This wаs an action filed in Georgia by the resident noncustodial father against the Florida-resident custodial mother, seeking to hold her in contempt of the visitation rights provisions of the parties’ Georgia divorce decree. The complaint аlso sought to modify the visitation rights so as to allow the father’s time to be extended to make up for visitation rights lost by reason оf the mother’s alleged violation of these provisions. The Court of Appeals reversed the holding of the trial court insоfar as it held that the Georgia court had jurisdiction to determine the child-custody (visitation) issue, and the Court of Appeals hеld that the complaint should have been dismissed.
Baker v.
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Ashburn,
1. This court’s order transferring to the Court of Appeals the application for interlocutory appeal made to this court in this case, provided in part that “inasmuch as this court no longer has jurisdiction over aрpeals involving child custody unless the appeal also involves a judgment for divorce and alimony,
Carter v. Foster,
The Court of Appeals in Baker v. Ashburn, supra, p. 758, after tracing the legislative backdrop for our Munday decision, supra, held that, “since the Supreme Court transferred the applicаtion for interlocutory appeal made to that court in this case, it is clear that it does not involve an actiоn for contempt for violation of the divorce decree, but must be considered an independent proceеding to change child custody.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court of Appeals’ conclusion, that the case does not involvе an action for contempt for violation of the divorce decree, is apparently based on the assumption that this court has jurisdiction of actions for contempt for violations of any type of provisions of divorce decrees. However, this court having eschewed jurisdiction over appeals which involve child custody but not a judgment for divorсe and alimony, and having held that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of such appeals (.Munday, supra) — it would be inconsistent for this court to retain jurisdiction of contempt actions involving the same situation of which we had held the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction. Hence, our transferral did not indicate that the case does not involve an action for contempt for violation of the divorce decree (which it does), but rather that jurisdiction over appeals involving child custody but not a judgment for divorce and alimony, carries with it jurisdiction over contempt actions in such circumstances. Thus, the appeal involved both an action for contempt for violation of the divorce decree and a proceeding to changе child custody (visitation rights).
2. The Court of Appeals’ analysis of the jurisdictional status of the visitation-modification petition led tо the correct finding that jurisdiction in the case is controlled by the UCCJA (Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act; Ga. L. 1978, p. 258 et seq.; OCGA § 19-9-40 et seq.). However, its erroneous assumption, that the case does not also involve an action for contempt for violation of the divorce decree, precluded a specific holding as to the jurisdiction of that claim, although the holding that the complaint should have been dismissed would have the effect of adjudicating the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction of that claim.
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“ ‘ “The courts of this state have no extra-territorial jurisdiction, and cannot make the citizens of foreign states amenable to their process, or conclude them by a judgment in personam, without their consent.
Dearing v. Bank of Charleston,
As the Court of Appeals noted in
Baker,
supra, the Georgia Long-Arm statute (OCGA § 9-10-91 (5)) would not give the Georgia court jurisdiction, because this was not a proceeding for “alimony, child support, or division of property in connection with an action for divоrce or with respect to an independent action for support of dependents,” so personal servicе outside Georgia would not give the Georgia court jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-10-94. See
Lee v. Pace,
Among the purposes of the UCCJA, supra, in addition to рroviding for
modification
of custody decrees of other states (OCGA § 19-9-54),
is enforcement
of custody decrees of other states (OCGA §§ 19-9-41 (a) (7); 19-9-55). “Although the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act is the last expression of the legislature, it does not expressly repeal any particular provisions of the Civil Practice Act, nor the existing statutory provisiоns covering divorce, custody, alimony, and child support procedures. Finding this to be true, we will consider the requirements of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in pari
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materia with the other applicable provisions of law pertinent thereto.”
Gambrell v. Gambrell,
Pretermitting thе question whether the UCCJA provides the exclusive procedure for enforcement of child-custody decrees against non-residents, or merely a cumulative procedure to the one recognized in Downey, supra, and cits., the Georgia court did not have jurisdiction under either procedure. Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the father’s complaint should have been dismissed.
Judgment affirmed.