Juana Lorena Arvizu and her son were injured when her car was struck by a pickup truck driven by Edward Cantu. Montgomery County Auto Auction employed Cantu. Puckett Auto Sales owned the truck. Cantu’s negligence was stipulated. A jury found that, although MCAA was his employer, Cantu drove the vehicle for Puckett’s benefit. The jury found that MCAA, as Cantu’s employer, had the right to direct the details of his work. It also found that Cantu was subject to Puckett’s control “as to the dеtails of the mission” when the accident occurred. The trial court rendered judgment for Arvizu. The court of appeals remanded for a new trial, holding that a jury could not logically find MCAA and Puckett to have simultaneously controlled Cantu’s conduct, as the trial court had instructed the jury that Cantu could not have been an employee of both. But the jury also found that MCAA was subject to Puckett’s control and was on a mission for Puсkett’s benefit — which comprise the elements of a principal — agent relationship. MCAA is vicariously liable for its employee’s negligence; Puckett as principal is responsible for its agent’s conduct. Because we are able to reconcile the jury’s answers on that agency theory, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment.
Puckett Auto Sales buys used cars and sells them at public auctiоns. Puckett had a longstanding commercial relationship with Montgomery County Auto Auction in which MCAA would not only auction Puckett’s vehicles, but would also transport unsold vehicles to other auction houses or back to Puckett’s car lot. When Puckett’s pickup truck did not sell, Puckett instructed MCAA to deliver it to another auction house. MCAA assigned its employee Edward Cantu to accomplish that directive, and the accident with Arvizu оccurred in transit.
Arvizu sued Cantu, MCAA, and Puckett
Puckett’s sole argument on appeаl was that the jury findings fatally conflicted, and the court of appeals agreed.
When taking the finding in Question 1 as true and disregarding the finding in Question 2, the court concluded that MCAA would be vicariously liable because it had the right to control Cantu’s work. Id. at 316-17. But when taking Question 2’s finding as true and disregarding Question l’s, Puckett would be vicariously liable because it had the right to control Cantu’s work. Id. The court said both cannot be true at the same time, and therefore held that the answers fatally conflicted. Id. The court reversed and remanded the trial court’s judgment as to Puckett. Id. Arvi-zu, Cantu, and MCAA petitioned this Court for review, each contending that Puckett cannot escape liability for its role in the Arvizus’ injuries.
We think the court of appeals’ analysis, so far as it goes, is correct. The threshold question in reviewing jury findings for fatal conflict is “whether the findings are about the same material fact.” Bender v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 600 S.W.2d
To determine whether a conflict is fatal,
the court must consider each of the answers claimed to be in conflict, disregarding the alleged сonflicting answer but taking into consideration all of the rest of the verdict, and if, so considered, one of the answers would require a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and the other would require a judgment in favor of the dеfendant, then the answers are fatally in conflict.
Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Dunn,
We need not question whether the “control” findings are inconsistent if the verdict nevertheless supports the trial court’s judgment. Findings can be “inconsistent or in conflict, or even in irreconcilable conflict,” and still nоt be fatal to the entry of judgment. Bay Petroleum Corp.,
Puckett cannot show that one of the findings necessarily requires a judgment different from the trial court’s. Applying the Little Rock test, when the finding in Question 1 is disregarded, judgment would be rendered against Puckett because Question 2’s finding establishes non-employee mission liability against it. The result does not change when Question 2’s finding is disregarded. Although the court of appeals correctly noted that Question 1 establishes vicаrious liability against MCAA,
Question 3 establishes a principal-agent relationship between Puckett and MCAA. The jury found that MCAA, a nonemploy-ee, was on a mission for the benefit of Puckett and subject to Puckett’s control. See Wolff,
MGAA workеd for Puckett; Puckett controlled the details of the mission; and the accident occurred during this transaction. Combined with the finding in Question 1 that Cantu was MCAA’s employee, there existed a subagency relationship between Cantu and Puckett for which Puckett is vicariously liable. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § B.15 (2006) (“A sub-agent is a person appointed by an agent to perform functions that the agent has consented to perform on bеhalf of the agent’s principal and for whose conduct the appointing agent is responsible to the principal.”); id. § 3.15 cmt. d (“As to third parties, an action taken by a subagent carries the legal consequences for the principal that would follow were the action instead taken by the appointing agent.”); see also Royal Mortg. Corp. v. Montague,
Because Puckett cannot show that one of the purportedly conflicting findings necessarily requires the entry оf a judgment different from that which the trial court rendered, the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s judgment. Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, we grant the petitions for review, reverse the сourt of appeals’ judgment, and reinstate the trial court’s judgment. Tex. R.App. P. 59.1, 60.2(c).
Notes
. Specifically, Arvizu sued George Puckett d/b/a Puckett Auto Sales. George Puckett passed away after the lawsuit was filed, and his wifе, Linda, is defending the suit as the estate’s representative.
. Puckett agreed to the stipulation only as to form but does not dispute Cantu’s negligence on appeal.
.The questions submitted to the jury were as follows:
Question No. 1: "On the occasion in question, was Edward Cantu acting as an employee of Montgomery County Auto Auction or George Puckett d/b/a Puckett Auto Sales?”
Question No. 2: "On the occasion in question, was Edward Cantu transporting the vehicle in the furtherаnce of a mission for the benefit of George Pucket[t] D/B/A Puckett Auto Sales and subject to control by George Pucket[t] D/B/A Puckett Auto Sales as to the details of the mission?”
Question No. 3: “On the occasion in questiоn, was Montgomery County Auto Auction transporting the vehicle in the furtherance of a mission for the benefit of George Puck-et[t] D/B/A Puckett Auto Sales and subject to control by George Pucket[t] D/B/A Puckett Auto Sales as to the details of the mission?”
Questions 2 and 3 track the Texas Pattern Jury Charge's language for nonemployee mission liability. See Comm. On Pattern Jury Charges, State Bar of Tex., Texas Pattern Jury Charges: General Negligence & Intentiоnal Personal Torts PJC 10.10 (2010 ed.). Nonem-ployee mission liability is a form of "respon-deat superior liability outside the employment context.” St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff,94 S.W.3d 513 , 537 (Tex.2002); see also Comm. On Pattern Jury Charges, at PJC 10.10 cmt. (“PJC 10.10 should be given if the respondeat superior doctrine is raised in a case not involving an ordinary employee.”). "The key elements of such a theory are (1) benefit to the defendant and (2) right of control.” Wolff,94 S.W.3d at 537 .
.The trial court also ordered that MCAA recovеr all damages exceeding 50% of the amount of the judgment from Puckett and that Puckett recover nothing from MCAA for its cross-claim for property damage.
. In Bradford v. Arhelger,