Ashley R. Bunch v. Canton Marine Towing Co., Inc., a Missouri Corporation Sir Joseph, an Inland River Towboat, Her Engines, Boilers, Etc.

society the interests of —let Ashley BUNCH, Appellant, R. alone those of Ellefson—are served her (almost years sentence sixteen 188-month the extent that To her addic- prison). actions, her a sentence ad- tion caused CO., INC., CANTON MARINE TOWING underlying addiction would dressing her Corporation; Joseph, a Missouri Sir society. the interests of better serve towboat, Engines, an inland river Her Boilers, etc., Appellees. Unfortunately, our inflexible federal justice policy responds epi- to the criminal No. 04-1292. drug adequately crimes without demic of ability providing judges federal with the Appeals, United States Court of drug address addiction—the root cause of Eighth Circuit. contrast, epidemic. many this states April Submitted: specialized drug have created courts that approach epidemic greater with much Aug. Filed: courts, nonviolent, drug In most success. substance-abusing charged offenders with

drug-related ju- crimes are channeled into

dicially supervised substance abuse treat-

ment, mandatory drugs testing, and other services in an effort to

rehabilitative re- Eligible typi-

duce recidivism. offenders charges

cally against stayed have the them successful, if treatment dropped

plead guilty prosecution with deferred and punishment

criminal withheld if treatment

is successful. Evidence shows that pro-active approach

flexible and drug reduces

courts recidivism rates to less

than half of the recidivism rate of those simply imprisoned

offenders who are drug Unfortunately,

their crimes. the fed- justice system

eral criminal offers no such nonviolent,

alternatives substance-

abusing offenders. Given the tremendous human

economic and costs of imprisoning drug offenders, Congress

nonviolent seriously creating

should consider federal

drug drug courts. Federal courts would significant money

save a amount of

taxpayers. McPherson, Louis,

Jeffrey argued, T. St. (David Sciuto, Ott, Cynthia A. Missouri G. Louis, Missouri, Moore, Craig G. St. brief), appellant. on the Erickson, Sr., Louis, argued, St. Greg J. (Ronald Fox, Louis, E. Mis- Missouri St. bief), souri, appellee. on RILEY, McMILLIAN, and Before GRUENDER, Judges. Circuit RILEY, Judge. Circuit (Bunch) injured Bunch Ashley (Sir Joseph Joseph), aboard the SirM/V employer, Can- tugboat owned (Can- Inc. Towing Company, ton Marine ton). and the Sir Jo- Bunch sued Canton (defendants) under section 33 seph 1920, 46 Act of Merchant Marine as the Jones commonly known app. summary granted court Act. The district defendants, concluding to the judgment by not a “seaman” covered Bunch was “simply Bunch did not because to a vessel connection have a substantial reverse. navigation.” We

I. BACKGROUND cleaner Bunch worked as facility, cleaning barge Missouri Canton’s of the Missouri River. moored to the bed was ferried every day, Bunch Almost barge from morning facilities, then back Illinois Canton’s in the home again to return lunch and Joseph. usually the Sir evening, aboard twenty minutes spent Bunch days most On Joseph. Cleaning third- Act because he the Sir was not seaman. aboard motion, normal barges consumed Bunch’s court party granted ruling district workday barge. seaman, aboard the qualify Bunch could not be- approxi- on barges Bunch all but cleaned cause he did not have a “substantial con- days mately ten of the he worked navigation.” nection to a Bunch during year his first with Canton. On appeals, arguing he had a “substantial con- days, Bunch approximately those ten barge, nection” to the a cleaning which was worked as a deckhand for a few hours on in navigation.” ap- “vessel After Bunch Joseph. Viewing the Sir the evidence pealed, Supreme the United States Bunch, favorably summary most decided Stewart v. Dutra Construction — judgment purposes, the district court as- Co., -, 1118, U.S. most, spent, percent Bunch ten sumed (2005), L.Ed.2d 932 wherein the Court of his work time as a deckhand. clarified the definition of “vessel” under Longshore the Jones Act and the Har- and cleaning

