3 La. Ann. 105 | La. | 1848
Lead Opinion
The judgment of the court was pronounced by
The plaintiff, in September, 1844, sold to the defendants two bills of exchange, amounting to ¿62,327 15 6 sterling, and with them were delivered bills of lading for six hundred and ninety-seven bales of cotton shipped on board the Coromando. The plaintiff and defendants were merchants in New Orleans; the bills were sold here, and were drawn on Henry H. Hoskins of Liverpool, to whom the cotton was consigned. It is alleged that the bills
By the retention and disposition made of the cotton in Liverpool, the plaintiff charges that he suffered a direct loss of $6,000, and that by reasons of the failure of the defendants to comply with their agreement aforesaid, and of the dishonoring of the bill aforesaid, his reputation as a merchant was greatly affected, and his commercial transactions, which were important and extensive, were embarrassed, that the dishonor of said bills becoming generally known in New Orleans, New York and Boston, to persons engaged in the bill business, with whom he had theretofore dealt, he could no longer with facility negotiate his bills in the ordinary course of his business as he could before, and that the loss and damage so sustained by him in his commercial reputation and business amounts at leant to $1.0,000, which he sues for* The petition concludes with a prayer for judgment for $16,000, and costs.
The agreement about the bills of lading is expressly put in issue by the defendants’ answer; it is charged that it was agreed that the cotton was to be their security until the Mils were paid. Other matters of defence are specially set forth, but as they come under the general issue it is not material to notice them particularly. This case was submitted to a special jury of merchants, who found a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $4,§43 91, on which judgment was rendered, and the defendants have appealed.
We are disposed to give great weight to the verdict of a special jury of merchants in a case of this kind ; but, in estimating the damages on so broad a surface of facts as the pleadings in this case present it is not at all surprising that, without any direction from the court as to the rules of law on that subject to which the evidence can be applied, the jury should have fallen into error. We giye full faith and credit to this verdict as settling all doubtful questions of fact, and all points of conflicting testimony, and we consider it as established : That the agreement was made as stated in the petition : That it was broken by persons for whose conduct the defendants are responsible: That the bills of exchange were protested without any reasonable cause, and that the defendants are liable to plaintiff for damages for those acts. The only question is, as to the amount- And in reviewing the verdict on this point, we do not conceive that we are interfering with any question of fact, but applying the law to the facts as they are in evidence. The jury has no more right to assess damages arbitrarily and without eyidence in a ease of this kind, than we have to sanction such a verdict.
The cotton was sold by the defendants’ agents from the 13th to the 16th December. The advance of price between that time was very gradual until the
We think, under the finding of the jury, that the defendants had no right to retain the bills of lading, and thus to divert the consignment from its destination. They had consequently no right to sell the cotton, and still less the whole quantity of cotton contained in the bills of lading, for which there appears to be no apology. We are disposed to allow the plaintiff the extent of indemnity which his case warrants and the breach of the contract authorises ; but in so doing we are not disposed to award him any thing which a deliberate view of the law will not sanction, notwithstanding the verdict in his ffiyor. We think the defendants have no claim for the commissions on the cotton, which they had no right to dispose of, and that they owe interest on the balance of the proceeds of the cotton remaining in their hands, over and above the amount of the bills. New Orleans Draining Co. v. De Lizardi, 2 Annual R. 283. 6 Toullier, 268.
But it is said the jury had before them other elements besides the value of the cotton, on which they had a right to base their verdict — the injury done to the plaintiff’s credit resulting from the defendants’ acts. We have considered this subject with.great care ; but under the allegations of the petition and the evidence on this branch of the case, we are satisfied that the jury would not be authorised in assessing damages against the defendants for the injury alleged to have been done to the credit of the plaintiff. In the assessment of damages in mses of contracts, even where there is fraud, the damages for which the debtor s liable are those which are the immediate and direct consequence of the breach >f the contract; and, in cases of quasi-contracts, offences and quasi-offences nuch discretion is left to the judge or the jury; but in these cases that discre;ion ought to be directed by proper pleadings, and supported by sufficient evilence.
There can be no better rule than that which experience has imposed upon :ourts in other countries, as a necessary protection against the abuse and error o which an undue latitude in the assessment of damages exposes judges as veil as jurors. When the law does not necessarily imply that the plaintiff has uslaingd damage by the acts complained of, the resulting damage should be al
A proper administration of justice requires that the rules established by law for the assessment of damages should be adhered to; for the article of the Civil Code which gives a discretionary power to judges and juries in certain cases, expressly declares that, in. other cases, they have none, but are bound to give a full indemnity to the creditor whenever the contract has been broken by the fault, negligence, fraud, or bad faith of the debtor, according to the rules provided therein.
