Plaintiff contends the court erred by granting defendants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of breach of contract. We disagree. Without addressing whether plaintiff may bring an action against these particular defendants, we find that plaintiffs action for breach of contract is barred by N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-52(1), the three year statute of limitatiоns, and N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-52(16), which provides that in an action for physical damage to claimant’s property “the cаuse of action . . . shall not accrue until . . . physical damage to [claimant’s] property becomes аpparent or ought reasonably to have become apparent to the claimant, whichever event first occurs.”
Our Supreme Court recently addressed the precise issue raised. In
Pembee Mfg. Corp. v. Cape Fear Constr. Co.,
313 N.C.
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488,
The plaintiff . . . first complained of leaks in the roof within two months after occupying its newly built facility. The undisputed facts shоw that further complaints about leaks in many spots in the roof were made over five consecutive months in 1976 аnd 1977. These complaints clearly show that plaintiff, although perhaps not aware of the extent of damаge, knew that its roof was defective at least as early as April 1977. The statute of limitations does not require рlaintiff to be a construction expert. See Earls v. Link, Inc.,38 N.C. App. 204 , 208,247 S.E. 2d 617 , 619 (1978). However, it does require that plaintiff not sit on its rights. Plaintiff, knowing of the existence of leaks in the roof, was put on inquiry as to the nature and extent of the problem. Plaintiff failed to inform itself оf the nature and extent of the roofs defects when leaks were discovered and recurred repeаtedly. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, there is nothing in the record which would indicate that рlaintiff was unaware that its roof was defective until a point in time within three years prior to filing suit.
Plaintiff here concedes that it was aware in early 1975 that the gym roof had begun to leak. Plaintiff made repeated complaints about leaks in many places over the next three years and thereafter. These complaints clеarly show that plaintiff knew its roof was defective at least as early as sometime in 1977, even if it was not awarе of the extent of the damage. Knowing of the leaks, plaintiff was obligated to inform itself of the nature and extеnt of the roofs defects. As in
Pembee,
“there is nothing in the record which would indicate that plaintiff was unaware that its roof was defective until a point in time within three years prior to filing suit.”
Pembee
at 493,
Plaintiff contends defendants are estopped from raising the statute of limitations because defendant D.V. Ward repeatedly promised to repair the roоf and assured plaintiff that everything
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was fine. However, these “[assurances . . . fade[d] in the face of repeated . . leaks in the roof.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Odell Associates,
Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs amended complaint against D.V. Ward of 25 July 1983 relates back to the original complaint filed 11 June 1981, the action is still barred as to both defendants by N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-52(1), (16), the three year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the сourt did not err by granting defendants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of breach of contract.
Plaintiff nеxt contends the court erred by granting D.V. Ward’s motion for directed verdict on the issue of negligent roof repairs. We disagree.
“To overcome the motion for directed verdict plaintiff was ‘required to offer evidence sufficient to establish, beyond mere speculation or conjecture, every essential element of negligence.’ ” Sasser v. Beck,65 N.C. App. 170 , 171,308 S.E. 2d 722 , 722-23 (1983), disc. rev. denied,310 N.C. 309 ,312 S.E. 2d 652 (1984). “The basic elements of negligence are a duty owed by [defendant] to plaintiff and nonperformance of that duty, proximately causing injury and damage.” Id.
“ ‘[W]here actual pecuniary damages are sought, there must be evidence of their existence and extent, and some data from which they may be computed.’ ”
Norwood v. Carter,
Here plaintiff presented evidence of damages resulting from the failure to complete the gym in accordance with the original
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plans and specificаtions. It did not, however, offer any evidence of damages resulting from improper repairs to the roof аfter completion. There was neither evidence of the difference in the market value of the gym before and after the repairs nor evidence of the cost of repairs to the roof.
See Plow v. Bug Man Exterminators,
Plaintiff could sеek nominal damages, however. Such damages are recoverable in negligence actions.
Jewell v. Price,
For the reasons stated, we find no error. The result reached renders consideration of plaintiffs evidentiary arguments unnecessary.
No error.