The defendants concede the Compensation bor Workers’ Act worked, barge, usually origi- where Bunch (LHWCA). nally However, navigation. was built for was later moored to the II. DISCUSSION by spud poles, bed of the Missouri River long posts placed which are steel or wood “We review the district court’s vertically through the hull aof vessel and grant summary judgment of de novo." In waterway embedded into the bed of a terstate Cleaning Corp. v. Commercial anchor a vessel. barge gen- The Underwriters Ins. erally position, was secured in strong but (8th Cir.2003). “grant We will affirm a of barge. currents would shift the The clean- summary judgment pleadings, ‘if the depo ing barge pumps, contained water vacuum sitions, interrogatories, answers to and ad tanks, tools, generator, a a CB file, together missions on with affidavits ’ radio, a and satellite. The genuine demonstrate that no issue of propellers did not have and did not move material moving party fact exists and the tenure, During itself. is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” cleaning barge was moved once from the 56(c)). (quoting Id. Fed.R.Civ.P. Illinois of side the river to the Missouri observed, Court has “sea- side, when the arrived on the man status under the Jones Act is a ques- side, Missouri put spud poles Canton back jury.” tion of fact for the McDermott into the riverbed to moor barge. Int’l, Wilander, 337, 355, Inc. v. 20, 2001, April On while Bunch was be- (1991). 112 L.Ed.2d 866 facilities, ferried to the Illinois the Sir While the Court Wilander was not Joseph stopped to check if barges other rule,” asked “to reconsider noted required cleaning. Bunch and another question “the of who ais ‘member of a employee barges climbed aboard the from crew,’ ‘seaman,’ therefore who is the Sir Joseph. As the two climbed back better question characterized as a mixed Joseph, aboard the Sir Bunch fell and sus- law and fact.” Id. at 111 S.Ct. 807. injuries. tained Thus, summary judgment proper if the Bunch sued the for damages support defendants law and facts one conclusion. under the Jones Act. The defendants Johnson v. Cont’l Grain (8th Cir.1995). moved summary judgment, arguing Both claim no Bunch could not recover disputes may factual exist and this issue purposes a matter of law based on those statutes.” resolved as “requires only record. This definition that a water- ‘used, used, craft be or capable Act, any “sea Under of transportation means on water’ to injured during employ man” the course qualify require vessel. It does not may bring negligence a federal claim. ment that a watercraft be used primarily for 688(a).1 The Jones Act app. 46 U.S.C. purpose.” Id. at (quoting But does not define the term “seaman.” 3).§ Nor require does section 3 Chandris, Latsis, Inc. v. qualify watercraft “be motion to as a 2172, 132 L.Ed.2d 314 Furthermore, require- vessel.” (citation omitted), the es Supreme Court ment that a watercraft be a navi- determining two-part tablished test gation purposes for Jones Act employs no (1) “employee’s status: duties seaman less inclusive a definition than that used must to the function of the contribute] for the term “vessel” other maritime accomplishment vessel or to the of its mis Thus, contexts. Id. at 1128-29. the Court sion,” employee have a and “must any concluded notion that the use of the navigation connection to a vessel in term “vessel” under section 3 is consider- is substantial terms of both its ably more inclusive than use of the term nature.” The duration and its navigation” “vessel in under the Jones Act agree Bunch’s duties contributed to a ves longer is no at tenable. Id. 1129. The “in Thus, sel’s function. the sole issue is navigation” requirement only is relevant Bunch had a connec substantial “to capable whether the craft is ‘used or navigation.” tion to a “vessel in The de transportation.” used’ for maritime argument fendants conceded at oral if the Id. at 1128. The explained Court that a navigation, is a vessel in ship “permanently moored to the shore or Bunch a seaman under the Jones the ocean floor can be cut loose and made Accordingly, we must determine whether to sail.” question Id. “The remains in all cleaning barge, upon which Bunch cases whether the watercraft’s use ‘as a ninety spent percent at least of his work transportation means of on water’ is a time, qualifies navigation.” as “vessel practical possibility merely or a theoretical Stewart, In one.” Id. The Court has never indicated Supreme Super held Scoop, “a any given structure’s locomotion at mo- dredge only with limited means of self- Accordingly, ment mattered.” Id. in the long only and propulsion moved distances context of the Jones we look to the by tugboat, awas vessel under “vessel,” section 3 definition of rather than Super Scoop navigated LHWCA. The attempting meaning to discern additional thirty fifty every short distances of feet “in phrase navigation.” from the couple by manipulating of hours its an Acknowledging the distinctions between Noting chors and cables. Id. courts had vessels, dredges long seagoing and “more traditional recognized similar craft as vessels,” that, the Court observed at the time the Court noted the enacted, century and Act similarities nineteenth LHWCA the Jones were between “1 dredges Super Scoop. 3 defined the term ‘vessel’ for and the "[A]ny person by 1. Maritime workers are classified as either 1123. covered the Jones mutually coverage sea-based or land-based due to the Act is excluded from under the Johnson, relationship exclusive between the Jones Act LHWCAand vice versa.” 