Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss appellee’s suit on the ground of forum non conveniens. 1 We hold that, assuming the court can exercise personal jurisdiction over appellant, 2 its ruling was not an abuse of discretion.
*978 I
The parties were married in Maryland in 1966 and voluntarily separated in 1975. Several months later they entered into a separation agreement which provided for, inter alia, the custody and support of their minor son Justin. In 1977, when the parties were granted an absolute divorce in Maryland, the court ratified their previously executed separation agreement.
Some time thereafter, appellee and her son moved to the District of Columbia, and appellant moved to Virginia. In October 1982 appellee filed suit against appellant in the Superior Court, alleging that since the preceding February appellant had reduced the amount of child support payments in violation of the separation agreement. Appellant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. The court denied the motion on both grounds.
II
The decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss on the ground of
forum non conveniens
is committed to the sound discretion of the court and will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion.
Cockrell v. Cumberland Corp.,
In ruling on a motion to dismiss on the ground of
forum non conveniens,
a trial court must consider both the private interest of the litigant and the public interest.
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, supra,
Applying the doctrine of
forum non con-veniens
to a suit for maintenance, the court said in
Curley v. Curley,
[T]he public policy of the District of Columbia does not require its courts to take jurisdiction of a matrimonial dispute between two persons who are neither domiciled in the District nor even residents thereof; especially where there is no showing that the welfare of children, rights of property, or other public interests, in the District are in any way affected. [Footnote omitted.]
Following this pronouncement, absent unusual circumstances
3
which are not present here, we have upheld trial court dismissals based on
forum non conveniens
in cases involving non-residents domiciled elsewhere.
Haynes v. Carr,
Appellant is a Virginia resident. Appel-lee and her son are District of Columbia residents. The separation agreement was entered into in Maryland, and its provisions specifically call for Maryland law to apply to questions regarding its validity, enforcement, and interpretation.
Applying the factors relevant to the private interest of the litigant, we find that, unlike the plaintiffs in
Haynes
and
Clark,
appellee is a District of Columbia resident. This factor, while not dispositive, is certainly entitled to considerable weight.
Washington v. May Department Stores, supra.
The child for whom support is sought is also a District of Columbia resident.
See Curley v. Curley, supra,
With respect to the public interest, it is true that Maryland law will govern any questions relating to the enforcement or interpretation of the separation agreement. Our courts, however, are not unfamiliar with the law of Maryland,
see Crown Oil & Wax Co. v. Safeco Insurance Co., supra
note 1,
Considering all of these factors, and finding no “convincing circumstances” 4 which would justify dismissal of this suit brought by a District of Columbia resident, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conven-iens. Accordingly, the order of the Superi- or Court from which this appeal is taken is
Affirmed.
Notes
. In this jurisdiction, a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground of
forum non conveniens
is an appealable order.
Frost v. Peoples Drug Store, Inc.,
. Appellant also contests the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We held in
Crown Oil & Wax Co. v. Safeco Insurance Co.,
We note that appellant did not seek leave to appeal under D.C.Code § ll-721(c) (1981) from the order rejecting his jurisdictional claim. That statute permits appeals to be taken from certain interlocutory orders in civil cases in the discretion of this court, upon certification by the trial court. Had appellant sought such leave, in all likelihood it would have been granted, since part of the case was here in any event as a matter of right under Frost v. Peoples Drug Store, Inc., supra note 1. When it appears that litigation in the trial court will have to be suspended pending the outcome of an interlocutory appeal of right, the better practice is usually to seek leave under section 11-721(c) to appeal from any other interlocutory ruling which, in the words of the statute, “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion .... ” The two appeals can *978 then be consolidated, and the “controlling question of law” can be resolved expeditiously by this court before trial.
.
See Dorati v. Dorati,
.
Washington v. May Department Stores, supra,
