden of informing the court of the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact by citing to particulars in the record. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(a), (e); Celotex,
If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the оpposing party to establish a genuine dispute of fact. Beard v. Banks,
II. Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806
In relevant part, Section 806 of the Sar-banes-Oxley Act provides that a publicly traded company, including any subsidiary or affiliate whose financial information is included in the consolidated financial statements of such company, may not:
discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the employee ... to provide information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of section 1341 [mail fraud], 1343 [wire fraud], 1344 [bank fraud], or 1348 [securities fraud], any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders, when the information or assistance is provided to ... a pеrson with supervisory authority over the employee (or such other person working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct) —
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(l)(C).
Courts employ a burden-shifting framework to assess retaliation claims under Section 806. Bechtel v. Admin. Review Bd.,
“At the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff need only demonstrate that a rational factfinder could determine that Plaintiff has made his prima facie case. Assuming a plaintiff does so, summary judgment is appropriate only when, construing all of the facts in the employee’s favor, there is no genuine dispute thаt the record clearly and convincingly demonstrates that the adverse action would have been taken in the absence of the protected behavior.” Leshinsky v. Telvent GIT, S.A.,
A. Prima Facie Case
Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie showing of retaliation because he cannot demonstrate that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; or (2) Defendants had knowledge he engaged in a protected activity. Def. Mem. 36-47.
1. Protected Activity
An employee’s activity is “protected” under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act when he provides information “ ‘regarding .conduct which [he] reasonably believes constitutes a violation’ of the enumerated federal provisions.” Nielsen v. AECOM Tech. Corp.,
As an initial matter, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff did not engage in a protected activity because he: (1) does not offer documentary evidence corroborating the existence of the shell company scheme or his objections to it; (2) failed to raise the scheme in post-termination communications with CGI; and (3) objected to conduct that he ‘claimed was in violation of HUD and federal procurement requirements, nót the provisions enumerated under Section ’ 806. Def. Mem. 36-38.
Defendants’ argument regarding the existence of the shell company, scheme is a red herring. In their briefing, Defen
To the extent that Defendants seek to disprove the existence of the shell company scheme in order to challenge the reasonableness of Plaintiffs belief, that turns on factual questions that cаnnot be resolved at this stage. “Even when a plaintiff has relied exclusively on his own testimony, courts have denied summary judgment, as long as the plaintiffs ‘testimony was not contradictory or rife with inconsistencies such that it was facially implausible.’ ” Perez v. Progenics Pharm., Inc.,
Likewise, Defendants provide no support for the argument that a whistleblower’s failure to reference earlier objections to fraudulent conduct during termination discussions conclusively undermines an allegation that such objections took place. Indeed, there are a host of reasons a person seeking to retain his job would decline to mention the alleged fraud to which he had objected, and it would be speculative for the Court to cоnclude that Plaintiffs failure to do so proves that no protected activity occurred.
Finally, as to Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff objected only to violations of HUD and federal procurement requirements, “ ‘the critical focus is ... whether the employee reported conduct that he or she reasonably believes constituted a violation of federal law,’ and ‘not whether that information definitively and specifically described one or more of those violations.’ ” Leshinsky,
These issues aside, the Court now turns to whether Plaintiff had an objectively reasonable belief that the conduct about which he complained constituted a violation ’ of the provisions enumerated under Section 806.
a. Objective Reasonableness
“The question whether a plaintiff’s belief was objectively reasonable is a ‘mixed question of law and fact,’ meaning that it-should be decided by the Court only if there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the beliefs reasonableness.” Leshinsky,
Although the scheme’s success does hinge on a number of uncertain elements,
Furthermore, Plaintiff could reasonably believe that “mail fraud or wire fraud was taking place, or was on the verge of taking place,” despite the contingencies attendant to the underlying scheme. Id. at 447. Because the Rat Pack was allegedly considering and planning a scheme to defraud HUD by phone and e-mail, a person of like experience and training as Plaintiff could conclude that mail or wire fraud was under way. Id. at 447 & n. 6 (indicating that it was reasonable for a plaintiff to believe that mail and wire fraud was “taking shape” or “in progress” based on substantive discussion of alleged scheme furthered through use of mail, telephone, and email).
