Fоllowing a bench trial on partially stipulated evidence, Orienthal James Arnold was convicted of possession of a controlled substаnce, possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, speeding, and felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer. He appeals the denial of his motion to suppress and his conviction.
Arnold’s motion to suppress was first heard in a probation revocation proceeding arising out of an earlier offense. The transcript of that proceeding was stipulated into evidencе in this case so that Arnold’s motion to suppress could be considered for the purposes of the trial. The arresting officer also testifiеd.
This testimony shows that on the evening of October 21, 2010, Officer Josh Wages of the Walton County sheriff’s office was traveling in his patrol car monitoring traffic for speeding on a section of Highway 138 in Walton County. Wages saw a grey Chevrolet driving at a high rate of speed in a 55 mile per hour zone. His radar indicated that the car was traveling at 72 miles per hour, so he initiated a traffic stop. Wages asked for and got Arnold’s license and bеgan talking to him when he observed a brown purse in the front passenger seat. Wages asked for consent to look inside the purse, which Arnold gave, and Arnold passed it to Wages. Inside, there were electrical fuses but no personal items. Wages returned to his patrol car, filled out a traffic citation, and performed a computer check of the license, which revealed that it was valid.
Wages returned to Arnold’s car to issue the citation, but just prior to doing so, he shined his light inside the car and saw, from outside the car, one or two full-length cigar wrappers and one partially smoked and flattened cigar wrapper in a cup holder on the floor in the center
Wages then asked Arnold to step out of the car, which he did, and he asked for consent to search Arnold’s person and his pockets, which Arnold gave. Wages then told Arnold оf his suspicion about the marijuana, and he reached in the car, picked up the blunt, and smelled it, which led him to believe that it was, in fact, marijuana. At this point, Arnold said that it was his girlfriend’s car (which the State conceded) and that she smokes marijuana, so it was hers. Wages told Arnold that he now had probable cause to search the car, which he proceeded to do. The search revealed marijuana and crack cocaine. After completing the search, Wages attempted to place Arnold under arrest, but Arnold pushed Wages away and ran off. Wages fell to the ground and, as a result, sustained abrasions on his hand and knee. Wages then pursued Arnold but fell, further injuring himself. Wages was never able to give Arnold the ticket or return his license.
The trial judge found that the officer saw contraband in plain view and upon further investigation confirmed it to be contraband, which gave him grounds to search the car.
1. A trial judge’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress should not be disturbed if there is any еvidence to support them; determinations of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous; and the evidenсe must be construed in favor of the trial court’s findings and judgment. Tate v. State,
The officer obviously had authority to stop Arnold for speeding. And there was evidence to support the trial court’s finding that there was contraband in plain view. Wages saw, based on his experience, what he believed to bе a marijuana blunt. Whether Wages was authorized to enter the car to seize the item is controlled by Glenn v. State,
merely requires that the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief thаt certain items maybe contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false. A practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. [Cit.]
Glenn,
Here, as in Glenn, the suspectеd contraband was in plain view from outside the vehicle. “Therefore, based on the officer’s experience and the object’s similarity to other marijuana [smoking devices] seen by the officer, its incriminating nature was immediately apparent to the officer. [Cit.]” Id. at 875. See аlso Sapp v. State,
Finally, because Wages saw the item before he had returned the license or issued the ticket, he was not exceeding the scope of the initial traffic stop by seizing the obj ect. An officer who stops a motorist for a routine traffic violation “is absolutely permitted to expand the detention into unrelated offenses. The officer may question the motorist about anything and may ask for consent to search, as long as the questioning does not unreasonably prolong the detention.” Hayes v. State,
2. Arnold also contends the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction of felony obstruction of an officer because, he contends, there was no evidence that he offered to do or did violence to the officer
Judgment affirmed.