2 Conn. App. 239 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1984
This appeal1 arises from a dissolution of marriage action. At the time of the dissolution, the parties had been married for twenty-seven years and had four children, one of whom was a minor.2 The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with a stipulation of the parties which was orally stated in open court and recorded in the presence of both parties and their respective counsel. Just prior to rendering judgment, the court asked each party whether each understood and agreed to the stipulation. Both answered in the affirmative and the court then stated that the settlement agreement was fair and appropriate. *241
The settlement agreement was reached after almost two days of trial and included a provision relating to the disposition of a $105,000 life insurance policy on the defendant's life. It is that provision which contains the core issue of this appeal. The terms of the judgment which relate to the disposition of the life insurance policy parrot the agreement and provide as follows: "The husband has life insurance in the amount of $105,000 and will continue to maintain that life insurance policy in full force and effect with his wife, the plaintiff, as irrevocable beneficiary for the sum of $75,000 until Laura reaches the age of eighteen years. Thereafter he will continue to maintain said life insurance in effect with the plaintiff as irrevocable beneficiary of $35,000 worth of life insurance and the children as irrevocable beneficiary [sic] of the rest of that policy. If the husband has a change of employment and cannot carry this life insurance policy, he shall notify the wife in advance so that appropriate steps may be taken concerning modification."3
Less than a month after the judgment was rendered, the defendant filed a motion to clarify "the transcript and Orders of the Court," claiming, in pertinent part, that the words "the rest of that policy" referred to the balance of $75,000, and not to the balance of the entire policy of $105,000. The motion stated that it was the husband's intention to provide $35,000 of life insurance for the wife and $40,000 for all of the children after the minor child attained eighteen years of age. The trial court agreed with the defendant's interpretation as to the meaning of the words "the rest of that policy" and found that the original order of the court entitled the *242 wife to $35,000 of the policy and the minor child to $40,000 once she had attained eighteen years of age.4
On appeal, the defendant raises for the first time the issue of whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction to render orders relating to support, education, care or maintenance of children over the age of eighteen years.5 A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and cannot be waived by either party. Vogel v. Vogel,
Since the defendant is not precluded from belatedly asserting a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the first issue to be decided is whether the trial court had such jurisdiction to render a judgment pursuant to an oral stipulation of the parties which included an order requiring *243 the husband to maintain life insurance with his children over eighteen years of age named as irrevocable beneficiaries.6
It is the defendant's contention that General Statutes
It is now axiomatic that support for a minor child extends to age eighteen years only, and that, absent a written agreement, a court has no jurisdiction to render orders requiring the supporting spouse to name adult children as the irrevocable beneficiaries of life insurance policies. Gallo v. Gallo,
Litigation about whether subject matter jurisdiction exists should take into account whether the litigation *244
is a collateral or direct attack on the judgment, whether the parties consented to the jurisdiction originally, the age of the original judgment, whether the parties had an opportunity originally to contest jurisdiction, the prevention of a miscarriage of justice, whether the subject matter is so far beyond the jurisdiction of the court as to constitute an abuse of authority, and the desirability of the finality of judgments. Connecticut Pharmaceutical Assn., Inc. v. Milano,
Oral stipulations recorded in open court are just as binding, obligatory and conclusive as if in writing and executed with every legal formality if the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Bryan v. Reynolds,
Two recent Connecticut cases have obliquely involved the issue of this case but did not resolve it. In Venuti v. Venuti,
The legislature has provided that agreements for the support of adult children may be incorporated by reference into the dissolution decree or may be the subject of orders of the court if the agreements are in writing. Had the legislature intended that the parties could orally agree in court that such support be the subject of a court order, the legislature could have so provided. The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and we cannot by our construction substitute other words for the words "in writing." Brunswick Corporation v. Liquor Control Commission,
Since, absent an agreement in writing, the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to render orders for the support of children over eighteen years of age and since the plaintiff wife may not have agreed to the other provisions of the agreement without the provision relating to life insurance benefits for her adult children, the matter as to alimony and the disposition of property must be retried.
There is error, the judgment is set aside and a new trial is ordered limited to a determination of alimony and the disposition of the property of the parties.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.