Therefore, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the objective reasonableness of Plaintiffs belief.
b. Subjective Belief
In addition to having an objectively reasonable belief, Plaintiff must also subjectively believe that the conduct about which he objected was in violation of a provision enumerated under Section 806, for “it would make no sense to allow a plaintiff to proceed if he himself did not hold the belief required by the statute.” Id. at 447 (quoting Livingston v. Wyeth, Inc.,
Plaintiff admits that he did not document evidence of the scheme or his objections and that he did not raise concerns about the scheme to anyone outside of the Rat Pack. PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 119-21, 126. Although courts have found that -similar actions suggest a lack of subjective belief, see Leshinsky,
Although Plaintiffs testimony indicates that he believed the scheme might ultimately not be executed,
Accordingly, construing the. evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff held a subjective belief that Defendants’ conduct amounted to mail or wire fraud.
2. Knowledge of the Protected Activity
Next, Defendants argue that CGI did not know Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity because Plaintiffs statements to Carragher would only place CGI on notice that Plaintiff believed the scheme violated HUD and federal procurement regulations, not a provision enumerated under Section 806. Def. Mem. 40-41. This argument simply recasts Defendants’ earlier contention that Plaintiff failed to engage in protected activity because his communication was insufficiently specific. Plaintiff’s communication need not have the degree of specificity demanded by Defendants. Rather, if the communication conveys information about conduct that Plaintiff reasonably believes is a violation of an enumerated provision, it is sufficient for protection under the Sеction 806. See Welch,
3. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Plaintiff engaged in protected activity under, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and whether. Defendants knew of his protected activity.
B. Non-Retaliatory Rationale
Even if Plaintiff establishes a prima fade case of retaliation, Defendants are enti-
There is ample evidence in the record suggesting that- reasons unrelated to Plaintiffs alleged objection'to the shell company scheme contributed to Defendants’ decision to terminate -Plaintiff. Although. Plaintiff characterizes his April performance review . as “positive,” . PI. Mem. 64, Carragher gave Plaintiff an average rating in every performance category and criticized Plaintiffs-communication with supervisors and colleagues, project management, and time management. An employee’s assessment of his own performance is generally not entitled much deference, especially if there is no evidence independently demonstrating that Plaintiffs work was of similar quality to those receiving higher ratings. See, e.g., Hu v. UGL Servs. Unicco Operations Co., 13 Civ. 4251,
Notwithstanding Defendants’ showing, Plaintiff argues that Defеndants’ rationale is pretextual. Ph Mem. 54-55. Plaintiff notes the. close temporal proximity between his protected activity and termination, which occurred less than two months after his May 11 objection. In addition, Plaintiff contends that his April performance review was positive and contradicts evidence of poor performance. Plaintiff also points to Kyprianou’s decision to not issue a corrective action plan or to provide disciplinary guidance beyond a single phone call prior to seeking Plaintiffs discharge. Finally, Plaintiff argues that his exclusion from Rat Pack discussions shortly before his termination constitutes evidence of a retaliatory motive.
The Court, therefore, concludes that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the record clearly and convincingly shows that Plaintiff would have been fired absent a retaliatory motive. Accordingly, summary judgment on Plaintiffs Section 806 claim is DENIED.
III. Breach of Contract
“Under New York law, there are four elements to a breach of contract claim: ‘(1) the existénce of an agreernent, (2) adequate performance of the contract by the plaintiff, (3) breach of contract by the defendant, and (4) damages.’ ” Ellington Credit Fund, Ltd. v. Select Portfolio Servicing Inc.,
Defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted on Plaintiffs breach of contract claim because: (1) Plaintiff was an at-will employee who did not enter into a formal employ
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached the terms of his offer letter by failing to provide him with bonus compensation in accordance with the provisions of CGI’s profit participation program.