58 F.3d at and the LHWCA. See 125 S.Ct. at to use the Rand expensive inefficient or The Ala- approval with cited The Court (S.D.Ala.1884), vessel, not bama, those factors do serve 19 F. court observed status. The strip the district the Rand its vessel usually and its scows many dredge category Alabama “into the Rand fits tow, they had no means similarly moved limited ca- were other vessels with “by than use of other self-propulsion probably Rand Although the pacities.” windlass, Neither anchors, ropes.” moorings” and set “slip her will never made for scows were nor the the Alabama waters, nonethe- she is open off toward carrying passengers adapted to of use as capable less a towable vessel em- they ever been so nor had freight, means of on water. “may Although the vessels ployed. omitted). (certain Id. at 852 citations We own, and be power of their have no motive afforded “expansive scope” concluded externally,” applied only by power moved of the term “vessel” Congress’s definition navigat- capacity to be they still “ha[d] inescapable “to the conclusion leads waters, they [were] upon ed in and [Clean Rand was a vessel under the Wa- navigation.” Id. made for water-craft Act.” Id. ter] contrast, courts have denied recently tow held permanently status to those craft the Clean Water a under was vessel In v. or otherwise immovable. Kathriner definition of the the same employs which Inc., UNISEA, 659-60 3,§ the used in U.S.C. term “vessel” Cir.1992), ruled the UN- the Ninth Circuit LHWCA, federal statutes. See and other ISEA, into a fish liberty ship a converted F.3d Templeton, v. States United a in navi- processing plant, was not vessel Cir.2004) (cited Stewart, in 849-50 it gation under the Act because was 1128). Templeton, In the tow S.Ct. moored, permanent utili- permanently had own, Rand, on her was floated barge, the connections, ty capabili- had no movement shore, from and was feet moored fifteen ties, no navigation, had no means of had bolts, by removable spud poles to attached and independent propulsion, source of engines. operable no but had no function. The served vessel, a the Rand’s status as evaluating a fac- “designed UNISEA was observed, we tory-merely extending land over water for that it fact “[t]he we are aware While purpose increasing space of the usable does not make it on the water floats processing operation,” of a dock-side fish vessel,” Dry- v. Cope Vallette ship or ship shrimp after “was converted to a 625, 627, S.Ct. Dock cut processing plant, large opening was (1887), in this the facts 30 L.Ed. 501 traffic,” and, into her hull to allow for dock the conclusion the Rand was lead to case sea, put surely if to “she would sink.” Id. [Clean Water] a vessel under 626-27, Similarly, Cope, 119 U.S. at government’s fully appreciate We dry- Court ruled a adopt if but we were arguments, lying dock “moored and usual [the] term, “ca definition of the government’s twenty years, place” occupied it for over use,” equate we would have to of pable “perma- that was a “fixed structure” was use,” an in to mean “current the term moored,” an- nently temporarily not a statutory language terpretation Also, chored in Evansville & vessel. support. The Rand do not the caselaw vessel, Bowling Packet v. Chero Cola as a Green Co. “capable of use” albeit 19, 21-22, 46 S.Ct. Bottling been may have under tow. While (1926), acknowledged the Court con- The Stewart Court “the 70 L.Ed. 805 wharfboat, seeming incongruity of by grouping dredges secured cables to cluded water, alongside more traditional mainland; seafaring ves- connected to local sels under the lines; maritime statutes.” Stew- electricity, telephone and never art, However, quoting 125 S.Ct. at 1129. place place” from or used to “taken Fourth Circuit case from over one hundred transport freight, practically “was not ca- years observed, ago, the Court although it pable being of used as a means of trans- may be a “stretch of the imagination to therefore, and, portation,” qualify did not class the deck hands of a dredge mud as a vessel. quiet waters of Potomac creek with cases, Distinguishing these the Stewart the bold and skillful mariners who breast noted “the distinction drawn angry Atlantic[,] waves of the such and general maritime law between watercraft far-reaching principles so are the particular stationed in a loca- temporarily jurisdiction underlie the of the courts of tion and those affixed to admiralty they adapt themselves to all resting on the ocean floor.” shore property the new kinds of and new sets Steivart, “Simply put,” 125 S.Ct. at 1127. operatives and new conditions which are concluded, “a not the Court watercraft brought into progress existence ‘capable for maritime trans- used’ (quoting Saylor Taylor, the world.” Id. if port any meaningful sense it has been (4th Cir.1896)). 77 F. permanently moored or otherwise ren- hold the was a practically incapable transporta- dered and, thus, a in navigation vessel tion or movement.” Id. In Templeton, under the Jones Act. after specifically The Stewart Court also es noting inoperable engines the Rand had tests for vessel focused on chewed status and would need to be towed if she were to “primary purpose” either a craft’s moved, be we concluded such facts were in whether the craft is “actual transit” at strip insufficient the Rand of vessel the time of an accident. Id. at 1127-28. Templeton, status. 378 F.3d 850-52. The district court in this case relied on spud The Rand also was connected to just applying other circuits’ cases such bolts, poles by easily “which could be re Bros., Traylor tests. See DiGiovanni moved, Rand to permitting the be towed (1st Inc., Cir.1992); 959 F.2d 1123 own, because she floated on her Structures, Inc., Pilings Hurst v. & sufficient to bestow ‘vessel’ status on [was] Cir.1990); F.2d Bernard v. undisputed her.” The facts of Binnings Constr. 741 F.2d cleaning barge this case do not show the (5th Cir.1984). The defendants also cite moored or anchored to permanently was subsequent applying Seventh Circuit case bed, barge the river and the had been the same test. Howard v. Riv See S. Ill. mooring to moved from its travel across Cruises, Inc., erboat Casino during the river the time Bunch worked Cir.2004). Stewart, 856-58 Based on Although cleaning barge the Canton. reject we the district court’s reliance on in position, strong was secured currents these cases and focus on instead whether barge, belying perma would shift the “used, cleaning barge capable was nency mooring. of its Nor does the evi used, as a means of barge dence show the had been taken out Stewart, 1128; on practically incapable water.” See 125 S.Ct. at of service or rendered § transportation. U.S.C. 3. of maritime See in we conclude Indeed, holding Templeton, court’s the district at 1128. vessel, thereby cleaning barge cleaning barge was is court concluded moved. Bunch a making movement was seaman capable of for use barge was built cleaning The in the barge was moored The

