126 F.2d 134 | 3rd Cir. | 1942
The law suit between these parties has previously been before this court and the decision is reported in 3 Cir., 1940, 116 F.2d 57, where the relevant facts are set out. At the time the case was here before
The case then went back for trial upon the facts. The theory of the defense was that the assignment made by Bauman, as assignor, to Lehigh, defendant here, as assignee, was not absolute but was for collateral security only, to Lehigh to insure performance by Bauman of the latter’s contract with it. This was found as a fact by the trial court. It was further found as a fact that the defendant completed all the work required under its contract with Bauman prior to February 2, 1933 on which date the affairs of the two companies concerning this contract were concluded; further, that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the assignment until October, 1934. Judgment was given for the defendant at the conclusion of the trial' below. Plaintiff again appeals.
With regard to the showing that the assignment was intended by the assignor and the assignee to be collateral security only and not absolute, the plaintiff makes two points. The first is that the evidence does not support the learned trial judge’s conclusion upon the facts. This point requires no discussion. Rule 52(a), of the Rules of Civil Procedure 28 U.S. C.A. following section 723c, provides: “ * * * Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous * * The trial judge had before him both the direct testimony of intention concerning the assignment and the circumstantial evidence of how they regarded it shown in the subsequent conduct of the parties concerned. There is adequate support for the fact conclusion arrived at by the trial judge.
The plaintiffs second point is one of law. He contends that the receipt of evidence showing that the assignment, absolute in form, was for collateral security only violates the parol evidence rule and is, therefore, incompetent. The broad question of when parol testimony may be received to vary the terms of a writing is not before us. The sole question here is whether, in conformity with the Pennsylvania decisions, evidence may be received to show that an assignment, unqualified in terms, was made for collateral security only.
While there is some confusion on the subject the view, generally held is that such evidence is admissible. Thus Willis-ton says: “Frequently an assignment in terms absolute is intended to operate merely as security for a debt, and this may be shown by parol.”
Phrased in different words, but entirely consistent with the analysis given by Wigmore, is the test enunciated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Bryant v. Bryant, 1929, 295 Pa. 146, 153, 144 A. 904, 907: “The test, to determine whether an alleged parol agreement, by which it is proposed to modify the expressed understanding, comes within the field embraced by the writing, is to compare the two and determine whether parties, situated as were the ones to the contract, would naturally and normally include the one in the other, if it were made.”
Directly in point is the Pennsylvania case of Fryer v. Rishel, 1878, 1 Walk. 470, holding that it may be shown by parol evidence that an instrument absolute on its face was intended merely as security for payment of a debt. Relevant, also are Kerr v. McClure, 1920, 266 Pa. 103, 109 A. 600 and Howell v. Wheelock, 1934, 115 Pa.Super. 599, 176 A. 252, the latter decision analyzing and discussing the
We conclude that the rule in Pennsylvania does not preclude in this case the showing of what was found to be the fact, that the assignment by Bauman to Lehigh was for collateral security only. This being so, it 'follows, as the learned court below held, that the plaintiff’s case against this defendant falls and judgment was correctly entered for the defendant.
The result is clinched by a consideration of the plaintiff’s claim from a somewhat different angle. At most the plaintiff here was a creditor beneficiary
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
2 Williston on Contracts, Rev.Ed., § 431.
See Restatement, Contracts § 133(b) for definition of creditor beneficiary.
“A discharge of the promisor by the promisee in a contract or a variation thereof by them is effective against a creditor beneficiary if,
“(a) the creditor beneficiary does not bring suit upon the promise or otherwise ‘materially change Ms position in reliance thereon before be knows of the discharge or variation, and
“(b) the promisee’s action is not a fraud on creditors.”