Despite the offer letter’s lack of. detail, the evidence indicates .that the program allowed for distribution of profit participation to employees who: (1) worked for CGI and the particular business unit for at least ninety days in the applicable fiscal year; (2) were not on a separate incentive or commission plan; and (3) whose performance for the past period at least met expectations. Carragher Decl. Ex. 15, at 2, ECF No. 117-15; see, e.g., Raedle v. Credit Agricole Indosuez, 04 Civ. 2235,
Although Plaintiff was employed for more than six months during fiscal year 2010 and was given a “meets expectations” rating in his 2010 performance review, evidence indicates that an employee needed to be employed at CGI until at least the end of the fiscal year to be considered eligible for profit participation in that year. See Herbst Deck Ex. 66, at 1 (e-mail concerning-fiscal ’year 2009 profit participation allocations with attached planning document that included only employees within Carragher’s group as of September 30, 2009).. Because Plaintiff was fired before the end of fiscal year 2010, he was not entitled to bonus compensation for that year. Plaintiff adduces no evidence demonstrating that the terms of the profit participation program, as set forth in the offer letter, required that he receive a bonus.
Accordingly, summary judgment on Plaintiffs breach of contract claim is GRANTED. ’ "
IV. Motion to Remove Confidentiality Designation
Plaintiff also moves for an order removing the confidentiality designation from
A. Legal Standard
Protective orders issued pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 serve “the vital function ... of ‘securing] the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination’ of civil disputes ... by encouraging full disclosure of all evidence that might conceivably be relevant.” Martindell v. Int’l Tel and Tel Corp.,
B. Application
Defendants' seek to keep redacted portions of various documents describing organizational structure,. staffing models, budgets, and pricing between CGI and PHAs for bids made following Plaintiffs termination.
As an initial matter, although produced pursuant to a protective order, thesé
The Second Circuit has held that “documents submitted to a court for its consideration in a summary judgment motion are—as a matter of law—judicial documents to which a strong presumption of access attaches, under both the common law and the 'First Amendment.” Lu-gosch,
Defendants have-not met this burden. Although “courts may deny access to records that are ‘sources of business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing,’ ” the party seeking nondisclosure “must make a particular and specific demonstration of fact, showing that disclosure would -result in an injury sufficiently - serious to warrant protection; broad allegations of harm -unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning fail to satisfy the test.” In re Parmalat Sec. Litig.,
Therefore, Plaintiff’s request to remove the confidentiality designation from the documents submitted in connection with the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs breach of contract claim and DENIED with respect to Plaintiffs Section 806 claim. Plaintiffs motion to remove.- the confidentiality designation from documents submitted in opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motion is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. CGI Federal, Inc. is a subsidiary of CGI Technologies and Solutions Inc., which is in turn a subsidiary of the CGI Group, Inc., Def. Mem. 1 n. 1. Defendants argue, in a footnote without citation, that claims against CGI Group, Inc. should be dismissed because Plaintiff was not employed by CGI Group, Inc. and did not make specific allegations against CGI Group, Inc. Id. Putting aside the fact that the issue was not properly raised, see United States v. Restrego,
. The following facts, which are taken from the parties’ Rule 56.1 statements and other
. Although the Court cites the redacted versions of documents filed on ECF in connection with Defendants’ ■ motion for summary judgment, unredаcted versions of these documents were considered by the Court.
.. Attached as Exhibit 9 to Herbst Declaration. EOF No. 134-9.
. In anticipation of the rebid, CGI had entered into memoranda of understanding with prospective PHAs with whom CGI would form subcontracting relationships, PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 18, 21; Ashmore Decl. ¶ 52.