navigation. III. CONCLUSION The clean- river, to the shore. rather than disputes no factual claim floated, if it did obviously ing barge decide, and we find no jury exist for a no need to not, have been there would any material fact. We genuine issue as to poles. Under the defen- spud it with moor grant court’s of sum- reverse district interpretation dants’ Act mary judgment on Bunch’s Jones during moored barge permanently further claim and remand the case for employment, opinion. consistent with this proceedings moored permanently have been would on the Illinois side when it was GBUENDER, Judge, concurring Circuit river, it difficult to conclude too. findWe dissenting part. part permanently is moored any river more side of the on the Missouri district agree I with the Court that the on moored while permanently than it was summary judgment order of should court’s side. As Stewart the Illinois vacated and the case remanded observed, ship even a However, because I proceedings. further Id. The and made to sail. can be released the issue of whether Canton’s believe “snap- avoid a directed that we Court has by 1 cleaning barge is a “vessel” as defined status to turn on allowing test shot” developed § requires a better at a motion a watercraft light record in of Stewart v. Dutra Const. — Id.; Templeton, see time. given -, 1118, 160 U.S. “capa- (rejecting equating term at 852 (2005), I remand the L.Ed.2d 932 would use”). to mean “current ble use” court and leave the case to district viewing avoid that direction and heed Therefore, a finder of fact. I issue to in determin- cleaning barge’s current state respectfully dissent from the hold- Court’s ing its status as vessel. that Canton’s ves- sel under U.S.C. 3. cleaning barge is recognize the “[a]ny that sea- provides of what this The Jones Act near or at the outer limits injury in the personal as a vessel. We man who shall suffer recognize court would employment may, in course of at his elec- the his recognize also tion, damages an for at dredge in Stewart maintain action case differs from the Employers limit under the Federal Liabili- dredge capable of law” insofar as the However, §§ ty 45 51-60. O’Donnell v. this charac self-propulsion. ed Dredge Lakes & Dock not determine vessel Great teristic alone does (1943) 36, 38, 488, L.Ed. 596 A is not defined its 63 S.Ct. 87 status. vessel 688(a)). One of (quoting U.S.C.App. for The term 46 capability self-propulsion. obtaining for “any prac predicate determinations “vessel” refers to watercraft Act is whether transportation, coverage maritime tically capable of is con- the structure to which the worker regardless primary purpose of its or state qualifies navigation.” as a “vessel in particular of transit at a moment.” Stew nected Gizoni, Marine, art, 502 Southwest Inc. v. 125 at 1129. Based on the Su See S.Ct. 81, 88, 486, 405 116 L.Ed.2d holding in and this U.S. preme Court’s Stewart

