Dеfendant was charged by accusation with pandering by soliciting a fourteen-year-old female to perform an act of prostitution. He was tried, convicted and sentenced to serve 12 months. Defendant’s motion for new trial was filed, heard and denied, and he appeals. Held:
1. One of the principal witnesses against the defendant was the victim’s mother, who testified she was called by a friend of her daughter and notified that the defendant “had been over to the house and tried to rape” the victim. The mother, a security guard, requested permission to leave work and went immediately to her home, at which time her daughter told her that the defendant had offered her money to have sex and had attempted to rapе her when she refused. As one of the first people on the scene after the alleged incident occurred she testified, under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, as to everything her daughter told her about the incidеnt. On cross-examination the mother denied ever having used the name “Rita Dukes,” or any other false name and denied that she had ever entered a plea under any name in Fulton County State Court on a shoplifting charge.
To rebut her testimony (as well as to impeach), a defense witness was called and testified that she was a co-defendant with the victim’s mother in the State Court of Fulton County and was present when the mother entered a plea of nolo contendere to thе offense of shoplifting under a false name, Rita Dukes.
The jury was recessed and both the victim’s mother and this defense witness were instructed by the court as to the pertinent law concerning perjury. The victim’s mother was advised of her right *11 against self-incrimination. The defense then attempted to introduce a certified copy of an arrest record with an attached photograph showing that Rita Dukes was the same person as the victim’s mother and that she lied when she said she had never used the name Rita Dukes. However, the court excluded this document from evidence on the state’s motion that it was not a certified record of any conviction.
At the motion for new trial hearing the defendant produced documentаry evidence of the mother’s application of a security guard and license to carry a weapon, including photographs and fingerprint charts. A witness, qualified as an expert on fingerprint identification, produced the original аrrest record defendant had attempted to introduce at trial, including a certified copy of the plea of nolo contendere for the offense of shoplifting entered by Rita Dukes and her photograph and fingerprints. He identified the two as being the same. The mother was then called to the stand by the defense and the special prosecutor who had assisted in the criminal case informed the court that he had been employed to represent her against a charge of perjury and he had advised her to exercise her right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment. The mother then refused to answer any questions “on the grounds it might incriminate me,” all of which were propounded to her as “Ms. Dukes.”
Three of the dеfendant’s enumeration of errors are concerned with the above. We proceed to the consideration of same.
(a) The exclusion of the mere charge of a crime by the trial court during the trial was not error in that samе is incompetent proof of an offense involving moral turpitude. A witness may be impeached, when the witness allegedly has been involved in a crime, by introduction of his criminal convictions involving moral turpitude, but the mere charge of a crime alone is not competent evidence to discredit him. See
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Saul,
(b) Defendant contends that under the recent decision of this court in
Kitchens v. State,
(c) The remaining enumeration of error concerning the above is that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a new trial after the
*12
alleged proof of perjury committed during the trial and contending that the actions by the special рrosecutor (we assume the taking of the Fifth Amendment during the motion for new trial by the witness) deprived the defendant of his right to due process of law. First of all there has been no finding that any perjury was committed, no conviction for perjury and the evidence with reference to perjury did not involve any material statement by the witness as to issues of fact concerning the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Code § 110-706 (repealed for certain purposes by the Civil Practice Act of 1966) states that it shall not be lawful for a trial court to set aside any verdict or judgment by reason of a charge of perjury unless “duly convicted, and unless it shall appear to the said court that the said verdict, judgment... could not have been obtained and entered up without the evidence of such perjured person.” We decline to reverse on this ground. See
Self v. State,
2. The state filed a motion in limine for an order instructing defense counsel to refrain “from making any direct or indirect reference whatsoever in person, by counsel or through witnesses, to any other сriminal charges not involved in this case or any probation record of the minor [victim] in compliance with Section 24A-3502 of the Code of Georgia, which prohibits the disclosing of any juvenile proceedings to the public.” Based on Davis v. Alaska,
The defendant complains that he was therefore improperly limited in cross-examination of the victim and her “partner,” the other minor, upon the trial. However, the transcript of the pretrial hearing discloses that defense counsel agreed to question the victim only to establish that she hаd been adjudicated a delinquent and was on probation, stating that he was “not interested in going on a fishing, smearing expedition.” No objection was made when the court ruled that it would admit the certified records of the juvenile court proсeedings only if the victim denied it, and prohibit questioning as to further details in order to protect the juvenile. Under these
*13
circumstances the refusal of the trial court to permit unabridged cross-examination of the victim or of the partner as to what she and her “partner” had done to be adjudicated delinquent was not an abuse of discretion. See
Goodrum v. State,
3. The state asked questions on direct examination as to why the victim was afraid of defendant and whether he had made previous sеxual advances. Defendant contends this improperly placed his character in issue in violation of a motion in limine granted prior to trial, and alleges error in the trial court’s failure to grant a mistrial therefor. However, the transcript reveals that one objection was sustained when the witness started to answer, and on the other occasion the trial court stated in the presence of the jury, “I’m going to tell the jury to disregard the question; disregard the answer, and I overrule thе motion for a mistrial.” No further objections were made. “ ‘ [W]here the trial judge gives corrective instructions and thereafter counsel fails to request further instruction or renew his motion for mistrial, an enumeration addressed to such ground is without merit.’ [Cits.]”
Grayson v. State,
4. During cross-examination of the victim, defense counsel asked her if she were “aware that a $3.5 million damage suit had been filed against your father as a result of an incident relating to these facts.” Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in sustaining thе state’s objection on the grounds of irrelevancy and refusing to permit cross-examination to attempt to establish that her interest in the results of the civil suit was motivation for giving false testimony. We agree. Code § 38-1712 provides that “[t]he state of the witness’ feelings to the parties, and his relationship, may always be proved for the consideration of the jury.” As a general rule, and particularly when the evidence is conflicting, a party may show any fact or circumstance that might affеct the credit of an opposing witness.
Quinn v. State,
5. After the guilty verdict was returned against the defendant for the offense of pandering and before the trial court imposed sentence, the court advised the defendant that he had been found guilty of a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature and that he *14 could be punished by a fine not to exceed $5,000 or by confinement for a term not to exceed 12 months or “either a fine or confinement or both.” See Code Ann § 27-2506.1 (Ga. L. 1970, pp. 236,241). The trial court also called attention that he had an individual record card from the City of Newnan showing certain charges made against the defendant. The court then sentenced the defendant to 12 months in the custody of the Department of Corrections.
The defendant nоw enumerates as error the consideration of “extraneous, incompetent evidence supplied by the prosecution without notice to the Defendant.” We note here that the record does not disclose that the individual record card was supplied by the prosecution, for when the state’s attorney was asked if there was anything to be said before sentence was imposed counsel replied that the court had heard the evidence and that’s all thаt could be added. Counsel for defendant seeks to argue that since Code Ann. § 27-2503 (Ga. L. 1974, pp. 352, 357) sets forth a requirement of notice of any evidence to be used against him in aggravation that the trial court erred in considering the individual record card. We note here that no objection was made when the court orally related items apparently included in the record card. One cannot “ignore what he thinks to be an injustice, take his chance on a favorable verdiсt, and complain later.”
Joyner v. State,
6. The remaining enumeration of error contends that a rational trier of fact could not have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonаble doubt. After careful review of the entire record and transcript it is our view that a rational trier of fact (the jury in the case sub judice) could have reasonably found from the particular evidence adduced at this trial proof of guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Drake v. State,
Judgment reversed.