. This event followed the' transmission of a series of e-mails dated April 16, 2010, one of which is from Carragher to various recipients including Kyprianou and Dennis Ryan, another Rat Pack member, indicating that she "believe[d] HUD has decided the unit cap will stand,” Herbst Decl. Ex. 49, ECF No. 134-49; see Herbst Decl. Ex'. 4, Ryan Dep. 33:16-17/34:10-35:16, 48:3-51:17, ECF No. 134-4 . (discussing e-mails).
. Kyprianou’s testimony referenced an e-mail dated January 29, 2010 that was written by him and addressed to Carragher among others not including Plaintiff. PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 128— 29; Kyprianou Decl. Ex. 19, ECF No. 118-19. The e-mail discussed possible methods of avoiding the "unit restriction,” including: (1) CGI "hid[ing] behind” a PHA’s instrumentality entity by subcontracting from the PHA's instrumentality entity rather than the PHA directly; and (2) the creation of "new entities [for] selected jurisdictions that are a join[t] venture of PHA and CGI subsidiary” that would not run afoul of the unit restriction because they are "somehow independent from CGI.” Kyprianou Decl. Ex. 19, at 1-2. In reference to this e-mail, Carragher testified that although legal counsel suggested that CGI may be able to set up subsidiaries that would each be аble to subject to separate unit caps, the idea was "quickly dismissed” because “CGI would never approve of that.” Carragher Dep. 132:7-133:19.
. In guidelines issued during the 2011 invitation for proposals, HUD did clarify that if a subcontractor certifies that it will provide less than 50% of the full time equivalent employees required to perform certain tasks under the PBACC, units subject to that agreement would not .be counted toward a subcontractor’s unit cap. Pi. 56.1 ¶ 145.
. The complaint does not reference the 49/51 strategy, PI. 56,1 ¶¶ 148, 150, and Plaintiff has no direct knowledge that the transfer-back element of the shell scheme was incorporated into GCI’s 49/51 strategy. Plaintiff contends discussions and fired. Id. Kill. Plaintiff, however, does point to documents that he claims show a blending of the shell company scheme and the 49/51 strategy. See Herbst Decl. Ex. 50, at 4, ECF No. 134-50 (presentation slide attached to an e-mail dated May 17, 2010 that states “[w]illing to transfer 51% to GCI after [after] years”); Herbst Decl. Ex. 53, at 7, ECF No. 134-53 (presentation slide dated July 12, 2010 noting under section for “GCI Role” that CGI would be “[p]rime for PHA [p]artnership ([s]ub during HUD recom-petes)”).
. There is no evidence in the record indicating that CGI did, in fact, have understandings with any PHA to have work transferred back at a later time. Plaintiff attempts to demonstrate that such understandings existed by referencing draft budgeting documents that he contends show that staffing remained constant even though CGI had purported to shift to a 49/51 relationship with those PHAs. See PL 56.1 ¶ 111. The Court, however, finds the conclusions to be drawn from these submissions to be speculative.
. Plaintiff contends that the reasons proffered for his termination are pretextual. Plaintiff points to an e-mail dated June 8 and notes related to a conference call held the following day that show changes to HUD's revised annual contributions contract, includ
. As Defendants' motion papers address neither the causation prong nor the unfavorable personnel action prong of the prima facie standard, see Def. Mem. 34-47, the Court concludes that Defendants have conceded these issues.
. As an initial matter, thе Court does not find that objections Plaintiff allegedly made prior to his May 11 objection qualify as protected activity. First, Plaintiff testified that when he raised concerns about the shell company scheme when it was first discussed at a Virginia hotel he didn’t take the idea seriously and only expressed that he didn’t think the idea would work. Ashmore Dep. 340:14-341:5. Although Plaintiff testified that when the subject was raised again he stated that it was illegal, he further stated that he,did not believe any steps were being taken in further- ’ anee of the scheme. Id. at 352:18-23, 355:11-358:2. Accordingly, the Court does not find that Plaintiff "had both a subjective belief and an objectively reasonable belief that the conduct he complained of constituted a violation of relevant law.” Leshinsky,
. In addition, Plaintiff has put forth some evidence beyond his testimony indicating that the CGI considered a strategy involving separate entities participating - in the -rebid. See Kyprianou Decl. Ex. 19; Kyprianou Dep. 217:11-220:4.; Gorris Dep. 45:16-48:2, 49:10-50:4, 51:20-54:20., However, Plaintiff has not submitted the allegedly incriminating document discussed during the May 11th Rat Pack call, even though he testified to having encountered it in Defendants' document production. See Ashmore Dep, 367:5-13.