875 (1991) Int’l, generally Inc. v. These cases (quoting recognized legal McDermott 807, Wilander, difficulty classifying of a structure aas noting that L.Ed.2d 866 112 vessel and instead developed tests for de- key [under to seaman status “[t]he termining alleged whether the vessel was connec employment-related isAct] Jones actually “in navigation.”2 approach This navigation”). in Given the tion to a vessel generally primary focused on the purpose inquiry necessary to highly fact-intensive structure, of the status the structure status, we have determine structure’s accident, at the time of the and whether left to the finder of fact the generally any transportation merely function was in- qualifies as a vessel with question of what primary cidental to the structure’s pur- meaning of the Act. See Slat Jones court, pose. relying The district Co., Inc., Eby K. ton Martin Const. primarily on this “in navigation” jurispru- Cir.1974) (“[W]hat F.2d is a dence, concluded that because “[t]here vessel and who is a crew member are no evidence that the [was] ordinarily jury questions.”); see also Stew was used for the of cargo, art, that (noting at 1128 S.Ct. equipment, persons navigable across inquiry “may into the status of the vessel waters,” Bunch, slip op. only “the jury”). involve factual issues for the As conclusion which a reasonable fact-finder result, spite riparian geogra and in could reach is that circuit, phy quite of our we do not have barge is not a in navigation vessel under might ocean of case law on this issue Act,” the Jones id. at 10. found in some of the other circuits. Stewart, Supreme Court es summary judgment, In the order “in separate naviga chewed this focus on a began analysis court its district Can- requirement. tion” cleaning barge by noting that it was ton’s (“[T]he navigation’ requirement ‘in not a standard but instead was more an element of the vessel status of water platform. akin to a The dis- work ... craft is relevant to whether the [and] trict court law therefore turned to the case ‘used, capable craft is used’ circuits, of other the Slatton “[s]ince transportation.”); maritime see also Uzda decision, clarified the have test Marine, Inc., vines v. Weeks determining special purpose whether a (2d Cir.2005) (noting that Stewart su- navigation structure is a percedes three-part Circuit’s Second Act purposes.” Bunch v. Canton Tonnesen). Instead, Co., Inc., test Towing Marine No. 2:02-cv-55- (E.D.Mo. 2004). DJS, slip op. qualifies at 9 Jan. Court held that watercraft See, e.g., prise only Howard v. S. Ill. Riverboat Casino are to be considered seamen when Cruises, Inc., Cir.2004) navigation at the actual or transit” UNISEA, Inc., (holding indefinitely injury); that an moored dockside time of Kathriner v. but, 657, (9th Cir.1992) ("Generally, casino is vessel because it has no trans 975 F.2d 660 portation purpose, function or it not “in are not classified as vessels is structures navigation indepen- navigation"); Contracting they incapable v. are Tonnesen Yonkers if Co., 30, water, (2d Cir.1996) (adopting, permanently 82 F.3d 36 dent are movement over land, modification, transportation with minor the Fifth Circuit’s moored to have no func- kind, navigation”); any ability test for whether a vessel is "in tion of and have to navi- no Bros., Inc., Co., Inc., Traylor gate.”); Binnings DiGiovanni v. 959 F.2d Bernard v. Const. 1119, (1st Cir.1992) (en banc) 824, (5th Cir.1984) (holding (promulgat- 1123 829 barge[’s] purpose primary that whether a vessel is "if or three-factor test for commerce, navigation navigation” purposes of the Jones business is not or then not "in Act). assigned workers thereto for its shore enter- 876 “used, Cope v. transportation”); a means of Act if it is or

