Via indictment, appellant, Darchelle Renee Arnold, was charged with two counts of malice murder, four counts of felony murder, three counts of armed robbery, and six counts of aggravated assault, in connection with the shooting deaths of two victims and the wounding of another. Pursuant to a negotiated plea, appellant pled guilty to two counts of felony murder and one count of aggravated assault. She was sentenced to two concurrent terms of life for each felony murder count and twenty years on probation, to be served consecutively, for aggravated assault. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea, claiming: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) she did not enter a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea; Following a hearing, the motion was denied, and this appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm.
1. Appellant contends defense counsel was ineffective because defense counsel erroneously informed her she would be eligible for parole within the first 30 years of her imprisonment if she accepted the plea offer. She also asserts defense counsel mistakenly told her she could withdraw her guilty plea any time after sentencing. Summing up, appellant claims that, but for the erroneous advice of defense counsel, she would not have entered a guilty plea.
In Hill v. Lockhart,
held that a defendant who pleads guilty and who seeks to overturn his conviction because of counsel’s errors must meet the now familiar two-part test of Strickland v. Washington[,466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)] — deficient performance and prejudice. The analysis of counsel’s performance is similar whether in the context of a trial or a guilty plea. The prejudice component in the context of a guilty plea, however, is met by showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) State v. Heath,
In reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “ ‘an appellate court gives deference to the lower court’s factual findings, which are upheld unless clearly erroneous; the lower court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. [Cit.]’ ” Moore v. State,
2. Appellant asserts her guilty plea was involuntary because the lower court failed to inform her on the record of the mandatory minimum sentence for the charge of felony murder in compliance with Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.8. We disagree.
In determining whether a guilty plea was voluntary and knowing, an appellant need not be specifically advised of each and every right set forth in Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.8. Britt v. Smith,
The test for manifest injustice
will by necessity vary from case to case, but it has been said that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice if, for instance, a defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel, or the guilty plea was entered involuntarily or without an understanding of the nature of the charges.
State v. Evans,
Judgment affirmed.