. Furthermore; Section 806 only requires that an employee provide information to a "person with supervisory authority over the employed." 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(l)(C).
. Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the ' scheme constituted mail fraud and wire fraud. Compl. ¶ 69, ECF No. 1. However, in his memorandum, Plaintiff puts forth a new theory based on a reasonable belief the schetne violated securities law. See PL Mem! 50, ECF No. 137. The Court declines to entertain this theory. See Brown v. Magistro, 10 Civ. 3705,
. Defendants also argue that' Plaintiff's beliefs lack objective reasonableness because Plaintiff has not proven the parties's competing testimony, there is a genuine issue of mаterial fact concerning the scheme’s existence. See supra Section II.A. 1.
.Specifically, Defendants note that in order for the scheme-to work the following would have to occur: "(1) .,. Carragher would have to get three levels of management above her to approve it ...; (2) the directors [of] CGI's entire PBCA operations ... would simultaneously need to resign at the same time to create these shell companies, without raising [HUD’s suspicion]; (3) these directors would then have to be willing to end successful long-standing careers and risk the loss of their reputation[s] ...; (4) these directors would then have to be able to convince a number of PHAs across the country to agree ..., not
. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff lacked a subjective belief because he only believed the conduct about which he allegedly objected was violation of HUD and federal procurеment requirements, not a provision under Section 806. Def. Mem. 46-47. However, this argument has already been rejected. See supra Section II.A.
. Indeed, Plaintiff testified that at the time he objected "th[e] scheme was a potential eventuality if the unit caps became firm,” but not a certainty. Ashmore Dep. 379:5-11.
. Plaintiff, however, was not excluded from Rat Pack discussions until June, more than a month following his objection. Pi. 56.1 ¶ 82. Indeed, this fact tends to support Defendants’
,Indeed, although an at-will employee may not maintain a breach of contract clаim predicated solely on the fact he was fired, see Geldzahler v. New York Med. Coll.,
. The letter, which was electronically signed by Plaintiff and Carragher, provides in pertinent part, "Profit Participation Program: You will be eligible to be a participant in the CGI Profit Participation Program. Through this program, you can earn an annual bonus based on the achievement of' certain financial ' results, client satisfaction, member satisfaction and оther measures tied to your performance. This program is dependent upon the success of the company, your business and your own performance.” Carragher Deck Ex. 1, at 2.
. Plaintiff testified that when he was hired Carragher informed him that if "[he] met all [his] performance metrics, [he] would get a bonus equal to [his] base.” Ashmore Dep. 385:3-14. The offer letter, however, does not mention a minimum guaranteed bonus and conditions the bonus on, among other things, "the success of the company.” Carragher Deck Ex. b at 2.
. Plaintiff references internal billing information in an effort to demonstrate that he was entitled to a bonus equal to his base salary. See Pi. Mem. 58. However, Plaintiff does not explain what, if any, relationship exists between internal billing rates arid bonus compensation.
. Specifically, the documents are: (1) staff■ing matrices' that outline the contemplated staffing structure for potential contracts; (2) HUD bid certifications that outline intended staffing for certain jurisdictions and indicate the basic administrative fee percentage for particular jurisdictions; (3) space needs documents that also show intended staffing contemplated for particular contracts; and (4) various revenue and staffing documents that indicate anticipated revenues, contribution margins, cost margins, fees, and profit percentages for potential proposals. -