vessel Co., 625, 627, 7 used, Dry-Dock as a means of trans- Vallette being capable of 336, (floating L.Ed. 501 at 30 S.Ct. on water.” portation had that drydoek was a “fixed structure” of “vessel” the definition (adopting 3). main- contrast, moored” to the “permanently “a been By in 1 found than a spars, rather being by land chains and ‘capable of used’ is not watercraft temporarily an- that had been any meaningful transport for maritime chored); Mississippi Riverboat Pavone if it has been sense 560, Corp., 52 F.3d incapa- Amusement practically otherwise rendered or Cir.1995) (floating longer was no at casino or movement.” Id. ble to the shore focus, therefore, where it “was moored is not on vessel man- semi-permanent or indefinite actually engaged the structure is ner”).3 cases, we know that a 1128, From these but rather wheth- transport, id. at moored” sim- may “permanently of vessel use ‘as a means er “the watercraft’s by to the shore four ply by being “secured practical pos- is a transportation on water’ one,” and connected to onshore id. at or five cables” sibility merely a theoretical Evansville, 21, 46 271 U.S. at utilities. However, seemingly permanent S.Ct. 379. navigation” “in that element Now necessarily preclude the moorings do not by the district court has been upon relied as a means of regular use of the structure effectively into the definition subsumed 20-21, at transportation. S.Ct. “vessel,” question before the salient (“Each was towed [the wharfboat] winter cleaning barge in this is whether the it from protect to Green River harbor to moored or “permanently has been case (“[T]he Pavone, ice.”); 52 F.3d at 564 incapable of practically rendered otherwise waters, navigable quite on its barge floats at 1127. transportation or movement.” Id. dockside attachment to land is substantial previous Like the Court and our indefinite, permanent, only if not save law, I that record case believe unless the ability to be unmoored and towed to its conclusion, only fact- supports one this approach- waters in advance of sheltered fact- inquiry is best left to the intensive weather.”). or other violent ing hurricanes See, e.g., Johnson v. Continental finder. Also, to conform that a structure “move[s] 1232, Cir. Grain Evansville, river,” stage to the 1995) (“Seaman usually a status is fact- or “floats on U.S. jury inquiry properly intensive left to the vessel,” ship not it a water does make resolve.”). only need look to those Cope, 119 7 S.Ct. 336. U.S. approval cited with to see cases Stewart Admittedly, parties claimed at oral the difficult factual nuances that arise See, that no facts in dis- making argument such a determination. there were when however, juncture, At I believe e.g., Bowling pute. Evansville & Packet Green regarding factual Canton’s Bottling Co. v. Chero Cola that the record (1926) (float inadequate to reach the 70 L.Ed. 805 a vessel under the ing wharfboat secured to the shore with conclusion I believe the particularly, and connected to onshore utilities More cables judge as a matter practically capable “was not used record is insufficient hull,” Kathriner, moving rendering incapable over (floating her 3. See also 975 F.2d at 660 water). processing longer plant was no a vessel where "large opening cut into her [had been] barge. Accordingly, I believe would be of law whether All moored. we semi-permanently prudent parties to allow the to develop the cleaning barge is a sta- know is that the light record in of Stewart. tionary staging platform cleaning other reasons, respectfully For these I dissent purpose, generator, barges. For this holding from the Court’s that Canton’s tanks, pumps, cleaning vacuum tools

