38 N.Y.S. 42 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1896
(dissenting). I am unable to concur with a majority of the court in reversing this judgment and order, and directing a new trial in the case. The plaintiff’s employment with the defendant as a brakeman commenced after dark on the evening of March 28, 1892. While he had been a brakeman upon other railroads, and had experience in their service, he had no knowledge at the time of the accident to him of the -condition of the track upon which he was called to work, or the place where he was at work; and, in performing the service of attempting to couple the cars at the place of his injury, he was obeying the direction of the defendant’s yard master, who had set him at work. There was evidence sufficient to go to the jury in the plaintiff’s behalf that, at the place of the injury, there was a hole in the track, between two ties, about'eight inches deep and ten inches long, that evidently had been left there by men at work upon the track in ballasting it. There was evidence, also sufficient to go to the jury, that no work had been done by defendant’s trackmen at that point for a considerable period of time prior to the accident; so that, if the doctrine of notice were applicable at all to this case, the jury might infer it, as stated by the