207 Conn. 665 | Conn. | 1988
This is an appeal by the town of New Milford (town) from a decision of the compensation review division (review division) affirming an award of the workers’ compensation commissioner (commissioner) for the seventh district. The claimants are Regina Gallo Ash and Robert J. Ash, the widow and minor child, respectively, of the decedent, Robert M. Ash, who were awarded workers’ compensation benefits.
On the basis of stipulated facts, exhibits and testimony given, the commissioner made the following findings that are pertinent to this appeal: Robert M. Ash, the decedent, was employed by the town on May 25, 1984, as a regular member of its municipal police depart
The claimant widow sent written notice of a claim for benefits, pursuant to General Statutes § 7-433C,
The commissioner found that the notice to contest the minor son’s claim was timely filed, but that the
The town appealed to the review division, claiming that the commissioner erred in: (1) precluding the town from contesting compensability as to the decedent’s minor son since he never moved to preclude the town from contesting his claim; and (2) failing to find that the decedent did not suffer a condition or impairment of health caused by heart disease or hypertension resulting in his death. The review division affirmed the finding and award of the commissioner and dismissed the appeal. Thereafter, the town appealed to the Appellate Court and, pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, the appeal was transferred to this court. On appeal, the town claims that the review division erred in holding that the granting of a motion to preclude an employer from contesting compensability of a claim as against one claimant barred an employer from contesting the compensability of a claim made by any other person arising from the same injury, where the employer filed a timely notice to contest the claim. We find no error.
The essence of the town’s claim is that because the town filed a timely notice to contest the decedent’s son’s claim, the commissioner and the review division
The validity of this argument depends upon the scope of General Statutes § 31-297 (b). Under § 31-297 (b), the commissioner determined and the review division agreed that unless an employer timely files a notice to contest a workers’ compensation claim, there is an irrebuttable presumption that the claim is compensable. Specifically, § 31-297 (b) provides in pertinent part: “If the employer or his legal representative fails to file
We recently interpreted § 31-297 (b) in Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420, 430-31, 541 A.2d 1216 (1988), where, quoting Menzies v. Fisher, 165 Conn. 338, 343, 334 A.2d 452 (1973), we stated: “ ‘The object which the legislature sought to accomplish [was] plain. . . . [It] was amended to ensure (1) that employers would bear the burden of investigating a claim promptly and (2) that employees would be timely apprised of the specific reasons for the denial of their claims. These effects would, in turn, diminish delays in the proceedings, discourage arbitrary refusal of bona fide claims and narrow the legal issues which were to be contested.’ ” We have also stated that “[w]e are mindful of the principles underlying Connecticut practice in workmen’s compensation cases: that the legislation is remedial in nature; Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 375, 94 A. 372 (1915); and that it should be broadly construed to accomplish its humanitarian purpose. DeCarli v. Manchester Public Warehouse Co., 107 Conn. 359, 364, 140 A. 637 (1928).” Adzima v. UAC/Norden Divi
The presumptive dependents’ claims emanate from the death of the decedent employee. The decedent’s cause of death giving rise to the presumptive dependent widow’s claim is the same cause of death that the defendant employer seeks to contest, and from which the presumptive dependent son’s claim is derived. It would be irrational and incongruous to hold that a contest of the presumptive dependent widow’s claim is barred because of preclusion and at the same time, another presumptive dependent’s claim, the son’s, derived from the same death, is open for contest. The commissioner’s decision, affirmed by the review division, properly determined that the preclusion that applied to bar the contestability of the decedent’s presumptive dependent widow’s claim also applied equally to bar the contestability of the decedent’s presumptive dependent son’s claim.
Our disposition of the preclusion issue renders it unnecessary to consider the town’s claim that the decedent’s cause of death was not within the purview of General Statutes § 7-433c, the Heart and Hypertension Act. Moreover, neither the commissioner nor the review division addressed the issues relating to the cause of death in the finding and award. “[0]nce the commissioner found statutory preclusion of any defense to compensability, ‘he was no longer permitted to make any factual exploration or finding concerning such a potential question.’ [The employer’s] threshold failure to contest liability foreclosed any further inquiry [not involving jurisdiction of the Workers’ Compensation Act].” Bush v. Quality Bakers of America, 2 Conn. App.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
“[General Statutes] Sec. 7-433c. benefits for policemen or firemen DISABLED OR DEAD AS A RESULT OF HYPERTENSION OR HEART DISEASE. In recognition of the peculiar problems of uniformed members of paid fire departments and regular members of paid police departments, and in recognition of the unusual risks attendant upon these occupations, including an unusual high degree of susceptibility to heart disease and hypertension, and in recognition that the enactment of a statute which protects such fire department and police department members against economic loss resulting from disability or death caused by hypertension or heart disease would act as an inducement in attracting and securing persons for such employment, and in recognition, that the public interest and welfare will be promoted by providing such protection for such fire department and police department members, municipal employers shall provide compensation as follows: Notwithstanding any provision of chapter 568 or any other general statute, charter, special act or ordinance to the contrary, in the event a uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department or a regular member of a paid municipal police department who successfully passed a physical examination on entry into such service, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart disease, suffers either off duty or on duty any condition or impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in his death or his temporary or permanent, total or partial disability, he or his dependents, as the case may be, shall receive from his municipal employer compensation and medical care in the same amount and the same manner as that provided under chapter 568 if such death or disability was caused by a personal injury which arose out of and
General Statutes § 31-297 (b) provides: “Whenever liability to pay compensation is contested by the employer, he shall file with the compensation commissioner, on or before the twentieth day after he has received a written notice of claim, a notice in accord with a form prescribed by the commissioners stating that the right to compensation is contested, the name of the claimant, the name of the employer, the date of the alleged injury or death and the specific grounds on which the right to compensation is contested, and a copy thereof shall be sent to the employee. If the employer or his legal representative fails to file the notice contesting liability within the time prescribed herein, the employer shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the compensability of such alleged injury or death and
General Statutes § 31-306 (a) provides: “death RESULTING FROM accident OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE. DEPENDENTS. COMPENSATION, (a) The following-described persons shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee and are referred to hereinafter as presumptive dependents: (1) A wife upon a husband with whom she lives at the time of his injury or from whom she receives support regularly; (2) a husband upon a wife with whom he lives at the time of her injury or from whom he receives support regularly; (3) any child under the age of eighteen years, or over said age but physically or mentally incapacitated from earning, upon the parent with whom he is living or from whom he is receiving support regularly, at the time of the injury of such parent; (4) any unmarried child who has attained the age of eighteen but has not attained the age of twenty-two and who is a full-time student, upon the parent with whom he is living or from whom he is receiving support regularly, provided that any such child who has attained the age of twenty-two while a full-time student but has not completed the requirements for, or received, a degree from a postsecondary educational institution shall be deemed not to have attained such age until the first day of the first month following the end of the quarter or semester in which he is enrolled at such time, or if he is not enrolled in a quarter or semester system, until the first day of the first month following the completion of the course in which he is enrolled or until the first day of the third month beginning after such time, whichever occurs first. In all other cases where there is no presumptive dependent, questions of dependency shall be determined in accordance with the fact, as the fact may be at the time of the injury. Such other dependents are referred to hereinafter as dependents in fact.”
As noted earlier, Regina Gallo Ash, the widow of Robert M. Ash, filed a workers’ compensation claim. The appeal in that related case, Regina Ash v. New Milford, Docket No. 13347, has been withdrawn, leaving the commissioner’s preclusion determination in her favor and the compensability of her claim and award standing.