water cleaning barge is a purposes vessel for equipment kept and communication are on the Jones Act. cleaning barge. incapable It is of inde- an- pendent presently locomotion and is piers massive steel that are

chored hull of through

driven the deck and

cleaning barge Mississippi and into the BERNAL-RENDON, Gloria During year-long River riverbed. Canton, al., Petitioners, cleaning barge et tenure with was once hauled from the Illinois side Mississippi to the Missouri side. Oth- GONZALES, Alberto R. United States erwise, Bunch, according to “[s]ometimes Attorney General, Respondent. barge.” strong currents can shift the No. 04-2798. Summary judgment might appropri- be Appeals, United States Court of ate if we how often moved knew Canton Eighth Circuit. barge prior employment, to Bunch’s whether Canton ever intends to move the Submitted: 2005. June future, cleaning barge in the and how often Aug. Filed: 2005. barges in other the area are Rehearing Rehearing En Banc Presently, moved. we do not even know Denied Oct. cleaning barge how difficult the would be seaworthy to unmoor or if it would be after Rehearing Rehearing En Banc spuds removed. I think it would were Oct. Vacated useful to also be know whether the clean-

ing barge registered or licenced with a

governmental authority or otherwise sub-

ject governmental inspection aas vessel.

Further, I might important think it to elaborate on whether the merely along moves

spuds rising with the tide or whether the actually

current spuds causes the to bend cleaning barge’s

or otherwise move off the

mooring. might Other relevant facts in- far

clude how offshore the legal arrangements,

is moored and what mooring rights,

such as leases or Canton

had to cleaning barge’s make secure the facts,

present mooring. These as well as easily anticipated stage

others not at this case, may prove indispensable well

in properly classifying Canton’s

Case Details

Case Name: Ashley R. Bunch v. Canton Marine Towing Co., Inc., a Missouri Corporation Sir Joseph, an Inland River Towboat, Her Engines, Boilers, Etc.

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Date Published: Aug 23, 2005

Citation: 419 F.3d 868

Docket Number: 04-1292

Court Abbreviation: 8th Cir.