328 Mich. 428 | Mich. | 1950
Plaintiff filed claim for unemployment compensation, was interviewed by an employee of the Michigan unemployment compensation commission, and one of its claims examiners made a determination and later a redetermination allowing the claim. Defendant Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Company, the employer, filed an appeal to referee before whom the plaintiff then appeared in person and the employer by attorney. All the papers contained in the commission’s files up to that point relating to plaintiff’s claim, consisting of plaintiff’s application for compensation, registration for work card, copies of notices of the determination and redetermination
In Dwyer v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 321 Mich 178, we held that the burden of proof rests upon claimant to establish that he meets the conditions of eligibility for benefits. The commission says, however, that despite the burden of proof thus reposing upon the plaintiff, after a determination allowing the claim, the “burden of evidence” in proceedings before the referee rests upon the appealing employer; that the papers in the file in this case made out a prima facie case for plaintiff, and that, therefore, at the hearing before the referee the burden was upon the employer to proceed to “offset the plaintiff’s prima facie case.” Aside from all constitutional considerations, authority for such position, running counter to the rule in all ordinary court proceedings, must be found, if at all, in the statute. Accordingly, the commission and plaintiff' point to the provisions of section 33 of the statute that “If any interested party requests a hearing before a referee on any determination * * * all proceedings in the matter shall be referred to a referee” and, further, that “If the appellant fails to appear or prosecute the appeal the referee may dismiss the proceeding’s.” Never yet has it been thought that the effect contended for by the commission followed from the similar provisions of the statute relating to appeals from justices of the peace to circuit court (CL 1948, §§ 678.11, 678.12 [Stat Ann §§ 27.3491, 27.3492]; CL 1948, § 678.21a [Stat Ann 1949 Cum Supp § 27.3501(1)]). The mere requirement of the statute that in an appeal to the referee all proceedings in the matter shall be referred to him discloses no legislative intent that by such refer
Nothing in the statute indicates an intention to establish a rule contrary to all ordinary court proceedings. Plaintiff filed a claim. Introduction of that claim or application into evidence did not operate to establish it. The claim does not prove itself. Neither do the determinations by claims examiners prove it. In the Divyer Case we expressed our disapproval of “the contention that the mere filing of
“In the case before us no claimant offered any proof in behalf of his or her claim. They contented themselves with the statement of availability herein-before quoted. This statement is addressed to the Tennessee unemployment compensation division as a ‘claim for benefits.’ It is the first requisite step a claimant makes. On the basis of this claim, other requisites being present, the commissioner allows the claim. Presumptively the filing of this paper established the claim with the commissioners. After this claim is filed the commissioner more or less enters a pro forma allowance. Up to this point the allowance of the claim is to all intents and purposes an ex parte proceeding. When the company enters the picture by an appeal it then becomes necessary for the claimant to support this formal claim by some proof in addition to the statements made in the claim when the company offers proof of facts and circumstances that offset the weight given the statements made in the formal claim. We have heretofore held that the burden of proof rests upon the claimants. Reese v. Hake, 184 Tenn 423 (199 SW2d 569). This being true the general rule applicable to ordinary court proceedings applies, i.e., the obligation of the claimants is to establish the truth of their claims by a preponderance of the evidence and that this obligation rests on them so long as they are asserting the affirmative of the issue involved.”
While in that case the employer, as it happens, did introduce proofs tending to show plaintiff’s ineligibility for benefits, we read the quoted portion of the Tennessee court’s opinion as expressive of a view supporting the position of defendant employer herein rather than that of plaintiff.
The order of the trial court reversing the order of remand of the appeal board is reversed, without costs, a public question being involved.