Under the charge in the petition of the injury done to the plaintiff's credit by the acts complained of, we consider that there is no sufficient evidence to support the verdict. Under the other charge of loss of profits and damages for the breach of the contract, we have felt ourselves limited to such as were the immediate and direct consequence of the .breach. We cannot admit that a discretionary power of awarding damages in actions of trover vested in juries by the law of England, admitting it to be .as insisted on by .the counsel for the plaintiff, would be the standard by which the responsibility of the defendants ought to be tested in this action.
It is therefore .ordered that, there be judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the defendants, for the sum of §1762 45, and interest at the rate of five per cent, from the 28th March, 1845, until paid, and costs in the court .below; the .costs of this appeal to be paid by the plaintiff and appellee.
Slidell, J. did not sit in this caso, having been of counsel.
Rehearing
Same Case — On a Ne-heaeing.
ON a re-hearing allowed to the plaintiff in this case, the opinion of the court was delivered by
We have considered with great care the argument submitted to us on the re-hearing in this case, without being able to change the conclusions first adopted. If, as alleged, the rule of damages for the breach of the contract by the defendants is to be that applicable to actions of trover, so far as the conversion of the cotton is concerned, we take that rule to have been correctly stated in the opinion of the court. We deduced it from the english.and.american cases within our reach, and we find it stated in nearly the same words by Ilir. Sedgwick, in his late valuable work on the Measure of Damages; “Unless the plaintiff has been deprived of some particular use of his property, of which the other party was apprised, and which he may be said to have thus directly prevented, the rights of the parties are fixed at the time of the illegal act, be it refusal to deliver, or actual conversion, and the damages should be estimated as at that time.” Sedgwick, p. 505. This is in fact the fundamental principle applicable to all breaches of contract that, as a general rule, the market value at the time of the breach is the rule of damages.
Admitting further that, as the arbitrary distinctions of the .common law in the form of actions do not obtain with .us, and the plaintiff is permitted to state his complaint according to the actual facts, he might claim exemplary damages for a fraudulent or malicious breach of contract as well as for any other willful wrong,
The plaintiff alleges that, by reason of the failure of the defendants to comply with their agreement, and by reason of the dishonoring of his bills, his reputation as a merchant has been greatly affected, and his commercial transactions, which were of an important and extensive character, have been greatly embarrassed; that the dishonor of his bills becoming generally known in New Orleans, in New York, and in Boston, to persons engaged in the bill business; with whom he had theretofore dealt, he could no longer as before negotiate his bills with facility in the ordinary course of his commercial dealing. But he has failed to establish the truth of those facts. On the contrary, Mr. Robb, an extensive banker of this place, testifies that, generally speaking, the protest of bills under the circumstances of this case would not affect the credit of the drawer; that he never heard of this protest, and has had since extensive dealings with the plaintiff. He cannot say what difficulties the plaintiff may have had with other persons, but he had none with the witness. Other witnesses testify that a protest when satisfactorily explained, does not effect the standing of the drawer, and the loss of credit of the plaintiff is not shown affirmatively.
Although english tribunals may at times infer certain established facts to be the natural consequence of other facts also established, it would be difficult to I find authorities to show that they have in any case inferred the existence of the facts themselves. Had the loss of credit been shown, the important question would still have remained, whether it was the natural and proximate consequence of the protest of the bills. According to the testimony of Mr. Robb, and other witnesses, it would not have been; and we incline to that opinion. At the time he sold his bills to the defendants, his credit was not the best, or he would not have consented to the transfer of the bills of lading; and many other causes, besides an accidental protest, might have affected his commercial standing, such as it was. In the case of Vickars v. Wilcocks, 8 East 1, the defendant had asserted that the plaintiff had cut his master’s cordage, and the plaintiff alleged that his master, believing the assertion, had thereupon dismissed him from his service. It was held that the discharge was not a ground of action, since it was not the natural consequences of the words spoken. Neither was the loss of credit, alleged in this case, the natural consequence of an accidental protest. How far we might deem ourselves authorised to follow the rules established by the english courts in questions of costs and of damages arising under contracts to be in part executed in England, it is unnecessary to say. Our own law provides that when the inexecution of the contract has proceeded from fraud or bad faith,
