1. The order is not final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 1 Nor is it the kind of interlocutory order made appealable by 28 U.S.C. § 1292, for it does not determine the rights and liabilities of the parties. 2 3
2. But, in appropriate circumstances, we may treat an appeal as a petition for a mandamus writ. 3 Yet if no more than an “abuse” of discretion is involved, and the order directs a transfer, 4 we have held that we will not entertain such a petition, for it must be addressed to the court of appeals for the circuit which includes the transferee district. 5
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If, however, the district court lacked all power to order a transfer, so that its order is a nullity, we will issue a writ of mandamus.
6
But we think that here ■ there was no such lack of power. 28 U.S. C. § 1404(a) relates to “any civil action”; see Ex parte Collett,
Appeal dismissed. Treating it as a petition for a writ of mandamus, the petition is dismissed.
Notes
. Magnetic Engineering & Manufacturing Co. v. Dings Manufacturing Co., 2 Cir.,
. See, e. g., Schoenamsgruber v. Hamburg-American Line,
. Magnetic Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 2 Cir.,
. If a district judge refuses to order a transfer, and, in doing so, “abuses” his discretion, we will issue a writ. Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 2 Cir.,
. Magnetic Engineering & Mfg. Co. v, Dings Mfg. Co., supra. In that case,
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the writer of the present opinion dissented; he still believes that decision wrong — see Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Davis, 5 Cir.,
. Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 2 Cir.,
. It is perhaps arguable that § 1404(a) does not apply to an in rem proceeding because it could not have been brought in the transferee district. But we need not and do not pass on that question.
